




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
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FIFTY-SEVENTH YEAR.

JANUARY—~~JUNE~~. *See*

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ASSASSINATION AND THE SPOILS SYSTEM.

CIVILIZATION has its stages at which the taking of the life of a ruler is held a justifiable remedy in politics. Tyrannicide was defended in Greece. The bloody work of Brutus and Cassius was not generally condemned except by the adherents of Cæsar. A man might defend his country as he might his own life, by taking that of its enemy. The fearful experience of half the nations of Europe in our own time discloses great elements of population ready to justify the savage remedy of the assassin when passions are up or a sense of wrong maddens the people. Those we call lunatics are often little more than ill-balanced intellects, reasoning and deciding rather according to the standards of earlier times and a lower civilization than our own; yet with so much justice and logic that, while doubting their responsibility, we recognize their acts as ominous indications. In whatever walk of life insanity increases, we expect to find great wrongs or gross violations of morality.

The tenure of Amadeus and Louis Napoleon were never seen to be so precarious as in the light flashed from the deadly missiles of assassins. No proof of the dangerous forces restrained by Russian despotism has so convinced the world as the martyr spirit shown by the half-crazed assassins who have made light of their own lives in order to take that of the emperor. History and oratory can present no argument so convincing of the perils of national injustice, long continued, as is afforded by the murderous frenzy of Irishmen. When stormy and vindictive passions sweep with such fury through a nation that impetuous abnormal natures are driven over the lines of reason to deeds of violence and blood—as the weaker plates of a boiler are the first to yield to the pressure which bears alike upon all—we are wise in believing the political fabric can bear no more strain, and that

its relief is the condition of national safety. The lunatic assassin of rulers is therefore a solemn notice of peril to the state, as every nation readily sees in the case of its neighbor, and a wise nation is able to see in its own affairs.

Three times, at the national capital, within the recollection of men not yet old, a President of the United States has stood at the peril of death from the pistol of the half-crazed assassin, desperately resolved to take his life for political reasons alone.

The revenge and the wild rush for office which Jackson's introduction of the spoils system had aroused were pregnant enough of danger, when his attack upon the National Bank soon after—distorted into a national crime by reckless partisans—aggravated that excitement into a frenzy more intense and lawless than the country had ever seen before. Hate, imprecations, and bloody threats filled the air. It was too much for ill-balanced, excitable minds. On the 30th January, 1835, as President Jackson, with two of his secretaries, was passing from the rotunda to the eastern portion of the Capitol, Richard Lawrence levelled a pistol at his heart, of which only the cap exploded, and before he could use the pistol in his other hand the assassin's arm was seized. Fearful excitement and wild clamor swelled over the land.

There are curious analogies between the cases of Lawrence and Guiteau. Both assassins belonged to the army of spoils-seeking idlers who lounge about the national capital, claiming to be out of employment, and importuning the government for favors. Both bought pistols of large calibre expressly for the assassination. Both repeatedly practised at targets to make sure of a deadly aim. As Guiteau once, when ready, forbore to shoot lest Mrs. Garfield should be excited, so Lawrence once forbore to shoot lest a funeral might be disturbed. Each, after the deed, was equally composed and without regret or fear of punishment. Each alike claimed to be a patriot acting for the good of his country. Lawrence's hope of protection was in the National Bank and its supporters, as that of Guiteau was in the Stalwart faction and its chieftain. Lawrence declared his act would make Clay, Webster, or Calhoun President, as Guiteau declared his would make Arthur President.

How the savage spirit of slavery, having long held sectional

and partisan passions at a fever heat and familiarized the country with scenes of blood, at last so worked upon the intense and morbid nature of J. Wilkes Booth that, in April, 1865, he had come to regard himself as an avenging patriot, and President Lincoln as a bloody tyrant whose life was forfeited, is fresh in the memories of all. Booth was but a little more crazy and savage than tens of thousands whose spirit he carried into action and who openly or with ill-concealed joy approved his work of death. "It was no one man who killed Abraham Lincoln: it was the spirit of treason and slavery, inspired with despairing hate, that struck him down," said President Garfield, in the House of Representatives, the day after the assassination—applying a logic now strikingly applicable to his own case.

In the case of Guiteau, it needs neither logic nor the lessons of history to connect the bloody deed with its cause. It was not left to reformers or pessimists to discover it. The assassin himself has declared it. A whole people has recognized it. Every civilized nation has taken notice of it. A morbid, impulsive, unrestrained nature; an intense, unscrupulous partisan; a disappointed, impecunious, desperate office-seeker; one of the thousands of needy or scheming men and women whom a vicious administrative system first invites to the capital, and to the siege of every office where places go by influence and favor, and then makes them half mad by its cruel and inevitable procrastinations and repulses. Guiteau was just the man through whom the vindictive passions of a fierce faction fight should naturally find their full expression. He, and all those like him, could see that a single bullet might seat one of the leaders of the hostile faction in the Presidential chair and cause a new deal of offices, in which he and they might win prizes. This required no more reason than his target-firing in the early morning hours and his shrewd calculation of all the opportunities and the chances for the fatal deed. Never before in our history had the spirit of faction sprung from causes so ignoble or manifested passions so desperate, and revolutionary. Never before had a Vice-President left the side of his chief to become the subordinate of a Senator in a faction fight. Only once before, and then to prepare for deeds of blood, had Senators abandoned their posts of duty to feed the flames of angry pas-

sions in the States. The frenzy and the spectacle might well have made desperate far stronger minds than that of Guiteau. His reasons, as he gave them, are a strange mixture of logic and folly: "I had no ill-will toward the President. His death was a political necessity. . . . It will unite the Republican party. . . . I was with Grant and the rest of our men in New York during the canvass. . . . I am a Stalwart of the Stalwarts, and Arthur is now President. . . ."

It is not for a moment to be imagined that ex-Senator Conkling, or Vice-President Arthur, or any of the officials in the faction of which they were the leaders, had any more information of the purpose of Guiteau, than Vice-President Stephens or ex-Senator Slidell had of the bloody purpose of Booth. They abhor and lament the acts and spirit of the assassin, like all other good citizens. It is the best justification, alike of the champions of the slave system and of the champions of the spoils system, that they were so blinded and misled by the vicious principles and methods they had inherited, and had long helped to enforce, that they were but half conscious of their real nature and effects.

With marvellous promptness and unanimity, hardly less in foreign countries than among ourselves, the source and significance of Guiteau's acts have been found in our spoils system of administration. The apologists of that system are awed to silence and shame, while it stands arraigned, without precedent, in the denunciations and warnings of the men and women of all parties and conditions, not only throughout this broad land, but in the utterances of the thoughtful friends of our country in every civilized nation. From a thousand pulpits the great fact, with solemn admonitions, has been proclaimed. On the myriad pages of our journals, of every section and class, the truth has been daily uttered in words of mingled anxiety, shame, and detestation. From foreign journals alone might be gathered a whole volume of warning. Despite the restraints of official usage, the diplomatic representatives of at least two foreign states, we are assured, have not forbore to express their deprecation of that system, even in their kindly messages of sympathy. And in the months before us, we may be assured that Guiteau's assassination, the American spoils system, and the

prospects of republican institutions will fill broad spaces together in periodical literature of every European state. Neither friends nor enemies of these institutions will be allowed to remain ignorant that the assassination for political reasons has a place in the great republic as well as in the great monarchies.

It is not without reason that the assassin shot of Guiteau has produced a far more profound sense of peril than that of Lawrence or of Booth. For, when Lawrence fired, there was no appreciation of the savage system which Jackson had just established, and the National Bank was writhing in the agonies of death. When Lincoln was murdered, slavery had perished; the shot of Booth being the very last ever fired in its name. But the spoils system which made an assassin of Guiteau is a living force, potential in councils of great parties, believed by many to be an essential agency in our politics which only doctrinaires and enthusiasts would attempt to overthrow.

Poor, indeed, would be their prospect, if at such a time the American people had shown themselves incapable of a grand, stern resolve for reform; and lamentable, indeed, will it be if the loss of so mighty a power for good as that resolve shall be allowed to evaporate in amiable sympathy for the afflicted and in mere denunciation of the assassin and the spoilsmen.

It is, therefore, the great duty of the hour to make it effective for the overthrow of that malignant destructive system which has been growing continually during the forty-six years between the two assassinations which mark its establishment and its crisis.

Under such a government as ours, it is plain that there can be no discretion for mere patronage, no right to confer office as a favor or a bribe, no right to remove without good cause. The authority of appointment and removal alike should be exercised as a trust strictly in the interest of the public. To exercise that authority arbitrarily, or as a mere favor, to help a party or a friend, is, therefore, as gross a violation of duty and as plain a prostitution of public functions as it is to use the public money for the same purpose. The difference in detail is that between the head of a department embezzling the public funds himself or appointing a subordinate known to be likely to embezzle it—the difference between causing the people to

pay for needless servants to work for his partner, or to pay for the same needless servants to work for his party. The fact that so few people see the matter in this light but illustrates the blinding and demoralizing effects of our partisan methods and our neglect of administrative affairs.

Among the reasons for the careful separation of legislative from executive departments in the Constitution, none are more important than those: on the side of legislation, that members of Congress may have the independence and courage needed for dealing fearlessly and thoroughly with all abuses in the executive department, for holding every official to a strict account as the Constitution contemplates, and also the time and disinterestedness essential for considering and maturing sound measures of legislation touching a vast variety of interests on which the prosperity of a nation depends; and, on the side of the Executive, that he may have the independence and courage essential for the selection, discipline (and for removals, as the public interest may require) of that great number of officials through whom his high trust of seeing that the laws are faithfully executed is discharged, and also that every one of those officials may feel a direct and undivided responsibility to the Executive, without which all unity and rigor of administration are impossible. And it needs no proof from our sad experience to make it plain that nothing can be more fatal to such objects than a mingling and barter of the functions of these departments, sure to lead to appointments, enactments, and appropriations being pledged and made as conditions of each other, to confirmations by Senators being based on legislation promised for their States, to economy forbore lest the appointees of members of Congress should lose their places or their salaries, to incompetent appointments made to please legislators, to executive authority defied by subordinates under guarantee of protection by members of Congress.

In the Constitution itself there is a great departure from this principle of separation of functions, which, even without the aid of a spoils system, tends to such abuses, so far as the Senate is concerned. For, altho the duty of selecting officials is emphatically executive, and the President is to nominate, the Senate is to confirm many of the higher officials before the appointment is completed. It was the intention, and in general the

early practice, that the Senate should act as a body in the matter of confirmations, and only pass upon the personal qualifications of the nominee, without entering into questions of executive policy, or regarding the pleasure of the Senators for the State where the vacancy existed, as a test of confirmation. Nothing but a natural dread of executive power, which the tyranny of the British king had intensified, could have caused the bestowal of so great and anomalous an authority upon the Senate in language so unguarded.

The Constitution allows appointments to be vested, as the law shall provide, in the President alone, in the courts of law, and the heads of departments. Many subordinate appointments have been so vested. But the power of confirmations of all the leading officials—members of the Cabinet, diplomatic representatives, judges, territorial governors, consuls, collectors of customs, and of internal revenue, the first, second, and third classes of the four classes of postmasters, surveyors, naval officers, district attorneys, sub-treasurers, and a great variety of other officers, serving all over the Union (in all between three and four thousand), exclusive of the postmasters—are still subject to confirmation by the Senate. How this vast power has been prostituted, and has led on to the rebellious madness of Mr. Conkling we shall soon see.

The administrative principles and methods contemplated by such a government permit the existence and appropriate activity of great political parties, which are as desirable as they are inevitable under republican institutions.

All elective officers, whether State or federal, are chosen at elections, when, of course, the stronger party can prevail. This gives that party a controlling power, not only in Congress and in the legislatures, but with the President and the Governors. Being thus potential in both the departments, which must co-operate in legislation, its majorities are able to make and repeal all laws.

In the discharge of his great functions, the President is aided by the heads of the executive departments, whose opinions the Constitution authorizes him to require from time to time as he shall see fit. Directly by his own act, and indirectly, as the laws may provide, through the heads of departments, who together

make his Cabinet—a body, however, which neither the laws nor the Constitution of this country or Great Britain anywhere recognize—the President causes the laws to be executed and the policy and principles last approved by the people to be made effective in practice. This is done through the aid of about one hundred thousand executive subordinates, subject to his legal instructions, which they are bound to obey. And analogous reasons apply to Governors and their subordinates, including city officials. It is in connection with the appointment, promotion, removal, and political assessments of these subordinates—perhaps a quarter of a million in number—and their interference with elections, and their compliant work and intrigue for the benefit of chieftains, great officials, and corrupt factions, that the principal abuses of our administration exist. In the theory of the Constitution, by the express language of the laws, and according to the precedents of all enlightened nations, it is the duty of these subordinates to obey the legal instructions of their superiors, to whom, and not to members of Congress or of the legislatures, they are directly responsible. It is no part of the functions of these subordinates to interpret principles, or to guide as to the limits, times or methods of executing the policy of an administration. They are in no sense representative, and as executive officers their duties are administrative and ministerial—to be performed in the same way and in the same spirit, in all parts of the Union and under all administrations, irrespective of consequences to parties or individuals. Only on this theory can the popular will be executed, or the government be efficient, or justice be done. On no other theory and under no other practice can the President cause the laws to be faithfully executed and be justly accountable for a failure to do so. The political opinions and theories of legislators are material, for they are to represent the views and interests of the people, upholding them in debate and embodying them in laws. Their terms of office should be short, for such views and interests are continually shifting, and these offices should be continually representative. So also the opinions of Presidents and Governors are material; for they are to defend and enforce the policy and principles of the majority, and their term also should be short, since that majority frequently changes. In a still

broader sense, also, the Executive is a representative official; for as a representative officer his approval is required for the enactment of laws. On the other hand, the political opinions of those subordinates who never guide or direct, but are continually guided and directed by those responsible for the government—and who should be removed if they refuse obedience—are not material, and are no qualification for doing the work well. Their fit term of office should be determined by their usefulness in their official places, and not on the theory of majorities or of partisan opinions, or of representative functions. There is neither policy, political principles, nor opinions, involved in discharging the functions of a collector, postmaster, or of any other of those subordinates, further than this, that honesty is the best policy; that policies are no part of their duties; that they should obey legal instructions; that they should treat all the people alike whatever party they belong to, and that they should use neither the power of their offices nor the time of the people in extorting assessments, in meddling with politics, in manipulating conventions, or in bribing voters with places. And so the Constitution, followed by the practice of those who framed it, treated the subject. The term of the President was made four years; that of the Representative, two years: that of the Senator, six years; but the term of these subordinates was not fixed in years, but, by implication and practice, was held to be during efficiency and good behavior. This tenure was observed and remained unaltered until 1820; when (or a little later as to some officers) those partisan influences, which finally triumphed under Jackson, having gained considerable strength, the tenure of collectors, naval officers, postmasters, and various others (to which the growing power of corruption and partisanship has added many more in later years), were reduced from constitutional tenure to a term of four years; thus greatly increasing the dangerous influence of the Senate through more frequent confirmations, and directly drawing into the Presidential contest the places of thousands of influential officials, and incidentally involving the places of tens of thousands of subordinates under them. Yet to this day the tenure of the great body of these subordinates is what the Constitution made it; tho, as we know but too well in practice, they are arbitrarily removed and

their places are arbitrarily filled under the spoils system, for mere personal and partisan, if not for corrupt reasons.

It should be added that, for much the same reasons as apply to the President himself, his constitutional advisers, who by law have large powers and discretion for enforcing executive policy and the principles of a party, need to have confidence therein, and hence their political opinions are also material. They cannot properly advise the President as to principles and policy which they distrust. In further explanation, it should be said that it may not be practically to draw near the top of the official sphere any line below which every officer has the duty of obeying, utterly without discretion involving principles. For this reason there may in practice be found a need of insisting on opinions as a qualification on the part of a few other officers; as in the case, for example, of foreign ministers sent to carry out a particular policy, district-attorneys and Governors of Territories, possibly of some others. The most fit and convenient line of division, between those who govern and those who obey—whose opinions therefore are or are not material—can easily be regulated by experience in our affairs, as it has been in the affairs of every well administered state of Europe. The principle by which that line will be determined will stand in wide contrast with the spoils-system theory of favoritism and partisan proscription which enforces a political test for the selection and removal not only of every collector, postmaster, and lighthouse-keeper, but of every letter-carrier, clerk, cartman, washerwoman, office-boy, in the public service; plain tho it may be to every candid mind, that their political opinions have no more to do with their duties than have their views about evolution or the length of the tail of the last comet.

Thus in the theory of the Constitution as it was carried into effect by its framers, a broad and elevated field of action is open to political parties, allowing them to be supreme over the vital, moulding forces of the country, alike in the sphere of law and of administration. It is the true function of parties to embody, sustain, and make effective, in laws and in executive action, the great ideal forces of a nation. They can claim no right to coerce public opinion, and all party action in excess of what is required to give fair and free expression to the views of the citizen is pernicious and should be suppressed. The Constitution is

equally friendly to liberty and the just limitation of party activity, whether practically or philosophically interpreted. Whatever strength and honor a party may gain by supporting sound principles, by enacting wise laws, by placing worthy men in office, by enforcing pure and vigorous administration—all that it has free opportunity to attain under the true methods of our Constitution. But they are repugnant to a spoils system of administration. They forbid the use of public authority for party despotism.

Aaron Burr laid the foundations of the spoils system, and as early as 1820 De Witt Clinton complained of the interference of Custom House officials with New York elections. That system very early made New York politics more corrupt and proscriptive than the politics of any other state—a distinction they have never lost.

Brooding over his presidential prospects, General Jackson said to a New Yorker, "I am no politician, but if I were a politician I would be a New York politician." Van Buren made him a New York politician. The election of Jackson, inspired by Burr, was the work of Van Buren. Potent in Tammany Hall, and the autocrat of the Albany Regency, Van Buren carried the spoils system into the National Senate in 1821 and extended it to the executive departments when Jackson's Secretary of State. He enforced it while Vice-President and President from 1832 to 1840. It was a ground of attack upon him in his own State, and of his rejection as minister to England in 1832, that he had brought that infamous system to Washington. Its spirit is best declared in this language of Senator Marcy of New York in the debate on Van Buren's rejection—the only public defence of the system we believe ever made: "When they [the New York politicians] are contending for victory, they avow the intention of enjoying the fruits of it. If they are defeated, they expect to retire from office. If they are successful, they claim as matter of right the advantages of success. *They see nothing wrong in the rule that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy.*"

Parties, therefore, according to the New York spoils-system code, are hostile camps, under military discipline, forever engaged, not in peaceful controversies about principles, but in deadly conflicts for offices, contracts, and all the spoils incident

to treating the government as a price of war. It is the doctrine of the pirate and the robber, appealing only to selfishness, to hate, and to savagery. The demoralizing effects of such a system continually enforced before the eyes of the people must be manifest. It is the highest evidence of the beneficent influence of our institution and of the patriotism of our people that political virtue has not been extinguished. The system required the power of appointment, promotion, and removal to be exercised, not as a trust, but to coerce elections, to bribe votes, to strengthen chieftains, to reward henchmen, to balance factions, to purchase silence and subserviency.

Under Van Buren's advice, Jackson soon made three times as many removals as all those made by his predecessors. Before his administration ended that corruption began in the New York Post Office which culminated in the astounding defalcation of Fowler. Until reformed by Mr. James, through competitive examinations, the office was, generally, a disgraceful illustration of partisanship, inefficiency, and extravagance. Jackson's first New York collector, the partisan Swartwout, fled to Europe a defaulter for more than a million of dollars, and soon after Hoyts, his successor—a favorite from Van Buren's law-office—and Price, the spoils-system district-attorney, were also defaulters in vast amounts. Imitating the example at Washington, sweeping removals in those offices were made to balance factions and gratify leaders. Extravagance, inefficiency, and corruption of many kinds in the Custom House were the swift consequences. Ceaseless scandals in its administration, unavailing complaints from the merchants, constant interference by its officials with the freedom of elections, numerous perfunctory investigations by Congress without the courage or purpose to expose abuses damaging to the party, a perpetual use of places and salaries as bribes for votes—all these rules were a part of the disgraceful history of the office, which were unchecked until the limited enforcement of the civil-service rules under President Grant.

These frequent and unjust removals prevented the most worthy entering the customs service, kept those within it in a ceaseless turmoil of anxiety, discouraged fidelity, invited the incompetent and disreputable to press for places, degraded the moral tone and the public estimate of the service itself.

During his term, from 1858, the Democratic collector, Schell, removed 389 out of 690 Custom House officials; Barney, his Republican successor,—a worthy officer coerced by a bad system,—removed 525 out of 702; Draper, a fierce partisan, made a removal every third day; Smythe, a Republican factionist, in three years, from 1866, removed 830 out of 903; Grinnell made a removal for every day of his term, being 510 out of 892; Murphy, a mere counterfactionist of Smythe, not only decapitated a subordinate each secular day, but had a surplus of thirty for Sundays. Thus in the space of 1565 secular days, preceding 1871, the Republican collectors at New York, continuing the spoils system they had inherited from the Democrats,—in the name of government and with pretence of aiding a party,—made 1678 removals in a single office—*more than at the rate of one every day for nearly five years in succession!* And this in an office having nothing whatever to do with party politics; an office where to be a politician is a disqualification; an office where duties on merchandise of the value of nearly \$1,000,000,000 are yearly to be estimated and collected; an office where every day more than \$480,000 money is taken for the people. Think of the skill, experience, and business capacity required to value all the varied productions of the world which make up this vast aggregate, and of leaving such duties to a perpetually shifting force of working New York politicians headed by a New York partisan chieftain! Was there ever such a parody on government? Will posterity believe the disgraceful facts?

- The effects of this spoils system administration upon official morality and economy were even most disastrous. Bribes were accepted. Elections were coerced. A needless number of officials were employed. Money was extorted from merchants. Smuggling and under valuation caused a loss of five or six millions of revenue each year. Scandals filled the journals. Custom House affairs, having become infamous, disgraced our country and the very name of republican institutions throughout the civilized world. In 1874 it cost the United States nearly \$7,000,000 to collect the duties on less than \$700,000,000 of imports, while in the same year it cost Great Britain (under her reformed civil service to which we shall refer) only \$5,000,000 to collect the duties on imports of the value of \$1,800,000,000. Compared

with revenue collections in other countries at that time, they cost in the United States three times as much as in France, four times as much as in Germany, and five times as much as in Great Britain.

In the State and city government of New York the same system prevailed. There was partisan proscription of subordinates from those of the judge and school-trustee to the floor-washer, the office-boy, and the scavenger. The city paid many times the value of its public buildings. Its treasury was pillaged. Crime and violence alarmingly increased. Judicial decisions were sold. Enormous fabrications of naturalization-papers were committed. Election frauds were unexampled. Ignorant, immoral partisans rose rapidly in politics, while worthy citizens neglected them in despair. Barnard, Tweed, and Kelly, as well as Conkling and Platt, speak for the spoils system. Everybody knows the humiliating story. The contemporary abuses at Washington are well remembered—the whiskey frauds, the *crédit mobilier* scandals, the infamous Sanborn contracts, the Belknap transactions, the gross corruption in the District of Columbia among them.

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We get a one-sided view of the spoils system if we do not look at its side toward the elections and the public. The methods and discipline of the spoils system were carried back to the primary meetings of the people. The civil officials were the spoils-system generals, colonels, and captains. The obedient partisan workers were the soldiers. The two classes together held the gates of all the primary meetings for political purposes. These two classes *were held to constitute the party*. No one outside of the political folds they guarded were allowed to come in, except on servile conditions inconsistent with true manhood in politics. No outsider had any rights or hearing in the party. The Republicans inherited this "primary system," of which Tammany Hall is still the powerful leader on the Democratic side. Nothing is more remarkable or more degrading in American politics than these New York spoils-system "primaries." Neither the resignation of the New York Senators, their confidence of a re-election, nor the strength of the reaction that defeated them can be comprehended without understanding these primaries.

The primary organization is the assembly district, of which there are twenty-four in New York City. There is also a Central Committee. This committee has plenary power. There is an Executive Committee of the Central Committee, which has practically the whole authority of the Central Committee. Now, the constitution says of this Executive Committee that all its proceedings shall be kept strictly secret, except that the chairman must report to the Central Committee all matters requiring its action thereon. There are no such matters save at the option of the Executive Committee.

Here, therefore, is a secrecy and despotism hardly exceeded in conducting a military campaign.

Next, as to getting into a primary. It is a political faction club, as selfishly managed as the strictest, private club. In no sense is it representative of the Republicans of the assembly district. Its membership is permanent. Lifelong adhesion to the Republican party and unbroken support of its principles do not even create a presumptive right to pass the doors of any one of these primaries; and until admitted to one of them no man is recognized as a member of the party, nor can he vote or be heard on any nomination of delegates.

To get in he must first be proposed as a member of the primary of his district, and his name posted on its bulletin-board. His name goes to a committee on admissions. If a report comes in in his favor, and if a majority of the members present at a meeting vote in his favor, on signing the roll he becomes a member, but otherwise he must remain out forever.

But this is by no means all. The following pledges—we give the language of the constitution—are exacted as a condition of being a member of any primary association:

That he will—

“1. Support the Republican party organization.

“2. Submit to the legally expressed action of the association and of the Central Committee.

“3. Honorably sustain all nominations made by the Republican party through its legally constituted conventions called or recognized by the Central Committee.

“4. Will not become a member of any committee or body which does not recognize the authority of the association.”

And for any wilful failure "to keep the pledge of membership, any guilty member may be expelled by the vote of a majority at any meeting."

Scrutinize these pledges and conditions. There is not a word about fidelity to principles, but only obedience to the Central Committee (that being a committee all of whose authority is with its secret Executive Committee) and support of the party organization—that is, the county machine. Next, all nominations, "good or bad," must be sustained—that is, voted for. The most conscientious Republican, of lifelong devotion to the principles of his party, cannot even in silence stand aloof from the most detestable and ruinous nomination without this standing committee of investigation being upon him.

This is not all. The fourth pledge allows no membership of "any body" which does not recognize the authority of the primary club; thus making membership of any organization in aid of a more independent public opinion or for bringing about any reform in political affairs—if that body be not in subordination to a primary, which is impossible—a forfeiture of membership in the latter body.

Before the last election, if indeed then, the aggregate members of all the primaries was not more than from 6000 to 7000 out of a body of from 40,000 to 60,000 city Republicans who cast their votes! This 6000 to 7000 is held to be the sole Republican party of the city. There is decisive authority as to the character and secret conduct of this inner party of the primaries and the spoils.

We quote from an official letter of the present Governor of New York, then chairman of the Republican State Committee, dated August 10th, 1871: "When the delegates to the general committee of 1871 were elected, a very large portion of the true Republicans in every district declined to take part in such election on account of the frauds. . . . Many of the presidents of the Republican associations were in the direct employment of the city officials. . . . As might be expected, the election of delegates to conventions in nearly all of the districts were mere farces."

It was the delegates from such primaries which at the Utica Convention of last year made the majority that under-

took to pledge the State of New York on the Presidential question.

It is out of such organizations that those influences have come which have so widely separated the party managers and chieftains of the State from the great body of the better men of the party. It is the subserviency of such close-corporation primary clubs which has made it possible for these managers and chieftains to feel sure of support when the higher Republican opinion of the State condemned them; which have been felt at Washington, in resistance to the head of the party, and in national conventions in support of despotic instructions; which made Conkling and Platt brave to resign, because confident of re-election.

If it be asked how it has been possible for so degrading a despotism to maintain itself, the answer is easy.

In 1873 there were 2510 federal officials at New York City alone, and the reformed methods lately introduced enable much more work to be done now with little increase of force. Their annual salaries are about \$2,500,000. The assessments extorted from these officials, through fear of removal, has been from 2½ to 5 per cent. being from \$50,000 to \$100,000 for each election. The removals for securing workers, bribing voters, rewarding henchmen, and punishing independents, have numbered about 500 a year. These places and salaries, these vast sums of federal money, and the obedient service of the New York chieftains by these federal officials, are the contributions which the general government has made to the corruption and the despotism of New York politics. No other place has such vast numbers of federal officers. And when party leaders thus educated in piracy and injustice, and made independent of the local sentiment which abhors them, turn upon the nation which has tamely submitted to their insults, who will say that the affront and rebellion were undeserved?

The salaries of the city officials amount to more than \$10,000,000 a year. The State officials are to be added. Their salaries are assessed, we feel sure, to almost the same extent as federal salaries. When the Republicans are in power in the State, the exactions, which are universal on these salaries,—excepting perhaps those of school-teachers,—are divided; that is, the ma-

chine managers of each party count on from \$100,000 to \$225,000 annually from this quarter. The evidence seems to show, for example, that, last year, the 735 members of the fire department and the 2450 members of the police department were each required to pay about three per cent of their salaries to these managers for each party. Yet these faithful officials, thus plundered by both parties, on the theory that every official must help his party, are not permitted to be delegates to, or to take part in, any convention for nominating officers. The prohibition is just, but justice and decency alike require that the Commissioners over them should observe it instead of being the active partisans they are. The same system which makes these vast levies to fill its treasury compels, on pain of dismissal, all these public servants to work for the enforcement of its orders and the election of its candidates. The government thus permits its own authority to be prostituted, its own servants to be enslaved, and the money they have earned to be pillaged under pretence of maintaining great principles and of carrying on government through parties, when the whole process is destructive of all the conditions upon which political principles can be maintained or parties can be either vigorous, honest, or useful. Such assessments are unknown in any other country more civilized than Mexico and Turkey. They degrade the government itself, while supplying to partisan chieftains the means which enable them to defy it. They tell the public servant that his country is too feeble, too indifferent, or too corrupt to protect him from pillage. They prompt him to neglect of duty, and to embezzlement as his only means of indemnity. President Grant, before he allowed a relapse to the spoils system, forbade these assessments. In his message of December, 1879, President Hayes declared that, "If the salaries are but a fair compensation of the officers, it is gross injustice to levy a tax on them. If they are made excessive in order that they may bear a tax, the excess is an indirect robbery of the public funds." In a speech in Congress, April 19, 1872, President Garfield used this language: "I ask these gentlemen what they think of the system of political assessments, . . . of issuing a circular calling for one, two, or three per cent of the salaries of all the employees, . . . with the distinct understanding that unless they pay others will be found to fill

their places. I call the attention of gentlemen around me to that shameful fact. The practice affords a large so-called electioneering fund which in many cases never gets beyond the shysters and the mere camp-followers of the party." Such circulars have been issued during every campaign since that manly and patriotic speech was made.

But, in obedience to the growing public opinion demanding the suppression of the abuse, a bill well adapted for that purpose, and steering clear of objections which more radical measures had involved, was introduced, at the last session, by Democratic members, and is now pending in both Houses of Congress. If the Republicans will follow the advice of their three last Presidents and the principles to which they are committed, this measure may be passed at the next session. There is no subject in our politics upon which the moral power and intelligence of the pulpit and of all patriotic citizens may be brought to bear with more propriety and effect than upon this measure. It is a direct and vital issue not of party politics, but of justice, honor, and duty—an issue between all that is partisan, despotic, and corrupt on one side, and all that is pure, righteous, and manly in our politics on the other side. But this prostitution of the power of appointment and removal extended to higher quarters, where the consequences have been yet more disastrous. Members of Congress, as readily as the local politicians, comprehended the selfish use that might be made of it. They soon made themselves potential over its exercise in the great departments at Washington; each of them—always with many honorable exceptions—coercing removals, and dictating the appointment of not only those who are to serve within their respective districts, but of his alleged proportion of those who are to serve at Washington itself. For the places which they seize by usurpation they apportion among themselves as spoils. Having the power to make laws and the control of the appropriations, upon which every President and head of department and bureau is dependent, it only needed a spoils system of appointment and removal to make that power irresistible by the Executive. Or, where a President did not care to resist, a prostitution of the appointing power on the one side and of the legislative power on the other could thus readily be made

the consideration of each for the corruption of both. In this way not only has a demoralizing barter been established but the counterpoise of departments, carefully provided for in the Constitution, has been impaired, and stability of the government itself put in peril. Neglecting their functions as legislators, when great questions demand attention and thousands of bills remain on their tables without time, members of Congress intrude themselves upon the executive departments, going from secretary to secretary and from bureau to bureau, pressing their dependents for salaries where no vacancies exist, threatening or pleading, according to their temper, for removals that ought not to be made, and for the appointment of their favorites who are not worthy. We have heard a member plead with a secretary for the removal of a light-house keeper only for the reason, as he said, that the influence of his man would gain him twenty votes which would carry his election. This abuse makes members the spoils-system purveyors and patronage-mongers of their districts. It draws crowds of male and female office-seekers to Washington—of which Guiteau was one. It degrades the government and the morality of all who serve it in the estimation of the people. We have now before us many advertisements, cut from three different Washington journals within a few weeks, of this desperate office-seeking class, which since March last has hung about the national capital in greater numbers than for several years. Failing to get offices through members of Congress, they *now openly offer to give a large portion of their salaries—sometimes a fifth of it*—for a place in the departments or any influence effective for securing it! These unprecedented facts disclose a nefarious traffic in office none the less ominous because in a city where so many men are separated from their families and so many office-seeking women are in desperate circumstances. We regret that want of space must exclude all but a single example of these strange and suggestive advertisements, which is as follows: ¹

“Wanted by a lady who has good congressional influence a position in one of the departments. Will give 20 per cent of her salary. Address F. M., *Republican office*.”

¹ From the *National Republican*, April 30, 1881.

Similar advertisements are to be seen almost every day in the Washington journals. They reveal a deplorable state of things analogous to that which existed in England in the corrupt times of Walpole and Newcastle, and which led to the enactment of the office-brokerage statutes which we greatly need.

A writer in the *Penn Monthly* for July last shows that of 720 calls made upon a Cabinet Officer between March 4 and June 4 of this year, 710 were to make applications for office. Another member of the Cabinet has publicly stated that by far the greater portion of his time has been taken from his duties in the same way. But neither of them has stated what portion of these intrusions is chargeable to members of Congress. The *New York Tribune* stated on the 18th of April last that "three fourths of the time of the President is occupied in hearing applications for office."

President Garfield has deliberately declared that one-third of the time of members of Congress is absorbed in matters connected with office-seeking. In 1870 he said in Congress:

"We press such appointments upon the departments; we crowd the doors; we fill the corridors; Senators and Representatives throng the offices and bureaus until the public business is obstructed; the patience of officers is worn out, *and sometimes, for fear of losing their places by our influence, they at last give way and appoint men not because they are fit for the position, but because we ask it.*"

And in April, 1872, he further declares that

"For many years Presidents of the United States have been crying out in their agony to be relieved of this unconstitutional crushing, irresistible pressure brought to bear upon them by the entire body of that party *in the legislative department* which elected them."

It hardly need be stated that this great evil is a sheer, wanton invasion of executive functions by members of Congress; nor need the reader be told that it is within their power, as it is their plain duty, to remove it simply by attending to their own business. That they are urged into this abuse by partisan managers and the backers of office-seeking constituents are mitigating facts which only disclose other evils of the spoils system. Many members, we may be sure, are disgusted with

this mean office-seeking work and would be rejoiced to be rid of it. The best evidence that such is the feeling of the majority will be its vote to suppress the evil. It requires some courage to do so. Many a man had rather beg or bully a secretary than to say to a beseeching woman, an impecunious cousin, or a hard worker at the polls, "I cannot help you. I am only a legislator."

To their full share of guilt for such abuses, the members of the Senate have added one for which they are solely responsible. According to a practice called the "Courtesy of the Senate," the Senators from the State where an officer is to serve is allowed to decide whether the Senate shall confirm. The pleasure of these Senators according to the Courtesy is the law of confirmation. Thus the Senators, from each State, by conceding the same monopoly to their brother Senators, make themselves the feudal lords of patronage, supreme over all the higher federal officials within their own State. This power over the higher executive offices carries with it a control over the subordinates of the latter. A collector or a postmaster therefore cannot appoint or remove a clerk without the consent of the Senators. A refusal to regard the senatorial pleasure would be at the peril of a removal. For this usurpation, which began with appointments, has been made equally potential over removals. The President, therefore, unless he is ready for a quarrel with the whole Senate—since in principles the cause of one Senator is that of all—has little discretion of appointment or removal left among a body of several thousands of the higher officials who serve under him, and ought to obey his instructions, except that of executing the mandates of the Senators from the State where they are to serve. Within this class of officials falls all collectors, nearly two thousand postmasters, the naval officers and surveyors, the district attorneys, besides many others too miscellaneous to mention. It was the refusal of President Garfield to yield to this long-continued usurpation which precipitated the late rebellion and resignation of the Senators from New York. President Grant surrendered to the courtesy, which greatly contributed to his yielding the enforcement of the civil-service rules in 1875. This made him a favorite of Mr. Conkling, and of all those who pressed him for a third term. So far has this senatorial usurpation been extended,

that the President cannot now, by reason of the tenure of office act, remove an officer confirmed by the Senate, except by consent of that body; his sole and constitutional right of removal having been thus degraded by law to a privilege of mere temporary suspension, awaiting the pleasure of the Senate. At this moment there are more than 500 officers in the Treasury Department—33 of them serving at Washington—whom the President cannot remove without the consent of the Senate. Under the extension of the “*Courtesy*” to removals, it follows that, as to all those 500 officers, excepting at most the 33 serving in Washington, their removal really depends on the will of the Senators of the State where these officials respectively serve. So it is as to the three higher classes of postmasters and all other confirmed officers. These results proclaim a revolution accomplished in the theory and practical forces of administration—a new balance of power in the government slowly worked by the spoils system. The Senate has become as much an executive as a legislative body, making the President its subordinate in a broad field of his constitutional functions. Senators are inflated with the authority of an executive without any wholesome sense of responsibility. Subordinates of the President, thus situated, not unnaturally feel more responsible to, and more in danger from, Senators than from Presidents or heads of departments. The power and prestige of the Executive are thus enfeebled and degraded in the estimation of his own subordinates in the same degree that Senators are exalted and are tempted to become domineering patronage monopolists at Washington, and feudal purveyors of places and despots in partisan politics at home. The sad results are seen, in later years, in the greater frequency of partisan and patronage contests in the Senate, in the loss of dignity and public respect on the part of that body, and in the alarming extent to which all the corrupt elements of politics are drawn into senatorial elections. The whole body of federal officials in a State feel that their places may depend on the caprice of a newly elected Senator. Is it any wonder so many become servile to Senators, and rush into the elections in self-defence? Nor is this the worst. Never before its last meeting has the Senate given a whole session to little more than an ignominious contest about patronage.

Never before have members of that body resorted to resignation and rebellion because a President would not servilely surrender to their usurpation. Never before have bribery or corruption so shameless, or faction fights so deplorable, disgraced a senatorial election as in that just ended in New York. Thus, that spoils system which holds the primary gates of the party, putting all who pass them under servile pledges to obey secret orders; which opens and shuts the doors to all official places, allowing none to enter but the obedient favorites and henchmen of chieftains and patronage monopolists; which brings the whole public service under its degrading yoke, removing whom it will, and compelling every official, however faithfully he serves his country, to pay arbitrary taxes to the mercenary power by which in his person that country is insulted; which supplies the funds, the official workers, and the purchased votes that enable corrupt and cunning politicians to defy the public will and convert the administration to their own use—that same spoils system we can also see plainly standing behind Senators and Representatives, disarming many of the courage to denounce a slavery they loathe, but giving more the votes, the bribe-money, and the applause by which they are emboldened in the work of prostituting their functions, undermining the constitutional power of the Executive, and destroying together the honor, the character, and the stability of the government. And why should we be surprised that a system which, through a whole generation, has debauched the national conscience and degraded the sense of official duty, which has given birth to Barnards, Tweeds, Belknaps, and manifold abuses, should now on the one hand present us with Conkling, the half-crazed chieftain of a band of desperate factionists, aiming for selfish ends to destroy the President's power and dignity, and on the other hand with Guiteau, the half-crazed representative of a throng of desperate office-seekers, aiming to destroy the President's life? When, through the whole range of the public service, the frantic office-seeker sees that no fidelity protects a salary from pillage, that no character protects the official from being ruthlessly sacrificed for others, that the obligations of justice and the principles of the Constitution are habitually spurned in filling the public offices; while ambition, selfishness, and lust of power are potential forces—thus trampling every-

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thing sacred below human life—is the logic wholly absurd which brings the half-lunatic to regard life itself as entitled to little more protection than is accorded to what makes life most dear? So reasoned Guiteau and all the political assassins before him. So reasoned the public in charging his crime to the cruel system which has dominated our politics. So we reasoned when Sumner was struck down by Brooks. So also we habitually reason about political assassinations and violence in Russia and all foreign countries. But whatever the truth may be, let us be sure we comprehend that when Senators Roscoe Conkling and Thomas C. Platt followed the example of Senators Jefferson Davis and John Slidell in striding out of the Senate Chamber, threatening war and revenge because they could not dictate national policy, and rushing home to their States to bring them in hostility against the nation, they were guilty of treachery and rebellion as real in principle, as dangerous in example, while far more audacious and original than that of the arch-rebels themselves; for nobody before had conceived the ridiculous madness of the New York rebellion, while the Southern Confederacy had been the dream of a generation. No thoughtful man can comprehend the significance of this act of the New York Senators without a profound sense of the revolutionary spirit which the spoils system has developed, and of the desperate purposes of which its subjects are capable. They have been moulded by it as the system of the Jesuits has formed the character of those educated in its schools. In the case of each the accepted rules of duty have been enfeebled, and the great obligations of citizenship have been subordinated to the demands of a seductive and demoralizing code.

The personal importance and influence of no man have been so much exaggerated as in the case of Mr. Conkling. The interest he now awakens is due to the fact that he is the representative and the victim of the spoils system from the great manor where it was born and is most developed. His utter neglect of great things and his supreme care for little things, his rise, his rule, and his collapse, alike illustrate the spirit and the effects of that system. Let us charitably believe that but for it he would have been a sober and useful Senator—if a Senator at all—with no ambition to rule a President, to play the despot

in a State, or to rebel against his duty and the Constitution of his country. But above all we need to remember that he was an effect and not a cause, and that the fall of the rebellious Senators yet leaves in force a system capable of producing an endless series not only of Conklings and Platts, but of all the evils we have been considering.

DORMAN B. EATON.

THE PROSPECTIVE CIVILIZATION OF AFRICA.

IT seems at first sight a strange paradox that the quarter of the globe which was the cradle of civilization should now lag so far behind its fellows as to raise the question with many whether it will ever be civilized at all. Four thousand years ago—*seven* thousand, according to some—an empire was developed in the north-eastern corner of the peninsula which set an example to the whole world of orderly government, complex social organization, manufacturing industry, and progress in many of the arts—an example which for several centuries was only followed at a humble distance by the most advanced nations of Europe and Asia. Foremost among all the peoples of the earth, the Egyptians established a centralized and strong government over a wide extent of country, created an architecture remarkable for stability and grandeur, discovered the importance of the division of labor, invented metallurgy, glass-blowing, ship-building, statuary, hieroglyphic writing, literature of various kinds, and a mystic and profound theosophy. For centuries, if not millenia, while Europe was plunged in the profound darkness of extreme barbarism, cave-dwelling races with difficulty maintaining their struggle for existence against the beasts of the field, and in Asia civilization was just emerging into the light of day in the rich valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, there was in Egypt a well-ordered monarchy, laws, arts, education, trade, a luxurious court, a complex hierarchy, rich landed proprietors, a good system of agriculture, considerable engineering skill, and some knowledge of astronomy and medicine. Later on, but before the era of the Greek Olympiads—when light, we are told, first dawns on Europe—a second civilizing influence made, itself a home upon the African coast, and Carthage, the

greatest commercial state of the ancient world, arose in the central region of the north and became a second great African power, active, enterprising, adventurous, eager to extend her communications on all sides for purposes of trade. The Greeks followed with a colony, which in the fifth century before our era was one of the most flourishing of Hellenic states; and when the "Father of History" painted his sketch of the world as it existed in his day, Africa seemed as well advanced on the highway of civilization as either of her two sisters, Europe or Asia.

But the promise of this early period has not been fulfilled. No one can pretend to doubt but that Africa at the present day is the least advanced of all the five continents which are recognized in modern geography. We propose in the present paper to inquire, first of all, into the reasons of this backwardness, and then to consider what grounds there are for hoping or expecting that, in spite of them, the difficulty of civilizing Africa may be ultimately overcome and the "Dark Continent" effect its entrance into the "comity of nations."

Now, the obstacles which stand in the way of the civilization of Africa, and which have hitherto proved insurmountable, seem to us to come under the three heads of the geographic, the climatic, and the political difficulties: and under these we propose to discuss them.

I. THE GEOGRAPHIC OBSTACLES. Since the time that, by the advance of civilization, the sea became readily traversable, tracts of land have come to be accessible, or the contrary, in proportion to the length of their coast-line. The length of the coast-line of Africa is 17,000 miles only, or actually less than that of Europe, tho Europe is but one third of its size. To be proportionally equal to Europe, Africa should have a coast-line of above 60,000 square miles, or nearly three and a half times the actual extent. Compared with Asia and America, the difference is less, but still considerable. Asia's sea-board is 36,000 miles, or more than double that of Africa, while their respective areas stand in the proportion of three to two only, or one and a half to one. America's sea-board is 43,000 miles, or two and a half times the African, while their areas are as 23 to 31, or very nearly as three to four.

To put the same point in another way: In Europe very few

places can be named which are 500 miles from the sea. In Africa nearly half the continent is beyond this distance, and much of the interior is 1000 miles removed from the nearest point of the coast-line.

Defect in the length of the sea-board is elsewhere, in a great measure, compensated by the existence of large navigable rivers flowing from the regions which are most remote from the sea. In Asia, the Tigris and Euphrates, the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra, the Yang-tse-kiang, Hoang-Ho, and Amoor penetrate deeply into the continent, and furnish lines of communication with the interior which are of almost equal value for civilizing purposes with such deep gulfs—or, in geographic phrase, inland seas—as the Baltic and the Mediterranean. In South America, the Orinoco, Amazon, and La Plata; in North America, the St. Lawrence, the Hudson, and the combined Mississippi and Missouri, play the same part, and lay open the continent to commercial and scientific enterprise to a distance, sometimes, of 4000 miles from the ocean. Navigation extends by means of the Orinoco almost to the base of the Andes; the Amazon, with its tributaries, presents nearly 10,000 miles of navigable waters; vessels of 300 tons burthen can ascend the La Plata for nearly 1300 miles; steamers mount the Mississippi to a distance not much short of 3000, and the Missouri to a distance of 4000 miles. The interiors of these continents, altho remote from the sea, are thus easily accessible, and the path into their inmost recesses lies as open as the coast-line to the trader, geographer, or naturalist.

But in Africa the case is different. Africa has indeed at least four great rivers—the Nile, the Congo, the Niger, and the Zambesi—but these streams cannot be used as continuous waterways. The Nile, issuing from the Victoria Nyanza in a vast stream at an elevation of nearly 4000 feet above the level of the sea, almost immediately descends, at the Ripon Falls, in a rush like that of the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and again, before reaching the Albert Nyanza, plunges, at the Murchison Falls, in a single perpendicular leap of 120 feet into a dark and boiling basin. Access by the Nile to the Victoria Nyanza is thus absolutely impossible, and the success of geographical explorers has been the death-blow of commercial hopes. Even the Albert

Lake itself can scarcely be called accessible from the sea. The open navigation of the Nile ceases at Assouan, and thus extends a distance of only eight degrees out of the thirty-two between the Victoria Nyanza and the Mediterranean. After this cataracts occur, at intervals of some 100 or 150 miles, as far as lat. $16^{\circ} 10'$, which can only be surmounted with great difficulty by small steamers and other boats of a strong make for a month or so at the height of the inundation. By these means, or in some instances by land-carriage, European-built boats have been placed upon the Middle Nile above the Nubian Falls, and steamers have plied, and, we believe, still ply, between Berber (lat. $17^{\circ} 50'$) and Gondokoro.¹ The Albert Nyanza has been reached and explored by officers of the Gordon-Pasha expedition, and the possibility of effecting the *tour de force* above spoken of has thus been demonstrated. But the natural difficulties remain, and are irremovable. The Nile can never be used as a commercial water-way between Assouan and Khartoum, or between Gondokoro and the outlet of the Albert. Even between Khartoum and Gondokoro it is not a safe line of communication, since it is liable to be blocked by masses of floating vegetation and dense thickets of the papyrus rush, which always hinder, and sometimes absolutely prevent, navigation. Boats have had to be abandoned at the great vegetable barrier near the junction of the Nile with the Bahr el Ghazal, and expeditions have had to continue their journey by land.

The Congo is, in respect of volume, a still larger stream than the Nile. It is second among rivers only to the Amazon, pouring into the Atlantic Ocean, as it does, more than 2,000,000 cubic feet of water every second. Its length from its source in Lake Bangweolo considerably exceeds 2000 miles, and it is 1200 yards wide before it reaches Nyangwe, or within 500 miles of its source. Numerous broad and deep tributaries reach it from either side, and the basin which it drains appears to have a length of 20 and a width of 17 or 18 degrees. Had it the general character of the Amazon, how grand an avenue would it furnish for access to the whole western equatorial region of the African continent! But unfortunately here again Nature is

¹ *Geographical Journal* for 1876, p. 413.

adverse. The Congo has indeed a magnificent estuary, which runs up above Boma a distance of at least a hundred miles; but almost immediately after this the rapids begin, and are totally insurmountable by ship, boat, or canoe.

The Niger is a stream of much inferior importance to either the Nile or the Congo. Its entire course does not exceed 1800 miles; and it is not a *great* river much above Timbuctoo. It has but one affluent of any considerable size, the Benuwe. The inland region to which it conducts is the unproductive Sahara, and its basin is, comparatively speaking, of small dimensions. It has been ascended by boats as high as the village of Yauri, in north lat 11° nearly, or a distance of about 600 miles from its mouth; but to reach this point several rapids had to be passed; and the main stream is not readily navigable much above Rabba, 400 miles from the ocean. The Benuwe will probably be found superior to the Niger as a water-way. It conducts to the fertile region south of Lake Tchad, and is probably navigable into the heart of the Fumbina or Adamawa country, 600 miles from its junction with the Niger or Kwara.

The Zambesi drains a large tract in south-eastern Africa, and has a course not much short of that of the Niger. But its lower channel is full of shifting sand-banks, and it has a dangerous bar at its principal embouchure. Its upper course is, moreover, broken by the cataracts of Kebra-basa and Mosio-tuniya. Its tributary, the Shiré, which gives an outlet to the waters of Lake Nyassa, has thirty miles of its course blocked by a succession of rapids.

The other African streams have comparatively short courses, draining merely the outer watershed of the great central basins. Even these, however, are interrupted by falls. The Ogobai is interrupted by the Eugénie Falls at the distance of 250 miles from its mouth. The Coanza ceases to be navigable after 150 miles. The rivers of Kaffraria have mostly rocky channels, and abound with rapids and cataracts. None of them is navigable to so much as a hundred miles from the mouth.

To the short coast-line, and the deficiency of navigable rivers must be added, under the head of "geographic obstacles" to the civilization of Africa, the almost complete separation of the north from the south by the interposition of the Great Desert. Excepting along the Atlantic sea-board, and by the channel

which has been scooped in the desert by the action of the Nile, the sea of sand which stretches across the whole of Africa from west to east offers a barrier to intercourse that is only with extreme difficulty surmountable. A few travellers of great physical vigor and indomitable courage, like Lyon, Mungo Park, and Barth, have made their way across by Fezzan and Tebu, or by Tawat and Mabruk, and have reached the fertile region that lies south of the desert in the vicinity of Lake Tchad or of Timbuctoo. Small caravans of natives occasionally also effect the passage; but the absence of all rivers and streams between lat. 30° and lat. 18° , and the scantiness of the supply procurable from wells, renders the Sahara for commercial purposes almost impervious. As the main seats of African culture have always lain along the Mediterranean coast, the effect of this barrier in checking the progress of African civilization has been great. In ancient times the Sahara was viewed as impenetrable; and tho Mahometan civilization, such as it is, has crossed it, and established Mussulman communities in the tropical region between the Upper Niger and Darfur, yet the difficulties of the communication with the coast tract are such as to keep the inland states in an unprogressive and semi-barbarous condition. Towards the east, where the Nile valley furnishes a safe and well-watered route, the course of the river is so circuitous that travellers, and even caravans, generally prefer to it the passage through the Nubian desert from Koranko to Abu Hamed—which is “a wilderness of scorching sand and glowing basalt rocks” and which cannot but constitute a great hindrance to regular and frequent communication. Altogether, it must be said that the south is in a great measure cut off from the north, and that the civilizing influences which are to penetrate to the far interior must reach it mainly from the western, southern, and eastern coasts—from the shores of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

II. Another distinct head of impediment to African civilization is to be found in the CLIMATIC CONDITIONS. Africa lies well upon the equator, and more than three fourths of its area is included within the limits of the tropics. Low lands thus situated are notoriously unhealthy; and the coast tracts of tropical Africa, being but slightly raised above the level of the sea, are about as pestilential as any regions of the known world.

The tract adjoining upon the British settlement of Sierra Leone has long been known as "the white man's grave." Senegambia, the Gaboon region, the tract upon the Lower Ogobai explored by M. du Chaillu, the lower Zambesi region, and the whole of Mozambique, are almost as bad. They are choked with the rankest vegetation, and reek with fever and miasma. At a certain distance from the coast the land, however, generally rises; and it is among the most marked characteristics of tropical Africa that it consists mainly of elevated basins, varying from one to four thousand feet above the sea-level, and separated one from another by mountain ridges of considerably greater altitude. The basins of Lake Tchad, of the Upper Niger, and of the Benuwe in the north, those of the Ogobai and the Upper Nile upon the equator, and of the Upper Congo, the Upper Zambesi, and Lake Nyassa in the south, are all of them of this character; and the result is that they have a climate drier and lighter than that of most equatorial or tropical regions, and less injurious to the health of Europeans. Still, even these more favored tracts are trying to any but exceptionally strong constitutions. Their rainfall is excessive; their rainy season prolonged and most trying; the spongy soil sucks in and retains the wet; and the march has to be made along paths which are running brooks, and across plains little better than quagmires. Violent storms are frequent. The wind rises suddenly with tremendous force, accompanied by a heavy downpour, or by hail-stones "as big as pigeon's eggs;" the lightning blazes incessantly; the thunder-claps are deafening; the traveller is wetted through and through in a few minutes, and must ordinarily march on in his saturated clothes until the sun comes out and dries them. Under these circumstances fever, dysentery, asthma, rheumatism, even consumption, are apt to appear; and an expedition sometimes loses in a few days half its number.

The combination of heat with damp produces a most rapid growth of a rank and coarse vegetation. Hence arise fresh embarrassments. The African interior has no roads; and communication is by means of narrow paths cut through the jungle or the tall cane-like grass. In the wet season these frequently become blocked by the quick growth of the scrub on either side. Sometimes the path disappears altogether. More often it is

just traceable; and the traveller may force his way along it through grasses armed with hooks, and interwoven boughs bristling with thorns, but with constant injury both to his dress and person. Ten miles are thus accomplished in as many hours; unless, as sometimes happens, the path is lost, and a whole day consumed in the necessary task of recovering it.

The difficulties are still greater if the traveller or the merchant carries his baggage or his merchandise on the backs of animals. The camel, the ass, and the bullock are employed as beasts of burthen in different parts of the African interior; and unless they can be employed with safety, commerce on a large scale is clearly impossible. But the camel fails entirely, except in the drier districts; while the ass and the bullock have natural enemies in certain blood-sucking flies which render their employment hazardous. Dr. Barth tells us that the "blood-fly" in the north is such a terrible plague as to threaten the life both of man and beast; while the ravages of the tsetse fly in the south are almost too well known to need comment.

III. POLITICAL OBSTACLES form another, and perhaps the most serious, class of impediments to the civilization of the "Dark Continent." The country is split up into so large a number of small states; there are so few empires, or even kingdoms, of any considerable size, that the traveller, having with great difficulty gained the protection of some one potentate, almost immediately afterwards loses it, since a journey of a few days takes him beyond the dominions of the chief whom he has made his friend, and brings him into the territory of another who is strange to him. Moreover, even when protection is gained, safety is far from being assured. The African is proverbially faithless. "Keeping one's word," says one writer, "is an unheard-of absurdity in Africa." "I was amused during the whole month of January," says another, "with nothing but empty promises." No discredit seems to attach to detection in untruthfulness, since when Dr. Barth remonstrated with the Sheikh Sidi Ahmed el Bakay, and told him that he was not over-scrupulous in keeping his word, the reply given him was "that if a person had but one fault, it was of no consequence." Even when faith is kept by the head chief, no dependence can be placed upon his subordinates, who are no sooner removed by a few marches from the

court of their suzerain than they give themselves the airs of sovereign princes, disobey orders, and thwart or even plunder the individual whom they have been appointed to escort, to guard, and to assist in every way. Protection, moreover, has everywhere to be purchased by presents, and the tax upon the traveller or merchant is thus so onerous that some think it would be the most prudent course not to carry presents at all, as they only excite the cupidity of the natives. This plan, however, has not yet been adopted. At present Europeans literally buy their way with goods as they proceed, becoming, of course, poorer daily as they advance further, with the final result that their whole stock is liable to be exhausted when they have reached the heart of the continent and are most completely at the mercy of the inhabitants. It is the set intention of many chiefs to strip the traveller bare by following up exaction with exaction; and the utmost determination is necessary in order to frustrate this wicked design, which would reduce him to actual destitution.

If the spirit and temper of the chiefs is thus adverse to that freedom of movement which travellers, and still more merchants, regard as among the prime necessities of their position, what shall we say of the general disposition of the inhabitants, and of the attitude which they commonly assume towards strangers? The African counts every one whom he does not know an enemy. On the appearance of an exploring or commercial party, he sounds his war-drums, arms himself with shield and spear and bow, or with sling and stone, or in some instances with rifle or musket, and either openly rushes to the attack or lies in wait where he can take his foe at an advantage. He is an expert slinger and archer, has weapons, made by himself, which are of excellent quality, does not shoot ill with the musket, is brave to rashness in battle, and most pertinacious in renewing his assaults. Mr. Stanley, in his descent of the Congo, tho avoiding hostilities as much as possible by stealing along in mid-stream among islands, was forced to fight thirty-two battles between Nyangwe and Urangi, and lost by violent deaths fifty-eight men out of a hundred and forty-six. The African has war-vessels of considerable size and strength. Some of them are manned by forty rowers on each side, and carry fifteen

or twenty warriors besides, who run up and down the middle part of the boat, or occupy a platform at one end. He can bring to the attack, on the rivers, fleets of fifty or sixty such "monsters," and on the great lakes fleets of 200 or 300 war-canoes.

A double motive animates the attacks upon strangers. Strangers, especially whites, are feared and hated in consequence of the many iniquitous plundering expeditions and slave-hunts conducted by private individuals for a number of centuries in all parts of the peninsula, whereby an amount of suffering has been inflicted on the black races which one shudders to contemplate. There is scarcely a tribe but has injuries to avenge, or which does not regard itself as having a perpetual blood-feud with the whites. But this justifiable motive of a hostility provoked by a thousand acts of wrong-doing is reinforced by a second less venial ground of attack. The African is an epicure, and to his taste no food is so delicious as the flesh of a man, especially of a white. Strangers are viewed primarily as so much "meat;" and when a peaceful expedition is seen descending one of the magnificent reaches of the Congo or the Ogobai, the first feeling of the dwellers upon the banks is apt to be that there is delivered into their hands an abundant supply of the food which best pleases their palates. "Meat! meat!" they shout, as the unknown craft comes into sight. "Hurrah! we shall have meat to-day! Meat! meat! Plenty of meat!" Their feelings seem to be hurt if the "meat" steers off and by a vigorous use of sails or oars, or both combined, dashes past them and makes its escape. It is as if a herd of red deer swept by the sportsman in the highlands of Scotland, without giving him time to snatch up his rifle, cock it, and take an assured aim. The bitterness of disappointment succeeds to the delirium of hope, and the savage steers his canoe back to shore, a sadder and a hungrier man.

Explorers and merchants have not, perhaps, any serious objection to being eaten after they have been killed; but they take exception to the killing; and the great danger to life from the almost universal savagery of the natives must be regarded as one of the main reasons why Africa is still "the Dark Continent." Another peculiarly African practice has also a strong

deterrent force; to wit, the wide-spread use by the natives of poisoned arrows and other medicated weapons. Men are willing enough to take their chance of being wounded, or even killed, in fair fight; but they shrink from subjecting themselves to prolonged suffering or even a lingering death from the action of a poison which in no way adds to the disabling effect of a wound at the time.

The civilization of Africa would be altogether hopeless, were it not for the fact that neither danger nor difficulty nor distance will deter civilized men from penetrating to remote and savage regions, if they have a sufficient motive. Hitherto, in the progress of the human race, the most powerful of all civilizing influences has been the "earth-hunger"—the desire for "land, land, and still more land"—which in old times brought the nomadic hordes of Asia and Europe upon the oriental and Roman empires, and which at the present day sends thousands weekly across the stormy Atlantic to carry the arts of Europe into the distant wildernesses of the Far West. A time may perhaps come when the stream of navigation which now flows so persistently westward to Canada and the States, and south-eastward to Australia and New Zealand, will be diverted to the "Dark Continent," and Africa will at length receive from Europe, and perhaps from Asia, that large influx of enterprising white men which can alone wake it from its long slumber into active life, and place it ultimately upon a level with its sister continents. But the advent of this change is probably still distant. It will not be until the fertile and at the same time temperate regions of North America and Australasia are tolerably thickly peopled, and cease to invite the great swarms of needy emigrants from Europe and the "Celestial Empire," that the turn of Africa will come.

But while the stream of emigration is not likely for some considerable period to set in the direction of Africa, there are other and quite distinct lines of enterprise from which much may be expected. A good deal both of ancient and of modern civilization has had its origin in commercial activity. Phœnician and Carthaginian enterprise was almost wholly of this character; Greek colonization was largely based upon it; the influence of Genoa and of Florence upon the Europe of the

middle ages sprang mainly from the trading spirit; in modern times Holland, Portugal, and England have, actuated by the same motive, taken the lead in civilizing movements. Africa seems to have just now reached the point at which it is likely to present a great attraction to traders. The noble efforts of explorers have changed it from a *terra incognita* into one whose principal geographical features are almost as well known as those of Europe. Vast tracts of a virgin soil, extraordinarily productive, situated at a high elevation, and therefore not intensely hot, well wooded and well watered, are laid open to commerce, which, a generation back, were blanks upon the map, and had been unvisited by any stranger from the outer world since the time of the Cæsars. The interior of Africa has become accessible by two or three distinct routes, and the merchant seems invited to step in, if it be but to utilize the discoveries of the geographer. Africa produces gold, silver, iron, ivory in enormous abundance, natron, hard woods of various kinds, rhinoceros' horns, excellent wax and gums, salt, dates, tamarinds, figs, cocoanuts, ground-nuts, manioc, the fruits of the baobab and dour palm trees, yams, bananas, capers, senna, palm-oil, cloves, hides, leather, and ostrich-feathers. It grows, under an execrable system of cultivation, abundant wheat, barley, rice, maize, durra, millet, sesame, sugar, and coffee, besides yielding in places considerable amounts of cotton, tobacco, and indigo. The forests of the interior are but very partially explored, and may be expected to contain a variety of vegetable products suitable for dyes and medicaments, the exact qualities and values of which have yet to be determined. Mineral treasures of various kinds may also confidently be anticipated. Iron and copper are abundant and near the surface. Rich veins of malachite have been proved to exist in Benguela, at a distance of not more than 140 miles from the shore; and tho under the circumstances of the present time the expense of conveying the ore to the coast has been found to exceed the value of the commodity obtained, and the mines have consequently ceased to be worked, yet, as roads come to be carried from the coast into the interior, it can hardly be doubted that the enterprise will be renewed and will obtain the success which it merits. The emerald region of Mount Zabasa on the shore of the Red

Sea may also deserve more attention than it has received recently. It was worked with good results by the ancient Egyptians, and might not improbably under modern improved methods be found once more of considerable importance.

The earth has one commodity of which its inhabitants seem never to feel that they have enough; and that commodity is very widely spread over the African continent. On the west, the tract about Sierra Leone has long been known as "the gold coast," and it is from the native name of this same region that our original gold coin derived its name of "guinea." The neighboring highland, parallel to the coast between the mouths of the Senegal and the Niger, is a gold-producing district; and gold is found in the Benuwe, and in many other of the West African streams. Dr. Barth tells us that "gold forms the chief staple in all the commerce of Timbuctoo." It is found at Bambuk, at Buré, and in the Waughara country upon the Upper Senegal. The reefs at Tacquah and the gold-fields of Wassaw, one of the lately subjugated districts of Ashantee, are very productive. Millions of our money, it is said, lie buried in the graves of the chiefs and principal men of this rich region. On the other side of Africa, Abyssinia and Sennaar have long been celebrated as gold-producing countries; while recently it has been found that the mountain region of southern Mozambique, and portions of the Transvaal about Leydenburg, are auriferous. The Matabeli or Amadabela country—also in South Africa—is said to be "one of the richest gold countries in the world." Altogether, South-eastern Africa seems to hold a high place among auriferous regions, and may be expected in the course of the next ten or twenty years to attract a numerous body of adventurers and traders.

There is another important product of equatorial Africa, with which European markets are certainly not glutted at present, that may prove an additional stimulus to African trade, and especially to trade with the vast, well-populated interior. This is the ivory traffic. Already ivory is one of the main products exported from the central regions; and the consumption of the material by Great Britain alone is said to require the destruction of 44,000 elephants annually. No estimate with any pretension to authoritativeness can be formed of the amount of ivory

which Africa is capable of furnishing year by year, without serious diminution of the number and size of the herds which yield it; but there is much reason to believe that the vast region watered by the Congo and its tributaries is thronged with troops of the unwieldy animal, and might be made to yield during a long term of years double the supply that is at present obtained from all the ivory-producing regions in the world. Mr. Stanley found in one place "an ivory temple," which was a circular building supported on thirty-three huge elephants' tusks. These were carried off, and one hundred other pieces of ivory were collected, in the shape of log-wedges, long ivory horns, ivory pestles to pound cassava into meal, ivory armlets and balls, and ivory mallets. The "log-wedges" had been used to chop wood upon. In the chief's house was a veranda, or *bursah*, the posts of which were long tusks of ivory. Altogether, the ivory carried off from this single village was estimated, by a rough calculation, to be of the value of \$18,000 (£3600).

At present the traffic which produces by far the largest amount of commercial movement in Africa is the traffic in slaves. Notwithstanding the facts that the Emperor of Zanzibar has by special treaty with Queen Victoria engaged to suppress the trade, and that the Egyptian Government has undertaken important and expensive expeditions with (nominally) the same object, yet the traffic continues in unabated vigor, and were it not for the slave-trade, Africa would be at the present day almost wholly deserted by the merchants. Not only is domestic slavery an African institution—so deeply ingrained into the habits of the people that centuries must needs pass before it is eradicated—but the foreign slave-trade still flourishes, and whether in the north or in the south, in the "heart of Africa" or in the extremities, slaves are the staple produce of the soil, and slave-dealers have almost the whole of the existing trade in their own hands.

Legitimate commerce can never do her proper work in Africa until the accursed traffic in human flesh is put down, or at least confined within the narrowest possible limits. So long as the Egyptian authorities are half-hearted in the matter; so long as the Pasha, or "Khedive, in the north issues orders which are neutralized by his own authorities in the south;" so long as

the Gold Coast alone is carefully watched, and the Arab vessels are allowed to take what cargoes they please from the ports on the Egyptian coast of the Red Sea and from those of Mozambique, the trade will continue and will flourish, despite of any amount of philanthropic profession or even of international engagement. It is to be hoped that the governments of Europe will not relax their pressure upon the Egyptian authorities until the Nile slave-trade—the largest and most barbarously conducted branch of the traffic—is completely and finally suppressed. It is to be hoped, further, that they will not grudge the expenditure necessary to support the well-meaning Sultan of Zanzibar in his efforts to put a stop to the East African branch of the business, but will maintain a sufficient number of swift steamers on the Mozambique coast. That slavery will remain an African institution until Africa is Christianized, we have no doubt; but the foreign export of slaves may without much difficulty be stopped, and an end thereby put to the “desolating raids and horrible cruelties” which are now practised by the Arab traders of the interior.

Meanwhile legitimate commerce may well be expected to make efforts, and at any rate do something towards raising up a rival traffic to the unlawful one which has been the curse of Africa for so many ages. The geography of the continent is at the present time tolerably well ascertained; the character of the interior is well known, and the climate proved to be tolerable. The inhabitants have acquired a certain knowledge of white men, and entertain, beyond a doubt, a considerable respect for them. If there is still some danger to be affronted by the most peacefully disposed trader, as he moves from place to place, it is not much greater danger than has often been met and triumphed over by the spirit of commercial enterprise,—by the fur-hunters of the Hudson’s Bay Company, the gold-seekers of Australia, or the caravan-merchants of Turkestan and Kashgaria. “Nothing venture, nothing have.” We believe that there are many branches of trade which would amply repay the merchant who should convey a judicious assortment of European or American goods to Africa and exchange them for native products of no greater bulk, which might be readily conveyed to the coast by a small body of porters. Gold, ivory, skins, gums, spices, would form

an excellent return cargo for a vessel which went out laden with calico, red cloths, cotton prints, muslins, cutlery, looking-glasses, beads, needles, sugar, and tobacco. Of course the goods imported must vary somewhat with the locality; and perhaps the greatest profit would be made on a ship-load of bad guns from Birmingham and coarse gunpowder; but we cannot recommend traders at the present time to supply the Africans with implements of destruction, which would probably be directed mainly against themselves and their countrymen.

If commerce may thus be expected to play a large part in African civilization within a measurable number of years, still more may be hoped for from the love of enterprise, the attraction of a strange region and a strange life, and the desire of geographical discovery. The age of chivalry is past; but the spirit which animated it has not yet departed from the world. Our modern knight-errants are as brave and enterprising as the ancient ones, and as ready to penetrate into savage regions in quest of adventures. They take their lives in their hands, and with a score or two of followers plunge boldly into the mid-African wildernesses, brave all their perils, disappear from civilization on one coast and reappear on the opposite one, with no material object in view, but simply from a love of enterprise and a craving for distinction. Englishmen, Frenchmen, Portuguese, Germans, Americans, vie with each other in their readiness to go wherever there is an unknown country to explore or a dangerous region to traverse.

Besides the commercial spirit and the love of adventure and discovery, there is also a third motive at work, at least equally persistent and perhaps even more to be relied upon. This is the zeal of missionaries, the earnest desire of devoted Christian men to extend the kingdom of the Redeemer, and to spread the blessings of Christianity through the benighted regions now at length accessible to them. Notwithstanding the cold water that is thrown upon their efforts by some, notwithstanding the advice that is kindly tendered them to leave the civilization of the negro races to Mohammedans, and to "give the Arab a judicious support," Christian missionaries will continue to press into the "heart of Africa," introducing themselves wherever it is possible, braving all dangers, enduring all fatigues, suffering all man-

ner of losses, privations, pains, persecutions, miseries, animated solely by devotion to their Master's service, and by a longing to extend the benefits of civilization and true religion to their fellow-men. "The preaching of the Gospel," it has been observed by a recent French writer, "is capable of becoming the most active principle in the regeneration of the African nations. History shows that Christianity possesses a power peculiar to itself for drawing uncultivated races out of savagery and enabling them to mount rapidly the first stages of civilization." There is every reason to believe that, in the work of regenerating Africa, a leading part will be played by missionary societies, which will supply a succession of devoted and energetic men, banded together in communities and settled in stations, which will become centres of instruction, civilization, and enlightenment to the wild tribes dwelling around them.

In conclusion, we propose to give a brief sketch of what is actually done, and doing, towards the progress of civilization in Africa, and to point out her chief present needs.

In the north and the north-west, France is making considerable efforts. Besides establishing a protectorate over Tunis after a fashion that is not perhaps greatly to be commended, she is pushing her influence into the Desert from Algeria, and largely advancing it from her settlements upon the Senegal and Gambia into the region watered by the upper affluents of the Niger. An expedition under Captain Galliani has mapped the country for a thousand miles between Senegambia and Timbuctoo. A treaty has been made between France and the King of Segoo securing to French subjects the exclusive right to trade and navigation on the Upper Niger as far as the great emporium. France may be said now to dominate all North-western Africa between the tenth and the thirty-seventh parallels. She has recently sent an expedition under Lieutenant Sewalle to explore the Benuwe, or great eastern affluent of the Niger, but with what success we have not heard at present.

A German, Dr. Linz, has recently (1880) travelled from Tangiers to Timbuctoo by way of Morocco. He crossed the Atlas and anti-Atlas ranges, found the Sahara traversed by many high rocky chains, saw no signs of any depression of the desert, thus pretty well disposing of the idea that it might be possible to

create in the tract north-west of Timbuctoo a vast inland sea, and came away with the conviction that a "West-Sahara Railway" would be strenuously opposed by the Tuarik tribes, who now enjoy the entire carrying trade of the region, which gives employment to 40,000 camels.

On the west coast, the rivers Gaboon and Ogobai, already examined by M. du Chaillu, have been explored afresh by the French, and promise to become arteries of commerce for the equatorial region situated between the ninth and the fourteenth degrees of east longitude.

The Congo is being further explored by the intrepid traveller Henry M. Stanley, who is proceeding up the north bank of the river. Mr. T. J. Comber, a missionary, has made two attempts to reach Stanley Pool (E. long. 17°) from San Salvador, but has both times been baffled in his endeavor. He is now intending to follow in Stanley's wake.

The most promising field of present exploration is the south-east. In this quarter the London-African Trading Company and various missionary agencies, supported by several wealthy capitalists, are at work, and some considerable results have been accomplished. The Sultan of Zanzibar and the Portuguese Government—the principal local authorities—are friendly, and the former actively co-operates in many of the civilizing projects. Among the results aimed at and partly achieved by the missionary societies—Free Kirk, London, and Established Kirk of Scotland—are the formation of roads, the establishment of fixed routes with permanent stations, and the placing of steamboats upon the great lakes and rivers. One important road has been made, with surprising and most gratifying effects. It commences at Darer-Salaam on the east coast (S. lat. $6^{\circ} 45'$ nearly), and runs inland, towards the northern end of Lake Nyassa, a distance of seventy-three miles. Dr. Kirk, British Consul at Zanzibar, has recently traversed it, and finds it to have exerted a most extraordinary civilizing effect upon the inhabitants. Cultivation, he says, extends itself on either side of the route. The natives leave their stockaded villages in the depths of the forest, and build themselves single cottages near the road, from which they sow or plant the adjacent lands. Formerly no one could have crossed the region, which the road

traverses without a very strongly armed and numerous retinue; but now "any man may pass there without any weapon at all."

The *great* work now especially engaging the attention of missionaries and traders in these parts is the establishment of a regular route, supported by stations, and conducted along rivers or roads, from the mouth of the Zambesi to the northern end of Lake Tanganyika, a distance of more than 1400 miles. The line, as far as Lake Nyassa, is already laid down and in operation. It commences at the Kongoni mouth of the Zambesi, ascends the Zambesi, and then its tributary, the Shiré, to the Murchison Falls, 300 miles from the coast, and passes thence by sixty-five miles of road, *already made*, to Livingstonia, on the southern shore of the Nyassa. The Nyassa itself is navigated by a small steamer, the *Ilala*, which belongs to the Free Kirk Livingstonia Mission. It is liable to severe storms, but has a sufficient number of safe harbors on either side. Its northern end is found to be distant from Lake Tanganyika not more than 220 or 230 miles. The intermediate tract is for the most part a high table-land, abundantly watered by small streams, but without rivers; and here it is proposed to make a road. Ultimately there is good hope that a railway may bridge the space, for iron is abundant in the shape of brown hematite, "very hard and compact," and existing "in solid beds four or five feet thick;" and coal of a good quality has been found near the northern end of the Nyassa on the west coast, at about the point from which the road, or railway, would naturally start. At present the design is to make an ordinary road, with stations at Maliwanda and Mambwe, and to place a steamer on Lake Tanganyika, thus opening up to commerce and missionary exertion the entire territory between the eastern coast and the "heart of Africa," or the great central lake region, whence all the main rivers arise.

At the present moment the primary need of Africa is the need of roads. Omitting from consideration Algeria, Lower Egypt, and British Caffraria, there is scarcely more than a single road in the entire continent. The first requisite, for communication, for safety, for trade, even for access, is the formation and maintenance of recognized routes—by water, where possible; where impossible, by land—between the coast and the interior. The roads should be so laid out as to give place readily to tram-

ways, when the traffic justifies the outlay, the tramways themselves acting as temporary substitutes for the final rail. The second need is that of beasts of draught. Camels, largely employed in the north, are wholly unsuited for the moist equatorial regions; bullucks suffer so terribly from the tsetse fly that where they have been tried their use has had to be relinquished; the choice seems to lie between the ass and the buffalo, the former of which (if adopted) must be introduced by importation, while the latter must be reclaimed from its present savage condition and domesticated. For the present, there is no resource but to employ bullocks in the high, and human porters in the low regions, an unsatisfactory arrangement for many reasons.

The third great need is that of steamers upon the lakes and rivers. At present only one lake, the Nyassa, has a steamer upon it; and only one river, the Nile, can be said to be navigated by steamers. Even these do not run regularly beyond Assouan. A permanent line is wanted from Berber to Gondokoro—another from the Kongoni mouth of the Zambesi to the Murchison Falls—a third on the middle Congo—a fourth on the Niger and Benuwe. Tanganyika will soon, it is hoped, have its own steamboat, which will traverse in three or four days its 420 miles of open water. It is most desirable that Lake Tchad, the two Nyanzas, Albert and Victoria, the Muta Nzige (if it is indeed distinct from the Albert), Lake Bangweolo, should possess similar means of navigation. It would be possible even now to convey steamers, *in portions*, to all these localities, and after uniting the portions to launch the vessels upon the waters. But better roads than at present exist should precede or accompany the attempt to convey steamers to the inland basins, which would render their transit comparatively easy.

Lines of communication, whether by road, river, or lake, must be supported by permanent stations. These may be either trading, or missionary, or a combination of the two. Europeans must be their directors and managers; but natives may be largely employed in the minor parts. Preference should be given to natives whose home is at a distance. The great difficulty for some time to come will consist in the maintenance of the stations without an undue loss of life, either from climate or from hostile savages. A judicious choice of

localities will probably be sufficient to secure a fair average of health, especially in the upland regions, which are not insalubrious; but the occasional hostility of the natives, whatever care may be taken to avoid exciting it, must be counted on; and each station must be made strong enough to defend itself if attacked, and to inflict severe chastisement upon assailants. The good-will—even the protection—of the principal Mid-African chiefs may easily be secured by a system of subsidies; but in the divided state of the country and the looseness of the tie that binds even tributaries to their suzerain, no protection can be depended upon. There will always be robber-tribes and bandit-chiefs who fight for their own hand, like the knights and barons of the middle ages, and who will swoop upon any prey which is weak and excites their cupidity. If the European races are to subdue Africa, as they did the larger part of North America, without great military expeditions, by gradual occupancy and spread of influence, they must proceed in the same way, by making their stations strong and causing themselves to be at once feared and respected. The principles adopted by Mr. Stanley in his journey through the Dark Continent must be adhered to; friendly overtures must be made to all; hostilities must never be commenced; arms must be resorted to only in self-defence, to protect the lives of those wantonly attacked, and to “resist savagery.” We entertain a confident hope that, by these means, great strides may be made towards accomplishing the civilization of Africa within the next half or quarter of a century.

GEORGE RAWLINSON.

SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF INSPIRATION.

SOME surrender the plenary inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, and rest their authority on their acceptance by the moral consciousness of the believer. This is called the subjective theory of inspiration.

It is not a new theory. It had its origin in an attempt to explain alleged inaccuracies and imperfections in the divine record which are considered inconsistent with the idea of plenary inspiration. Two theories arose out of this attempt, that of degrees and the one which forms the subject of this article.

The first of these theories was brought out in the controversy occasioned by the work of Le Clerc (born at Geneva 1657, died 1736), which impugned the strict infallibility of the Scriptures and asserted the existence of more or less error in them. From the Reformation until that time distinct theories of inspiration were scarcely known in the church. The assertion of the absolute infallibility of the Holy Scriptures and the denial of all error in them rendered any theory except that of plenary inspiration unnecessary. Some of those who replied to Le Clerc admitted the existence of inaccuracies and imperfections in the sacred record inconsistent with the idea of absolute infallibility in every part and in every thing; and hence to retain the idea of inspiration along with admitted errors, they were obliged to have recourse to the theory of an inspiration varying in degree in different portions of Scripture—an inspiration consistent with human fallibility and imperfection. In those portions of Scripture in which they supposed error to exist they lowered the standard of inspiration; in those parts that consist of prophecies and essential doctrines they raised it to the highest degree. This is the theory of degrees.

The degrees which have been made by the advocates of this theory are : 1. *Superintendency*, by which God so influences and

directs the mind of any person as to keep him more secure from error than he would be by the use of his natural faculties. 2. *Plenary superintendent inspiration*, which excludes any mixture of error from the matter so superintended. 3. *Inspiration of elevation*, by which the faculties act in a regular and, as it seems, in a common manner, yet are raised to an extraordinary degree, so that the composition shall, upon the whole, have more of the true sublime or pathetic than natural genius can give. 4. *Inspiration of suggestion*, by which the use of the faculties is superseded and God speaks directly to the mind, making such discoveries to it as it could not otherwise obtain; and dictating the very words in which such discoveries are to be communicated, if they are designed as a message to others.

"This theory," Dr. Baneriman remarks, "admits of various modifications; and the distinctions in the contents of the Bible, and in the degrees of inspiration appropriate to each, may be multiplied to a greater or less extent. Under one or other of its aspects it has been held by Lowth, Whitby, and Doddridge in last century, and by Hill, Dick, Wilson, Pye Smith, and Henderson in the present."

As it is not our purpose to discuss this high, low, and broad, by turns, theory of inspiration, we now dismiss it.

The subjective theory had its origin, as it has been already intimated, from the same cause that originated the other. The aim of both was to explain alleged errors in the Holy Scriptures. Like the other, it admits of many modifications; and it receives from its advocates various forms of statement. Schleiermacher admitted the existence of error to almost any extent in the Bible, and reduced its authorship to a level with that of religious books written by ordinary Christians. The only distinction that he made is that the writers of the New Testament stood nearer than other men personally to Jesus Christ, the source of spiritual life. He precluded all intervention of the immediate efficiency of God in the world, with two exceptions, the creation of man and the incarnation of Christ. Everything else in the history of the world is natural. As a matter of course he eliminated the supernatural element from the Bible. Some German theologians, as Ullmann, Neander, Nitzsch, Tholuck, and others, gave this theory a stricter application. But the fundamental

principle of all is the same. Inspiration is regarded by them not as supernatural, not as the gift of God to preserve the sacred writers from error; but as the natural or gracious agency of God, common in a higher or lower degree to all Christians, and therefore consistent with mistakes, inconsistencies, and errors in the Scriptures. This view pervades the modern theology of Germany.

There are many theologians in that country who occupy still lower ground, and refer the Scriptures to natural revelation, common to reason in all men. Perhaps the ablest advocates of this view were Wegscheider, in Germany, and Theodore Parker, in the United States. These theologians and their followers maintain that the sacred writers were aided by no power apart from that rational and moral nature which God had given them. Schleiermacher and his followers hold that they were aided by a gracious influence from God acting upon their religious consciences. By Schleiermacher inspiration is assigned to the religious nature of man; by Wegscheider to the natural. Both exclude supernatural guidance or control. This theory, like that of degrees, is very accommodating: it suits both naturalist and spiritualist.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge was the chief agent in introducing this theory into England, where the influence of his name and genius gained for it a currency among many minds of no common order. Arnold, Hare, Maurice, and others of equal fame embraced and disseminated it.

The "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," contained in seven letters addressed to a "Friend," exhibit Coleridge's views, but give no systematic exposition of the theory. He says:

"And need I say that I have met everywhere [in perusing the Old and New Testaments] more or less copious sources of truth and power and purifying impulses; that I have found words for my inmost thoughts, songs for my joy, utterances for my hidden griefs, and pleadings for my shame and feebleness? In short, whatever *finds* me bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit, even from the same Spirit *which remaining in itself, yet regenerateth all other powers, and in all ages entering into holy souls, maketh them friends of God and prophets.*" (Wisd. vii.)

"In my last Letter I said that in the Bible there is more that *finds* me than I have experienced in all other books put together; that the words of

the Bible find me at greater depths of my being; and that whatever finds me brings with it an irresistible evidence of its having proceeded from the Holy Spirit."

"I comprise and conclude the sum of my conviction in this one sentence: Revealed Religion (and I know of no religion not revealed) is in its highest contemplation the unity—that is, the identity or coherence—of Subjective and Objective. It is in itself, and irrelatively, at once Inward Life and Truth and Outward Fact and Luminary. . . . As much of reality, as much of objective truth, as the Scriptures communicate to the subjective experiences of the believer, so much of present life, of living and effective import, do these experiences give to the letter of these Scriptures."

Coleridge was not a systematic writer. It was reserved for J. D. Morell to introduce German philosophy into England in systematic form. Tho Mr. Morell cannot be classed with any particular school, he has exhibited a greater approximation to the Eclecticism of Cousin than to any other system. In his work on the "Philosophy of Religion," he defines Revelation to be "a process of the intuitional consciousness, gazing upon eternal verities; while theology is the reflection of the understanding upon those vital intuitions, so as to reduce them to a logical and scientific expression. Revelation and Inspiration indicate one united process, the result of which upon the human mind is to produce a state of spiritual intuition, whose phenomena are so extraordinary that we at once separate the agency by which they are produced from any of the ordinary principles of human development. And yet this agency is applied in perfect consistency with the laws and natural operations of our spiritual nature. Inspiration does not imply anything generically new in the actual processes of the human mind; it does not involve any form of intelligence essentially different from what we already possess; it indicates rather the elevation of the religious consciousness, and with it, of course, the power of spiritual vision, to a degree of intensity peculiar to the individuals thus highly favored of God."

This theory of inspiration, in its different forms, may be briefly stated in the three following propositions:

I. Inspiration belongs to the sphere of the natural intelligence.

II. Inspiration belongs to the sphere of the spiritual, and

consists in a gracious influence from God acting upon the religious consciousness.

III. That is inspired which "*finds*" a man, or lays hold on his religious consciousness.

The discussion of these propositions now claims our attention.

I. Those who hold that inspiration belongs to the sphere of the natural intelligence make it the result of the exercise of the mental faculties. Moses was inspired as Solon was inspired, David as Burns, Solomon as Shakespeare, Isaiah as Milton, and Paul as Bishop Butler. In other words, inspiration is nothing more than genius, or an illumination of the rational consciousness. Those who deny the supernatural are, of course, shut up to this view. But does it explain all the facts of the case? When it is affirmed that Isaiah was inspired, do we understand by the affirmation that he had merely exalted genius? that he possessed merely a highly illuminated rational consciousness? These are both true; but they do not express the whole truth. The belief of the church has always been that he and all the writers of the Old and New Testaments were supernaturally inspired; and its belief is supported by good and substantial reasons.

I. Tho the term inspiration is sometimes used in a vague, loose sense, yet, as applied to the Holy Scriptures, it has always been employed to distinguish them from all other writings. Hence they have been called the *Holy Scriptures*, the *Divine Instrument*, the *Sacred Digest*, the *Divine Oracles*. St. Paul uses the phrase *γραφὴ θεόπνευστος* (*god-breathed Scripture*) (2 Tim. iii. 16). St. Peter, speaking of prophecy, says men spoke from God, *ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι* (*borne onward by the Holy Ghost*) (2 Pet. i. 21). Josephus expresses the same idea by the phrase *τῷ θεῷ πνεύματι κεινήμενος*. Our Lord asks: *Πῶς οὖν Δαυὶδ ἐν πνεύματι καλεῖ*, etc. (Matt. xxii. 43). Gregory of Nyssa commenting on this passage says: "Hence those of the saints who by the power of the Spirit are full of God are inspired, and therefore all Scripture is called *θεόπνευστος*, because the instruction is by divine inspiration."

These passages and many others that might be cited fix the idea of inspiration. It is not "an illumination of the rational

consciousness;" but it constituted the man who possessed it an organ of God in what he said. His words were the words of God (1 Thess. i. 13); yet he did not speak as a machine, but as a conscious, voluntary agent.

This doctrine is in harmony with the belief of all nations. In every age and in every country the idea has obtained that God has access to the human mind, that he can control it, and that he has occasionally chosen particular men to be his organs in communicating his will to mankind. The Greeks called such persons *θεοφόροι* (bearers of God). The term *ἐνθεος* (God within) was also applied to one gifted of heaven with prophecy (*Æsch. Eumenides*; 17).

In Palestine, in Greece, and in other countries there were many men who possessed a high illumination of the rational consciousness, *e.g.* some of the kings of Judah and of Israel, Philo Judæus, Hillel, Gamaliel, Plato, Aristotle, Carneades, and many others, who were never considered inspired. The term inspiration was limited to the sayings and writings of those who were believed to be the chosen organs for the communication of the Divine Will. This is the historical sense of the word.

2. The "illumination of the rational consciousness" does not and cannot account for objective revelations. The theory of naturalism denies them; but they nevertheless exist as Bible facts, which the most ingenious criticism has been unable to explain on naturalistic principles. The Messianic predictions—that the Messiah was to be of the seed of Abraham, of the house of David; that he was to be born of a virgin, in Bethlehem; that he was to suffer a violent death and be buried—and the apocalypses of Daniel and John could not proceed from the illumination of the rational consciousness however exalted. Such truths owe their origin to supernatural revelation, not to intuition or the operation of the mental faculties. They lie without the sphere of the natural intelligence, and cannot become the subjects of it by the ordinary laws of its exercise. They must be made known by revelation. Genius may carry its possessor to lofty heights; but it cannot unveil the future. It may make a man god-like, but it cannot reveal the divine counsels.

These remarks proceed, of course, upon the assumption of the supernatural, which naturalists deny. But on the principles

of naturalism, how can the facts of Scripture be explained without violence to its truth?

3. Inspiration, which consists in the "illumination of the rational consciousness," places the sayings and teaching of Christ on a level with those of Socrates; the writings of Paul and of John with those of Plato and of Aristotle. This leaves us without the resource of appeal to an authority which is final and binding upon all. Every man is his own advocate, witness, judge, and jury, and there may be as many different decisions as there are cases for trial, and each of equal authority. We do not deny the Protestant doctrine of the right of private judgment. That doctrine has always been held in perfect consistency with the belief of the infallible authority of Holy Scripture. The Reformers always appealed to the Bible as the ultimate authority, and justified by it their secession from the Roman Catholic Church.

When our Saviour represented David as speaking by the Holy Ghost (Matt. xxii. 43), and asserted that the Scripture cannot be broken (John x. 35); when Paul says that the words of David were the words of the Holy Ghost (Heb. iii. 7), and that the things which he wrote were the commandments of the Lord (1 Cor. xiv. 37), they both surely meant something more than the "illumination of the rational consciousness." The sacred writers claim, in many portions of their writings, to be the organs of God, and that what they said God said (Is. li. 16; Jer. i. 9; i. John iv. 6). Such claims, unless true, could only proceed from lunatics instead of men elevated by the "illumination of the rational consciousness." But the sacred writers were not lunatics. If they were, millions have been made lunatics by believing their statements; and among these millions many universally acknowledged to have attained to a high degree of illumination of the reason; but who, notwithstanding that illumination, never claimed infallibility on the ground that they were the organs of the Divine Will.

II. We come now to treat of a higher form of this theory.

Inspiration, it is alleged, belongs to the sphere of the spiritual, and consists in a gracious influence from God acting upon the religious consciousness. It is "identical with that grace and communion with the Spirit which the church under all circum-

stances, and every regenerate member of the church of Christ, is permitted to hope and instructed to pray for." Coleridge made an exception to this in favor of the law and the prophets, no jot or tittle of which can pass away; but this exception is not admitted, unless it be in very few instances, by those who believe in gracious inspiration.

What are we to understand by "that grace and communion with the Spirit which the Church under all circumstances, and every regenerate member of the Church of Christ, is permitted to hope and instructed to pray for"? Coleridge explains it to be the "actuation of the Holy Spirit," by which, "without any sensible addition or infusion, the writer or speaker uses and applies his existing gifts of power and knowledge. . . . The holy writers—the so-called *Hagiographi*—themselves, nor any fair interpretations of Scripture, assert any such absolute diversity, or enjoin the belief of any greater difference of degree, than the experience of the Christian world, grounded on, and growing with, the comparison of these Scriptures with other works holden in honor by the churches, has established."

A distinction, as already intimated, has been made that the authors of the New Testament stood nearer than other men to Christ personally, from whom all the influences of spiritual life emanate; but notwithstanding this nearness in locality and time to Christ, inspiration is regarded as the natural or gracious agency of God, common in a larger or less measure to all Christian men. This distinction is based upon the assumption that the immediate followers of Christ, who accompanied him and conversed with him, possessed a larger measure of grace than any of his subsequent followers. This is an assertion that no one has authority to make. Who will positively affirm that Matthew had more grace than Bunyan or Baxter? that Mark had a larger measure of the fruits of the Spirit than Henry Martyn?

We do not deny that the gracious operations of the Holy Spirit upon the soul elevate and purify our intellectual and moral nature. We cannot draw near to the Fountain of light without reflecting more of its radiance. We cannot converse with Infinite Holiness without being changed into the divine image. But a man may be enlightened and sanctified, without

being inspired in the etymological, historical, scriptural, and ecclesiastical sense of the word inspiration.

1. This form of the subjective theory of inspiration does not account, any more than the naturalistic form, for supernatural communications that were made to men of all characters and of different degrees of religious attainment. Revelations were made to Abimelech, Balaam, Pharaoh, and Nebuchadnezzar, as well as to Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, Isaiah, and Daniel. These facts show that God did not limit his communications to men advanced in spiritual life and enlightened in divine things. Revelations are not granted to men on the ground of sanctification or subjective holiness.

Coleridge admits the distinction between "revelation by the Eternal Word and actuation of the Holy Spirit," and says "there is a positive difference of kind—a chasm the pretended overleaping of which constitutes imposture or betrays insanity." But his followers generally "ignore this distinction and refer the whole Bible to an inspiration the same as what every believer enjoys."

The author of the "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit" is right in saying that there is a positive difference of kind between "revelation by the Eternal Word and actuation of the Holy Spirit," by which he means, according to his own explanation, the "predisposing, aiding, and directing actuation of God's Holy Spirit," under which "the writer or speaker uses and applies his existing gifts of power and knowledge." Between them lies the chasm which separates the "truth coming to man from the fountain of truth, and linking man's understanding and heart to the wisdom that is from above; making him partaker of its divine fulness and infallible certainty;" we say between this truth and that "truth coming to man from the uncertain discoveries of his own rational inquiry or spiritual insight, making his fallible nature to be its own teacher, and its erring dictates to be a revelation to himself."

2. What has been said pertains to *revelation*. But it may be asked, What need is there of distinguishing between *inspiration* and that common grace of the Holy Spirit bestowed upon all believers?

By inspiration, we think, the church has generally under-

stood, as it is well expressed by Archdeacon Lee, "that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit, in whatever degree or manner it may have been exercised, guided by which the human agents chosen by God have officially proclaimed his will by word of mouth, or have committed to writing the several portions of the Bible." This view of inspiration lies between the theory of verbal dictation and that of degrees, and is probably held by a large majority of the evangelical church in this country and in Great Britain. It claims objective inspiration for the whole Bible. Its authors were "chosen by God" and "proclaimed his will officially." This notion of inspiration differs very much from that of the common grace of the Holy Spirit bestowed upon all believers.

3. Has the church understood the two as identical?

The answer must be given in the negative.

The church from the earliest times, both by its representative divines and by its general councils, has so understood the sacred writings as to make a broad distinction between them and those of ordinary believers, on the ground that the former claim and furnish evidence of divine authority, while the latter do not. The early church fathers—men full of faith and of the Holy Ghost—never thought of putting their own writings on a level with those of the prophets, apostles, and evangelists. The very idea would have shocked them. They called the Scriptures the "Divine Oracles," a phrase which neither they nor the church ever applied to the writings of any man, however learned and holy, outside of the Bible.

4. The theory that identifies the inspiration of the sacred writers with that grace which is common to all Christians is inconsistent with the declaration of the Saviour, that "the Scripture cannot be broken" (John x. 35); with the words that he puts into the mouth of Abraham (Luke xvi. 29, 31), in which he makes the authority of "Moses and the prophets" equal to that of a miracle; with his command to "search the Scriptures" (John v. 39); with the declarations of Paul (1 Cor. xvi. 22; Gal. i. 8, 9); and with the fact that God confirmed the preaching of the apostles "with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost" (Heb. ii. 4).

Throughout the whole Bible we find the claim of authority.

It speaks as no other book speaks. Its language is, "Thus saith the Lord:" hear and obey. This is true not only of prophetic revelations, but also of doctrines and precepts. Has any believer, possessed of the common grace of the Holy Spirit, ever claimed such authority? Or if he has made the claim, has it ever been accorded to him?

III. We will now briefly consider the third form of this theory; viz., That is inspired which *finds* a man, or lays hold on his religious consciousness.

This may be denominated a proof of inspiration derived from feeling, or from the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit. This method of proof was proposed, in early times, for the purpose of determining the canonicity of such or such a book placed among the *antilegomena*, or the authenticity of such or such a doubtful passage. It was thought that a true believer received, while reading the Holy Scriptures, an impression produced by the Holy Spirit which assured him of the divine origin of the book, or of the passage in dispute.¹

1. This argument is hypothetical and individual, and of no value. It is fallacious; for applied to inspiration it constitutes that form of the fallacy, *petitio principii*, which logicians call "arguing in a circle." To prove the inspiration of the sacred writer, or of any passage of Scripture, the reader must be inspired.

2. If we are to understand by "the religious consciousness" that inward state of mind which enables us to apprehend truth, and which is produced by whatever purifies and exalts our religious feelings, then the proof derived from it, in behalf of inspiration, is very vague. It does not relate particularly to any doctrine, passage, or book of Scripture. It varies with the intensity of the religious consciousness. To-day it may be very strong; to-morrow very weak.

A man who loses his religious consciousness and becomes a reprobate could say, "The Scriptures are not inspired: my present consciousness furnishes me no proof of it. It is true that my past consciousness testified differently; but that is lost, and with it the proof of the inspiration of the Bible; for that

¹ Cell  rier, Manuel d'Hermeneutique Biblique, p. 273

proof is subjective." This is certainly a very convenient doctrine for a man who has abandoned the faith and wishes to renounce the restraints of all external authority.

3. This form of the theory of subjective inspiration leads to the conclusion that one portion of the Bible may be inspired to one man and not inspired to another. The seventh chapter of Romans may "*find*" the man who believes in remaining corruption or indwelling sin, but not the perfectionist. A jubilant psalm would not "*find*" the melancholy Cowper; neither would the *Miserere* "*find*" a man without David's penitential experience. Must we, therefore, conclude that the perfectionist is at liberty to deny the inspiration of the seventh chapter of Romans; and that the Christian, whose life has been a continuous stream of spiritual joy, may deny the inspiration of the fifty-first psalm? If that only is inspired which "*finds*" one, what other conclusion can we reach?

4. On this hypothesis, what authority can the Scriptures have with the impenitent and unbelieving? Their "religious consciousness," if they have any, must be very feeble. They say, "We do not feel the power of the Scriptures: they do not 'find' us." Must they admit as a principle of belief, or must we admit for them, that the Bible is not inspired until it "*finds*" them? that its inspiration depends upon their religious consciousness?

5. Coleridge states this mode of inspiration in another form. "Revealed Religion," he remarks, "is in its highest contemplation the unity—that is, the identity or coherence—of Subjective and Objective."

The metaphysical principle on which the doctrine of the identity of subjective and objective rests is this: "The laws of Nature must exist within us as the laws of Consciousness; and, *vice versa*, the laws of Consciousness are found to exist in objective nature as the laws of Nature." These unite in the infinite. In this way "Schelling founded his system on the *original identity* of that which knows and that which is known, and was led to conclude the absolute identity of the subjective and objective, or the Indifference of the Differing."¹

¹ Tennemann's Manual of the History of Philosophy.

This doctrine of the identity of that which knows and that which is known is very abstruse, and belongs to a system of philosophy which has not many advocates at the present day. As an explanation of the mode of revelation it scarcely deserves mention. Tennemann justly remarks: "The system is deficient in the solidity of its principles. It is not shown in what manner the human mind can elevate itself to the intellectual perception described; the principles, therefore, laid down are mere suppositions. *Thought* without a *thinking subject* is nothing better than an abstract idea. Absolute identity is inconceivable independent of relative identity."

CHARLES ELLIOTT. .

OUR PUBLIC DEBTS.

THE permanent advancement of prosperity throughout the world has undoubtedly been largely promoted by enormous public loans. According to a little book recently published in London,¹ public debt in the last ten years has increased 43 per cent, but this the author thinks is by no means alarming because the tangible increments of wealth since 1870 would suffice to pay off 88 per cent of all existing national debts. The same authority gives the aggregate national debts of Europe in 1870 at \$14,700,000,000, and in 1880 at \$22,265,000,000—an increase of \$7,565,000,000, or nearly 51½ per cent. The national debts of the newer countries of the world, excepting the United States, have increased enormously in the last decade; but our own national debt has decreased over 20 per cent in the period. I shall attempt in this article to present in concise form some interesting facts in regard to the magnitude not only of our national debt, but of our State, county, and municipal indebtedness, showing their relative burden on the tax-payer, the purposes for which these loans have been contracted, and as far as possible indicate when they will become due, the rate of interest they bear, and the annual burden of interest. The principal aim will be a clear presentation of fresh facts relating to this entire subject as it affects the United States, earnestly believing that the American people want exact statistics, especially on State and local finance, and that the intelligence of the reader will supply such deductions and conclusions as the pressure of important statistical information has unavoidably abridged.

The history of the national debt of the United States may

¹ "Balance-Sheet of the World," Mulhall.

be fairly divided into five periods, the first of these extending from September 5, 1774, to March 4, 1789. By various resolutions of the Continental Congress from June 22, 1775, to November 29, 1779, inclusive, the several issues of paper money amounted in the aggregate to \$241,552,780. In addition to a subsidy of \$1,815,000 given to the colonies by the king of France, three loans were made from the same source amounting to \$6,352,500, inclusive of \$181,500 secured from the French Farmers-General, to be paid for in tobacco. In addition to a subsidy of \$181,500 from the king of Spain, small loans were obtained from private bankers amounting to \$174,017.13. Four loans were made in Holland, through the agency of John Adams, amounting to \$3,600,000. Included in this period should be the certificates of indebtedness given to the French officers who served in the American army. These certificates, amounting to \$186,988.78, were to bear interest at 6 per cent from January 1, 1784.

The second period extends from March, 1789, to January 1, 1812. During this period the whole amount of loans made by the government amounted in the aggregate to \$109,450,183.71, divided as follows :

From Holland.....	\$9,400,000
Temporary loans from Bank of the United States.....	9,700,000
Temporary loans from Bank of New York and Bank of North America.....	923,204 37
Stock loans, bearing 6 per cent interest.....	14,791,700
Revolutionary debt refunded at 6 per cent.....	30,088,397 75
Revolutionary debt refunded at 6 per cent, } Interest from January 1, 1800, }	14,649,328 76
Revolutionary debt, being interest due refunded by the issue of 3 per cents.....	19,718,751 01
The balance due on the French debt paid off by issuing 4½-per-cent stock.....	176,000 00
The balance due on the French debt paid off by issuing 5½-per-cent stock.....	1,848,900 00
Old 6-per-cent stock refunded in 1807.....	6,294,051 12
Old 3-per-cent stock refunded at 6 to 5 per cent in 1807, and 6-per-cents issued in lieu.....	1,859,850 70

From January, 1812, to January 1, 1837, may be considered the third period, during which the whole amount of loans amounted to \$153,565,315.70, divided as follows :

Treasury notes issued.....	\$36,680,794 00
4½-per-cent stocks.....	10,000,000 00
5-per-cent stocks.....	12,735,295 43
6-per-cent stocks, including temporary loans during the existence of the war.....	71,761,173 55
7-per-cent stock issued.....	9,070,386 00
Mississippi stock, bearing no interest, issued in settle- ment of the Yazoo frauds.....	4,282,151 12
Old 6-per-cent-stocks refunded in 1812.....	2,984,746 72
War loans of 1812-14 refunded into 5-per-cent stock...	56,704 77
War loans of 1812-14 refunded into 4½-per-cent stock...	5,994,064 11

In the fourth period, from January 1, 1837, to March 1, 1861, the whole amount of loans negotiated amounted to \$232,024,592.63, embracing :

Treasury notes bearing interest.....	\$110,823,700 00
5-per-cent interest stock loans.....	45,002,782 15
6-per-cent interest stock loans.....	76,198,110 48

The fifth period began with the outbreak of the war and continues to the present time, tho for convenience I have placed the date from March 1, 1861, to June 30, 1880. During this period the following loans were contracted :

6-per-cent bonds....	\$2,429,919,291 65
4-per-cent bonds.....	1,455,266,370 07
3-per-cent bonds.....	99,155,000 00
4½-per-cent bonds.....	250,000,000 00
5-per-cent bonds.....	714,112,450 00
Interest-bearing notes.....	552,972,640 00
No interest.....	3,673,068,906 97
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	9,174,494,658 69
7 ³ / ₁₆ interest-bearing coupon notes.....	970,094,750 00
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	\$10,144,589,408 69

To briefly summarize the ground covered, the following table has been prepared :

First period.....	\$10,313,505 91
Second period.....	109,450,183 71
Third period.....	153,565,315 70
Fourth period.....	232,024,592 63
Fifth period.....	10,144,589,408 69
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Total.....	\$10,649,943,006 64

This brief account of the national debt would hardly be complete without a summary of the recent investigation into the ownership of the registered bonds made by the Wealth, Debt, and Taxation Division of the Census Office. From this account it would seem that at the dates nearest the census year there were \$1,173,749,250 of registered bonds outstanding. From this amount \$180,926,700 of six per cents, the interest on which was payable only in ten large cities, must be deducted, leaving \$992,822,550 of the other three species of registered bonds, owned as follows :

Private individuals and corporations.....	\$644,990,400
Foreign holders.....	27,894,350
National banks (to secure circulation).....	319,937,800
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	\$992,822,550

The aggregate number of holders of four, four and a half, five, and six per cent registered bonds is 80,802, and the aggregate amount held is \$825,917,100, as seen below :

LOANS.	Number of holders and amounts held of the 4 per cent, 4½ per cent, 5 per cent, and 6 per cent loans.			
	Number of holders.	Amounts.	Holders, per cent.	Amounts, per cent.
4 per cent.....	55,278	\$384,742,800	68.41	46.58
4½ per cent.....	10,745	125,631,300	13.30	15.22
5 per cent.....	7,091	134,616,300	8.78	16.29
6 per cent.....	7,688	180,926,700	9.51	21.91
Total.....	80,802	\$825,917,100	100.00	100.00

Omitting the six per cent bonds from the calculation, we find that of the total number of holders (73,114) of four, four and a half, and five per cent registered bonds, 42,262 are males, 29,325 are females, and 1527 are corporations; and of the amount held the males own \$327,185,500, the females \$90,353,350, and the corporations \$227,451,550. The average per capita for the male holders is \$7,741.84; for the female holders, \$3,081.10; for the corporations, \$148,953.20; and for both sexes and the corporations, \$8821.70. Of the \$644,990,400 no less than \$410,279,400 is held in amounts of over fifty thousand dollars;

\$58,730,600 in amounts varying from twenty-five thousand to fifty thousand dollars; \$59,143,850 in amounts exceeding ten thousand dollars and reaching to twenty-five thousand dollars; \$41,079,900 in amounts exceeding five thousand and reaching to ten thousand dollars; \$33,070,950 in amounts exceeding twenty-five hundred and reaching to five thousand dollars; \$22,032,550 in amounts of over one thousand and including twenty-five hundred dollars; \$13,097,250 in amounts of over five hundred dollars and including one thousand; and \$7,555,900 in amounts of less than five hundred dollars. The distribution of the registered bondholders, male and female and corporations, in the four geographical divisions of the United States, is indicated in the following exhibit :

LOCATION.	HOLDERS.							
	Male.		Female.		Corporation.		Total.	
	Num- ber.	Rate per ct.	Num- ber.	Rate per ct.	Num- ber.	Rate per ct.	Num- ber.	Rate per ct.
New England States.....	14,633	34.62	11,986	40.85	26,619	36.40
Middle States.....	18,723	44.30	12,580	42.90	31,303	42.82
Southern States.....	1,721	4.07	914	3.13	2,635	3.60
Western States.....	7,185	17.01	3,845	13.12	11,030	15.09
Banks, insurance compan- ies, trust companies, etc. }	1,527	1,527	2.09
Total.....	42,262	100.00	29,325	100.00	1,527	73,114	100.00

The above represents the number of holders. The following table, taken from the same source, exhibits the amounts held :

LOCATION.	AMOUNTS.							
	Male.		Female.		Corporation.		Total.	
	Amount.	Rate p'r ct.	Amount.	Rate p'r ct.	Amount.	Rate p'r ct.	Amount.	Rate p'r ct.
New England States	\$50,142,500	15.33	\$20,829,550	23.06	\$70,972,050	11.00
Middle States.....	223,225,150	68.22	55,783,100	61.74	279,008,250	43.26
Southern States....	10,241,250	3.13	2,898,550	3.21	13,139,800	2.04
Western States.....	43,576,600	13.32	10,842,150	11.99	54,418,750	8.44
Banks, insurance } companies, trust companies, etc.. }	\$227,451,550	227,451,550	35.26
Total.....	\$327,185,500	100.00	\$90,353,350	100.00	\$227,451,550	\$644,990,400	100.00

These two tables bring out the fact that while over thirty-six per cent of the holders reside in the New England States, not more than eleven per cent of the aggregate amount of bonds are credited to New England. On the other hand, over forty-two per cent of the holders have their residence in the Middle States, and upwards of forty-three per cent of the aggregate amount of bonds is held in that section. Over three and one-half per cent of the holders reside in the Southern States, and about two per cent of the bonds are owned there. In the Western States are fifteen per cent of the holders and nearly eight and one-half per cent of the bonds. The banks, insurance companies, and other corporations, representing in number only two per cent, own about thirty-five per cent of the bonds. Massachusetts with only three and a-half per cent of the total population of the country, has twenty-three per cent of the bondholders, while New York with over ten per cent of the total population, has twenty per cent of the bondholders.

Until within the last twenty years the question of local indebtedness has never assumed a serious form in the United States. Beginning the present century with only six cities, which number had increased in 1850 to eighty-five, it is not surprising that up to that time the danger of city indebtedness had not been felt to any great extent. Until the advent of railroads there was but little inducement for counties to contract debts; and the other minor civil divisions, such as townships, small villages, and school districts, are not now nor have they ever (excepting perhaps in two or three States) been seriously affected by the mania to run into debt.

The history of the public debts of the United States, other than the national debt, properly begins with the State debts. From 1820 to 1825 the aggregate of State debts amounted to twelve or thirteen millions. From 1825 to 1830 it stood at thirteen millions; but during the period from 1830 to 1835 it rose to forty millions. During the next seven years the greater part of the debt which caused so much financial embarrassment in 1841-42 was contracted, and the State governments laid the foundation for a series of financial disasters which have since overtaken many of our States, and disgraced us both at home and abroad. The increase and decrease of State debts in the

United States from this period to the present time may be seen from the following table, which I have carefully prepared from original sources :

STATES.	1842.	1852.	1860.	1870.	1880.
New England	\$7,158,274	\$6,862,265	\$7,398,060	\$50,348,550	\$49,969,514
Middle.	73,348,072	79,510,726	86,416,045	79,834,481	45,672,575
Southern....	73,340,017	64,499,726	93,046,934	174,486,452	113,967,243
Western....	59,931,553	42,993,185	49,395,325	44,018,911	36,565,360
Pacific.....	2,159,403	4,178,504	4,547,389
Total ...	\$213,777,916	\$196,025,305	\$236,256,364	\$352,866,898	\$250,722,081

The aggregate of the State debts to-day only exceeds by about thirty-seven million dollars the aggregate of the same class of indebtedness forty years ago. The table also shows a decrease of over one hundred and two million dollars, or of nearly twenty nine per cent, since 1870. Unhappily this has not been all paid, and, while some of the States have honestly reduced their debts, we have had of late years too many painful examples of State repudiation and dishonor to see any cause for congratulation in this decrease of State indebtedness.

The dearth of statistics renders it impossible to make a similar comparison to the above in county, city, town, township, and school-district indebtedness. Few who have not made the attempt could appreciate the difficulties that beset one on every side in the preparation of the little table on State debts; and to attempt a like presentation of local indebtedness would simply be impossible. The first systematic attempt to collect this class of statistics was made by Francis A. Walker, Superintendent of the United States Census in 1870. The result was not in any way satisfactory to that eminent statistician. The Census Office had no power to deal directly with the officers of counties, municipalities, townships, school districts, and other local debt-creating boards, and hence he was obliged to accept the returns as sent in by the United States marshals. There was no means of ascertaining the actual indebtedness of any particular city, town, village, or township, nor of the total indebtedness of the school districts. The items were all aggregated under the several headings "County Debt" and "City, Town, and Village

Debt." A division was made of the bonded debt, and a column, presumably of floating debt, appeared under the caption "All other." The sinking funds, and other assets and credits set aside for the payment of the debt, were not taken into consideration at all.¹ The result of this investigation may be briefly epitomized as follows:

DEBT OTHER THAN NATIONAL, AS REPORTED BY U. S. CENSUS, 1870.

CLASSES OF DEBTS.	Gross Debts.	Per cent.
State debt.....	\$352,866,693	40.62
County debt.....	137,565,540	21.59
City and town debt.....	328,244,520	37.79
Total....	\$868,676,753	100.00

In the right-hand column of the above table I have worked out the per cent of each class of debt according to the report of the Ninth Census. Of the debts found by this inquiry over 40 per cent were State debts, over 21 per cent county debts, and nearly 38 per cent the debts of cities, towns, etc. Before undertaking any comparison of the results of the two census investigations it will be necessary to briefly allude to the method adopted in 1880.

This branch of the Census work, the Wealth, Debt, and Taxation Division, as it was termed, was carried on entirely in Washington, and the facts were all obtained by the aid of direct correspondence with the local offices throughout the United States. Schedules were prepared with a view to suit the size of the places to which they were to be sent. To the large cities elaborate schedules were mailed, which not only called for an exact statement of the bonded and the floating debt, but also for the date of issue of the various classes of bonds, the date of maturity, the rate of interest, and the purposes for which the bonds were issued; also the amount of sinking fund or other assets and credits set aside for the payment of the debt. To the smaller cities and towns and villages a still simpler form of

¹ The census of 1880 shows that these assets in 311 cities and towns aggregate \$117,191,506.

blank was issued, and in some of the townships and school districts a postal card proved effective and secured answers, to the seven important questions. The extent of this correspondence, and the difficulties of securing lists, not only of the names of financial officers, but of the municipal corporations themselves, were great. The preliminary work was as difficult as the actual work of gathering the statistics. The authorities of every county had to be applied to for the names of the municipal corporations within its area; and after replies had been received from the twenty-four hundred counties it was found that in many States the entire work must be revised, and circulars addressed directly to the places named by the county clerks or auditors asking the question, "Is — an incorporated village or not?" In this way hundreds of the names originally placed on the lists were excluded. The lists of the minor civil divisions of the United States are formidable documents, as the reader may imagine when he realizes there are about 2400 counties; 311 cities and towns with a population of 7500 and upwards; about 8000 incorporated cities, villages, and other small places with a population below 7500; about 12,000 townships having a financial existence, and 105,000 school districts possessing a debt-creating and tax-levying power. To some of the larger and more important of these places as many as twenty letters were written before the schedule could be absolutely declared complete. There were others, probably fifty per cent, that replied with both accuracy and promptness. In several cases the editors of newspapers and prominent individuals were addressed and requested kindly to call the attention of the local authorities to the importance of this work. Almost unanimously did these letters meet with response. Editors called attention to the delinquency in their newspapers, governors and State auditors touched the State pride of the delinquent officers, and in some instances prominent business men dropped their work and filled out the schedule with their own hands.¹ With such an awakened interest, and thousands of willing assistants in all parts of the country, it is not surprising that this class of statis-

¹ One city schedule sent to this division of the Census was filled out by an ex-Vice-President of the United States.

tics is complete and satisfactory. Every municipal incorporation of over 1000 population has sent in a correct report, which has been amended, approved, and tabulated. There still remain scattered over the country a few post-towns in the South and backwoods places in the North-west and in the Territories, from which no returns have been received. But these delinquents cannot affect the results, and for all practical purposes the report is complete. The counties, too, have all reported their indebtedness, and substantially the same holds true of the hundred and five thousand school districts.

The result of this inquiry, so far as it relates to the large cities, is known in the Census Office with certainty, but only a preliminary addition has been made in the county, township, school-district, and small city branches of the work. The following table must therefore be taken with some allowance for possible corrections:

DEBTS OTHER THAN NATIONAL, AS REPORTED BY U. S. CENSUS, 1880.

CLASSES OF DEBTS.	Gross Debts.	Per cent.
State.....	\$250,722,081	21.11
County.....	125,001,258	10.52
Township.....	27,423,084	2.31
School district.....	18,844,415	1.59
Cities and towns over 7500 population.....	710,535,924	59.83
Cities and towns under 7500 population.....	55,009,836	4.64
Total.....	\$1,187,536,598	100.00

Returning to the point of digression, we find that the State debts which in 1870 represented over 40 per cent of this burden of debt, to-day represent only 21 per cent of it. The county debts, which undoubtedly included all the school-district and township indebtedness discovered by the marshals, represented $21\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the total debt, instead of only $10\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The cities and towns now bear about 64 per cent of the burden, whereas in 1870 about 37 per cent was their share. If the township and school-district debts are included in the county debts, and all municipalities are placed together, the following would be the relative showing for 1870 and 1880:

CLASSES OF DEBTS.	1870.		1880.	
	Amount.	Per cent.	Amount.	Per cent.
State.....	\$352,866,698	40.62	\$250,722,081	21.11
County.....	187,565,540	21.59	171,268,757	14.43
Municipal.....	328,244,520	37.79	765,545,760	64.46
Total.....	\$868,676,758	100.00	\$1,187,536,598	100.00

Admitting that the figures of 1870 are approximately correct, and the fact is established that tho in ten years nearly one hundred million dollars of State debt has been scaled down, repudiated, and declared illegal—wiped from the ledgers of the State—the debt other than national has increased 37.70 per cent. Had the hundred millions still remained an outstanding debt, the increase of the above three classes of debt would have been nearly fifty per cent. Taking the figures as they stand, State debts have declined 29.94, county debts 8.68, and municipal debts have increased at the enormous rate of 133.22 per cent.

However, these figures are misleading, because there is no means of telling to what extent the sinking funds of large cities entered into the calculations made in 1870. Some cities may have returned their debts to the United States marshals in gross, and some after deducting the sinking fund. In the present investigation the sinking fund whenever returned is shown in the tables. This at once reduces the debts of the large cities from \$710,535,924 to \$593,344,418, which may be called net debt. Upon this indebtedness the per-capita tables and rating according to relative indebtedness are made out. Omitting for the present county, township, school-district, small city, and village indebtedness, I shall call attention to some of the interesting results tabulated from the large city schedules mentioned at the beginning of the article. It will suffice for our present purpose to give a table showing the bonded, floating, and gross debt, the amount of the sinking fund and the net debt of the cities having a population of over 7500 in each of the States of the Union :

STATES.	Bonded Debt.	Float'g Debt.	Gross Debt.	Sinking Fund	Net Debt.
Maine.....	\$12,402,450	\$98,852	\$12,501,302	\$1,033,909	\$11,467,393
New Hampshire.....	2,952,400	53,637	3,006,037	11,189	2,994,838
Vermont.....	607,900	34,460	642,360	56,473	585,887
Massachusetts.....	73,696,019	4,994,421	78,690,440	17,334,790	61,355,650
Rhode Island.....	11,424,750	630,800	12,075,550	1,313,586	10,761,964
Connecticut.....	12,848,054	695,944	13,543,998	1,528,567	12,015,431
New England States.	\$113,931,573	\$6,528,164	\$120,459,737	\$21,278,514	\$99,181,223
New York.....	\$203,536,882	\$7,059,378	\$215,596,260	\$38,336,309	\$177,239,951
New Jersey.....	38,648,850	2,254,811	40,903,661	3,689,852	36,013,809
Pennsylvania.....	95,445,234	1,642,287	97,087,521	19,398,866	77,688,635
Delaware.....	1,372,450	1,372,450	1,372,450
Maryland.....	21,158,375	12,500	21,170,875	19,361,845	1,809,030
District of Columbia....	21,699,564	1,187,205	22,886,769	211,310	22,675,459
Middle States.....	\$386,861,355	\$12,156,181	\$399,017,536	\$31,318,202	\$317,699,334
Virginia.....	\$10,707,177	\$126,886	\$10,834,063	\$453,632	\$10,380,431
West Virginia.....	506,500	25,382	531,882	531,882
North Carolina.....	637,900	17,557	715,457	37,255	678,202
South Carolina.....	5,380,301	332,832	5,713,133	729,181	4,983,952
Georgia.....	8,927,800	69,769	8,997,569	149,250	8,848,319
Florida.....	256,497	14,419	280,916	280,916
Alabama.....	3,492,500	8,250	3,500,750	3,500,750
Mississippi.....	373,218	373,218	373,218
Louisiana.....	15,655,499	2,538,154	18,193,653	18,193,653
Texas.....	3,141,662	125,406	3,267,068	46,863	3,220,205
Arkansas.....	178,694	156,349	335,043	335,243
Kentucky.....	10,321,500	1,030,678	11,352,178	4,255,625	7,096,553
Tennessee.....	4,433,400	2,055,707	6,489,107	6,489,107
Southern States.....	\$64,082,648	\$6,501,589	\$70,584,237	\$5,671,806	\$64,912,431
Ohio.....	\$40,682,526	\$807,282	\$41,490,808	\$4,979,334	\$36,511,474
Indiana.....	6,958,700	315,048	7,274,648	98,890	7,175,758
Illinois.....	18,590,680	160,189	18,750,869	270,030	18,480,839
Michigan.....	5,546,045	2,200	5,548,245	540,428	5,007,817
Wisconsin.....	3,683,651	6,735	3,690,386	114,231	3,576,155
Minnesota.....	2,991,911	12,504	3,004,415	75,233	2,929,582
Iowa.....	3,091,939	165,059	3,257,018	416,291	2,840,727
Missouri.....	26,146,449	1,483,418	27,629,867	534,309	27,095,558
Kansas.....	1,839,813	5,962	1,845,775	12,151	1,833,624
Nebraska.....	428,335	49,030	477,565	50,372	427,193
Western States.....	\$109,961,269	\$3,008,727	\$112,969,996	\$7,091,269	\$105,878,727
Colorado.....	\$16,000	\$116,000	\$132,000	\$132,000
California.....	7,055,115	61,803	7,116,918	1,831,715	5,285,203
Nevada.....	112,000	112,000	112,000
Oregon.....	76,500	76,500	76,500
Utah.....	67,000	67,000	67,000
Pacific States.....	\$7,259,615	\$244,803	\$7,504,418	\$1,831,715	\$5,672,703
Grand Total.....	\$682,096,460	\$28,439,464	\$710,535,924	\$117,191,506	\$593,344,418

Taking the net debt column as most fairly representing the true burden of debt, we find that New York State has the gloomy pre-eminence of being first, and that Pennsylvania follows with a debt of one hundred millions less. Massachusetts ranks third, New Jersey fourth, Ohio fifth, Missouri sixth, and the District of Columbia seventh. The per-capita city indebtedness is to some

extent indicative of ability to pay, and the following statement shows the relative net city debt to the inhabitants of the forty States and Territories having cities of over 7500 inhabitants:

No.	STATES.	Net debt per capita.	No.	STATES.	Net debt per capita.
1	District of Columbia...	\$141 84	22	Mississippi.....	\$31 59
2	Maine.....	98 78	23	Indiana.....	28 50
3	South Carolina.....	83 04	24	Minnesota.....	27 21
4	Louisiana.....	81 22	25	North Carolina.....	25 48
5	Georgia.....	78 39	26	Arkansas.....	25 52
6	New Jersey.....	73 34	27	Vermont.....	24 92
7	New York.....	68 67	28	Illinois.....	23 99
8	Virginia.....	66 67	29	Iowa.....	18 62
9	Tennessee.....	65 59	30	Michigan.....	17 92
10	Alabama.....	65 13	31	West Virginia.....	17 01
11	Rhode Island.....	59 28	32	California.....	16 31
12	Missouri.....	58 97	33	Florida.....	16 02
13	Massachusetts.....	54 67	34	Wisconsin.....	15 69
14	Pennsylvania.....	51 60	35	Nebraska.....	9 82
15	Ohio.....	47 96	36	Nevada.....	8 17
16	Connecticut.....	40 69	37	Maryland.....	5 15
17	New Hampshire.....	36 86	38	Oregon.....	4 35
18	Kentucky.....	35 73	39	Utah.....	3 23
19	Texas.....	34 99	40	Colorado.....	2 62
20	Kansas.....	32 97			
21	Delaware.....	32 31		Average per capita...	\$51 17

The net per-capita debt varies from \$2.62 in Colorado to \$141.84 in the District of Columbia. It will be noted that but three Western States appear until after we have passed the twentieth in number; Indiana ranks twenty-third, Minnesota twenty-fourth, Illinois twenty-eighth, Iowa twenty-ninth, and Michigan thirtieth; Missouri seems to be worst off of the States in this section of the country, and Nebraska the most fortunate, having only a debt of \$9.82. The average per capita for the United States is \$51.17. These tables are in themselves a subject worthy of careful study, and having the merit of freshness they will undoubtedly attract the attention of those political students who have of late years been anxiously awaiting reliable data touching upon this question of municipal indebtedness.

In a discussion on the Public Loans Bill (1878) Sir Stafford Northcote very properly pointed out the evils arising from burdening those who are to come after us with a debt they have had

no voice in creating, and for improvements that may not meet the requirements of the next generation. He said:

“The effect of spreading the payment for works over a long period was this—that those who had planned and executed the work, and perhaps the generation who were most benefited by it, passed away while a very small proportion of the capital sum expended had been repaid; and that the repayment of the great bulk of the capital was thrown upon the succeeding generation, which might perhaps have views of its own; which might think, perhaps, that the action of its predecessors was not so good as should have been undertaken, and that the work, perhaps, was somewhat worn out; and that at all events the new works which had developed themselves rendered it very desirable indeed that the community should get rid of these old burdens as much as possible, in order to raise money for other purposes.”

While fully admitting the force of Sir Stafford's remarks, it must be admitted that where the works are of a permanent character it is perhaps only fair that posterity should have to bear a part of the burden, and it would be unjust to expect the present to sacrifice itself entirely to the future. The analysis of our city debts brings out some important facts showing that a considerable portion of the bonded indebtedness has been created for not altogether unproductive improvements. For example, nearly \$142,000,000, or above 21 per cent of the entire amount, has gone for the purpose of building and equipping water-works. In many cities this property is a good investment. The tables show that nearly thirty millions have been expended in this way in the State of Massachusetts, but the books of these same cities show receipts amounting to nearly two and a half millions of dollars as annual rental from water-works. The \$142,000,000 then cannot be considered as wholly unproductive. It adds incalculably to the health of the citizens by furnishing them with pure water for which they are willing to pay, and such taxes do not fall as heavily as direct taxation. Such investments certainly do not tend to handicap future generations. To bring this point in the briefest possible way to the mind of the reader I have prepared a very interesting table which not only shows the purposes for which the six hundred and eighty-two million dollars of bonds were issued, but also the per cent for each particular purpose:

PURPOSES.	Amount.	Per Cent.
Bridges.....	\$20,809,431	3.05
Cemeteries.....	272,912	.05
Fire Department.....	2,214,924	.33
Funding Floating Debt.....	122,864,804	18.02
Improvement of Harbors, etc.....	16,726,064	2.46
Parks and Public Places.....	40,490,636	5.94
Public Buildings.....	25,516,829	3.75
Railroad and other aid.....	68,309,493	10.02
Refunding old Debt.....	71,071,140	10.42
Schools and Libraries.....	13,889,915	2.04
Sewers.....	21,335,434	3.07
Streets.....	81,502,817	11.95
War Expenses.....	28,722,787	4.22
Water Works.....	141,797,828	20.79
Miscellaneous.....	26,571,446	3.89
Total.....	\$682,096,460	100.00

Second in importance to water-works is the item "funding floating debt"—about 18 per cent. It is impossible to trace this class of bonds to their original source: nearly 12 per cent were issued for streets; 10 per cent each for railroad and other aid, and for refunding old bonded debt; about 2 per cent for schools and libraries; war expenses, 4 per cent; sewers and bridges, each about 3 per cent. In this connection might be mentioned nearly 4 per cent for public buildings, which, if properly constructed, will meet the requirements of many years to come, and to this category belongs nearly $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent issued for improvements of harbors. Thus one third of these bonds have been issued for water-works, parks, public buildings, and harbors, to say nothing of streets, sewers, and bridges—all of which are permanent improvements.

Of the \$682,096,460 bonded debt, nearly 45 per cent of it bears 6 per cent interest; about 28 per cent, 7 per cent interest.

Rate of Interest.	Amount.	Per cent.	Rate of Interest.	Amount.	Per cent.
10 per cent...	\$6,404,145	.93	$5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent...	\$386,000	.06
9 " " ..	11,000	5 " " ..	98,650,791	14.46
8 " " ..	19,818,953	2.90	$4\frac{1}{2}$ " " ..	4,688,150	.69
$7\frac{1}{2}$ " " ..	356,500	.05	4 " " ..	21,462,435	3.15
$7\frac{3}{10}$ " " ..	16,903,550	2.48	$3\frac{1}{2}$ " " ..	13,504,900	1.98
7 " " ..	189,689,451	27.81	Unspecified....	2,502,804	.36
$6\frac{1}{2}$ " " ..	1,174,332	.18			
6 " " ..	306,543,449	44.95	Total.....	\$682,096,460	100.00

In the dates of issue the careful student can trace the history of local indebtedness in the United States for the past twenty years. Periods of extravagance can easily be discerned, and with equal clearness one can see how long the day of payment has been deferred—nearly one third of the amount not payable until the present century has been numbered among its time-worn predecessors. The years 1872 and 1874 seem to have been the most prolific of city debts. After 1874 a slight decrease is noted, which continues until 1878. However, in 1879 an increase set in which more than likely extended to 1880; but as a large proportion of the reports from which these returns were tabulated were for fiscal years ending in the first months of 1880, it is not at all likely the \$6,000,000 represents a sixth part of the bonds issued in the year 1880. The detail table of these dates of issue and of maturity will be of great interest :

Amounts issued in the Years named.		Amounts maturing in the Years named.	
Previous to 1860.....	\$51,222,558	Unspecified.....	\$12,979,602
1860.....	3,698,815	1880.....	26,588,405
1861.....	6,176,039	1881.....	16,932,351
1862.....	5,529,375	1882.....	15,732,079
1863.....	5,832,302	1883.....	15,001,529
1864.....	21,803,515	1884.....	23,096,679
1865.....	15,335,012	1885.....	16,067,709
1866.....	8,995,092	1886.....	22,642,915
1867.....	18,622,967	1887.....	25,798,435
1868.....	29,388,760	1888.....	19,055,741
1869.....	27,014,468	1889.....	18,814,758
1870.....	47,375,361	1890.....	29,248,621
1871.....	54,018,592	1891.....	25,659,648
1872.....	62,064,355	1892.....	35,310,640
1873.....	44,338,682	1893.....	19,196,933
1874.....	62,421,466	1894.....	27,975,471
1875.....	52,453,742	1895.....	26,261,087
1876.....	28,873,539	1896.....	24,052,108
1877.....	30,947,187	1897.....	13,912,456
1878.....	24,021,688	1898.....	15,907,734
1879.....	45,435,105	1899.....	24,366,428
1880.....	6,038,145	1900.....	26,436,132
Unspecified.....	30,489,695	Subsequent to 1900.....	201,058,999
Total.....	\$682,096,460	Total.....	\$682,096,460

The debts of small municipalities, amounting to fifty-five million dollars, and of school districts aggregating nearly nineteen millions, it is fair to presume are distributed equally in the

various States. The debts of townships (\$27,423,084) weigh the heaviest in such States as Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota, where the township has an important financial existence, and has been induced to aid in the construction of railroads. Outside of these States and of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York, the township, as a debt-incurring or tax-levying power, is of little importance. In view of this it will not be necessary to bring these three classes of indebtedness into the calculation, when I attempt to show the per cent of State, county, and municipal debt (debt of 311 principal cities) for which each geographical section of the country is responsible. The proportion of these three classes of indebtedness belonging to each of the five geographical divisions of the country is as follows:

SECTION.	STATE DEBT.		COUNTY DEBT.		MUNICIPAL DEBT.	
	Amount 1880.	Per cent.	Amount 1880.	Per cent.	Amount 1880.	Per cent.
New England.....	\$49,969,514	19.93	\$2,780,269	2.25	\$99,181,223	16.71
Middle States.....	45,672,575	18.21	30,877,931	24.70	317,699,334	53.54
Southern States...	113,967,243	45.45	24,081,915	19.26	64,912,431	10.95
Western States....	36,565,360	14.58	53,360,808	42.69	105,878,727	17.84
Pacific States.....	4,574,389	1.83	13,900,335	11.10	5,672,703	.96
Total.....	\$250,749,081	100.00	\$125,001,258	100.00	\$593,344,418	100.00

The New England States have about 20 per cent of the State debts, $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent of the county debts, and nearly 17 per cent of the municipal debts. The town system in the New England States and the massing of population in cities naturally has a tendency to increase the proportion of municipal debt. The counties in New England have little more than a judicial existence, and hence the smallness of the debt. In the Middle States we find nearly $18\frac{1}{4}$ per cent of the State debts, nearly 25 per cent of county debts, and $53\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of municipal debt. The Southern States have only about 11 per cent of municipal debt, but $45\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the State debts, and $19\frac{1}{4}$ per cent of county indebtedness. The Western States have a larger percentage of county debts than any other geographical section, which fact is due to the importance of the county organization and its facilities to create debt for the aid of railroads and other public

improvements. The Western States have about $14\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the State debts, and nearly 18 per cent of the municipal debt. The same is true of the Pacific States, these having over 11 per cent of the county debts, but less than 1 per cent of municipal debt, and less than 2 per cent of State debt. In brief, the table shows that nearly half the State debts are located in the Southern States, nearly half the county debts in the Western States, and over half the municipal debts in the Middle States.

The burden of State, county, and municipal debt in many parts of the country is more than the tax-payers can bear, and the effect upon American institutions and American credit is more dangerous than a well-regulated national debt of twice the proportions; the growth of city debts compels the most patriotic to doubt the wisdom of popular elections for cities, and the foreign capitalists to doubt our honesty. It is a mistake to think that repudiated State debts, worthless county securities and municipal bonds declared invalid, are of no national concern. To the foreigner we present the curious inconsistency of the richest and most prosperous country in the world with the plea of a Turkey or Peru; the figures presented show the exact amount of our local indebtedness. It is evident that the financial administration of some of our States and counties, and of most of our municipalities, is the particular branch of our financial administration with which we have the greatest reason to be dissatisfied and ashamed, and which most urgently demands radical reform. The remedy is simple: pay the present indebtedness as rapidly as possible, and make no more improvident loans.

ROBERT P. PORTER.

THE HISTORICAL PROOFS OF CHRISTIANITY.

FIFTH ARTICLE: THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EVANGELISTS.

IN the last two articles of this series evidence has been brought forward to prove that the Gospels were written by apostles and companions of apostles—in particular, that the Fourth Gospel is the work of John; that the First Gospel, at least in its original form and as to its main portions, had Matthew for its author, and that it existed in the Greek and in its present compass while the generation of the first disciples of Jesus, by whom it was acknowledged, was still in being; that the Second and Third Gospels were composed by contemporaries who brought together the information which they had sought and obtained from apostles and from others who were immediately cognizant of the facts. The Gospels thus meet one test of trustworthy historical evidence—that it shall come from witnesses or well-informed contemporaries. They present the testimony which the apostles gave respecting the words and actions of Jesus. We have to show that this testimony is entitled to credit. Let it be understood that in this place we have nothing to do with the theological doctrine of Inspiration or with the nature and limits of the divine help afforded to the historical writers of the New Testament. That subject is irrelevant to the present discussion. What we have to establish is the essential credibility of the evangelists; in other words, to show that the narrative which they give of the life of Jesus may be relied on as fully as we rely on the biographies of other eminent personages in the past which are known to have been composed by honest and, in other respects, competent historians.

1. The fact of the selection of the apostles, and the view

taken both by Jesus and by themselves of their function, are a strong argument for their credibility.

In inquiring whether the Gospel history is true or not, it is first of all important to ascertain what view Jesus took of the life he was leading among men, and also to observe in what light his career was regarded by his followers. Had his teaching and the events occurring in connection with his life such a significance in his own eyes that he meant them to be the subject of testimony? Did he design that they should be remembered, and be faithfully narrated to those beyond the circle of immediate observers? In other words, had he, and his followers with him, a "historical feeling" as regards the momentous occurrences, as they proved to be, belonging to his career? This question is conclusively answered by the fact of a deliberate selection by him of a body of persons to be with him, who were deputed to relate what they saw and heard, and who distinctly understood this to be an essential part of their business. They were called "The Twelve," and so current was this appellation at an early day, that Paul thus designates them even in referring to the time when Judas had fallen out of their number (1 Cor. xv. 5). The idea which they had of their office was explicitly pointed out by Peter when he stated the qualifications of the one who should be chosen in place of Judas (Acts i. 21-25). It may be remarked, before quoting the passage, that if there were any just ground for suspecting the accuracy of Luke in general, it could have no application in this place. There is no room for the bias of a Pauline disciple, since the transaction is one in which it is Peter who appears as the leader, and the thing proposed is the completion of the number of "the twelve." The passage reads as follows: "Wherefore of these men which have companied with us"—that is, travelled about with us—"all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us,"—that is, was in constant intercourse with us,—"beginning from the baptism of John unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection." The resurrection is particularly mentioned as the fact most prominent in the apostle's testimony. Here is a deliberate consciousness on the part of Peter that he and his fellow-apostles were clothed with the responsibility of witnesses, and that

to be of their number one must have the necessary qualification of a credible witness, a personal knowledge of that about which he is to testify. "We are witnesses," said Peter, on a subsequent occasion, "of all things which he did both in the land of the Jews and in Jerusalem" (Acts x. 39).¹ Their commission was to "teach all nations," and to teach them the commandments of Jesus (Matt. xxviii. 20). His teaching was to be brought to their remembrance (John xiv. 26). They were forewarned that they would be arraigned before magistrates to give reasons for their adherence to him (Matt. x. 18; Luke xxi. 12). The promise of the Spirit is given in a form to exalt and not to diminish the importance of the historical facts of the life and teaching of Jesus (John xiv. 15, *seq.*; 25, 26; xv. 24-27; xvi. 14; Luke xxi. 14, 15). The Apostle John speaks of himself as an eye-witness (John i. 14, xix. 35; cf. xxi. 24). Luke, at the beginning of his Gospel, refers to his having consulted, with painstaking, those who had heard and witnessed the things to be recorded by him (Luke i. 1-5). His object in writing is to satisfy Theophilus that his Christian belief rested on a good foundation of evidence. It is plain that the apostles and evangelists are distinctly conscious of their position.² They are aware that they have to fulfil the duty of witnesses. There is this barrier against fancy and delusion. It is a great point in favor of their credibility.

2. The apostles never ceased to be conscious that they were disciples. They never ceased to look back upon the words and actions of Christ with the profoundest interest, and to regard them as a sacred treasure left in their hands to be communicated to an ever-widening circle. In that life, as it had actually passed before their eyes, they placed the foundation of all their hope, and of the hope of the world. There is not the least sign that any enthusiasm which they felt in their work ever carried them away from this historical anchorage. They received the precious legacy which it devolved on them to convey to others, in a spirit of sobriety and conscientiousness, and with such a sense of its value and sacredness that they were cut off from the temptation to add to it or subtract from it. They were as far as

¹ Cf. Luke xxiv. 47-49; Acts i. 8.

² See also Paul, 1 Cor. xv.

possible from regarding what they had received as a mere starting-point for musings and speculations of their own. They were not "many masters," but continued to hold the reverent, dependent position of pupils.

3. The apostles relate, without the least attempt at apology or concealment, instances of ignorance and weakness on their part, together with the reproofs on this account which they received from the Master.

This proves their honesty; but, more than that, it illustrates the *objective* character of their testimony. That they were taken up by the matter itself, so that all personal considerations sunk out of sight, is the main fact which we are now endeavoring to illustrate. So absorbing is their interest in what actually occurred that they do not heed its effect on their own reputation. They do not think of themselves. They narrate what exhibits them in an unfavorable light with as much artless simplicity as if they were not personally affected by it. When Jesus taught them that no defilement could be contracted by eating one rather than another kind of food, at which the Pharisees were offended, Peter asked him to explain "the parable," or obscure saying. They tell us (Matt. xv. 16; Mark vii. 18) that Jesus answered, "Are ye also without understanding?" He expressed, they say, astonishment and regret that even they could not discern his meaning. When told to beware of "the leaven of the Pharisees and Sadducees," they surmised that the injunction had reference to a possible deficiency of bread. They report the severe reproach which this called forth, of a littleness of faith, a failure to remember the miracle of the loaves (Matt. xvi. 8; Mark viii. 17-21).¹ They tell us how they confessed their own weakness of faith (Luke xvii. 5). Repeatedly they state that they did not comprehend or take in the predictions of his suffering death which were addressed to them by Jesus. They represent themselves to have clung so tenaciously to the idea of a political Messiah, that after the death of Jesus they expressed

¹ The strong expression of grief and weariness, "O faithless and perverse generation," etc. (Matt. xvii. 17), is omitted above, for the reason that the parallel (Mark ix. 19) makes it, perhaps, doubtful whether the disciples were included among those addressed in the apostrophe. Matt. xvii. 20 would suggest that they were.

their disappointment in the words, "We trusted that it should have been he which should have redeemed Israel;" and, even after the resurrection, they anxiously inquired of him, "Wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?" This false conception of the Messiah's work led to expressions on their part which deeply wounded Jesus. These are faithfully reported by them. They inform us (Matt. xvi. 23; cf. Mark viii. 33; Luke iv. 8) that Peter's protest against the suggestion that Jesus was to suffer death, elicited from him such a rebuke as nothing but the feeling that he was tempted to sin by a friend by whom he ought rather to be supported on the hard path of duty, could evoke: "Get thee behind me, Satan"—adversary of the will of God, tempter—"for thou art an offence"—a stumbling-block—"unto me; for thou savourest not"—mindest not—"the things that be of God"—God's will, God's cause—"but those that be of men." This heavy, humiliating rebuke is recorded by all the synoptists. It entered into the story which the apostles, Peter included, were accustomed to relate. Other instances when they must have felt humbled by the Saviour's displeasure are recorded with the same candor. For example, when they repelled those who brought little children to him, Jesus "was much displeased," and bade them let the children come to him (Mark x. 13, 14; cf. Mark x. 14; Luke xviii. 16).

What surer mark of an honest narrator can exist than a willingness to give a plain, unvarnished account of his own mortifying mistakes, and the consequent rebuffs, whether just or not, which he has experienced? When Boswell writes that Johnson said to him, with a stern look, "Sir, I have known David Garrick longer than you have done, and I know no right you have to talk to me on the subject;" or when he writes, again, that Johnson said to him, "Sir, endeavor to clear your mind of cant," no one can doubt that the biographer is telling a true story. Men are not likely to invent anecdotes to their own discredit. When we find them in any author, a strong presumption is raised in favor of his general truthfulness.

4. The apostles related, and the evangelists record, serious delinquencies of which the former were guilty—unworthy tempers of feeling and offences of a grave character.

They tell us of the ambition and rivalry which sprang up

among them, and of the wrangles that ensued. The mother of John and James petitioned that her sons might have the highest places of honor in the new kingdom, of the nature of which she had so poor a conception (Matt. xx. 20). The two apostles joined in the request (Mark x. 37), having first tried to draw from their Master a promise that they should have whatever they might ask for. The other ten disciples were angry with John and James for preferring such a request (Matt. x. 41). One day, on their way to Capernaum, the disciples fell into a dispute on the same question, who should have the precedence (Mark ix. 34; cf. Luke ix. 46, xxii. 24). Altercations of this sort—so they themselves related—broke out in their company on different occasions. Will the reader ponder the fact that all four of the evangelists give a circumstantial account of the denials of Peter (Matt. xxvi. 58, *seq.*; Mark xiv. 54, *seq.*; Luke xxii. 54, *seq.*; John xviii. 15, *seq.*)? Here was the apostle who had a kind of leadership among them. It was he whose preaching was most effective among the Jews everywhere (Gal. ii. 8). Yet this undisguised account of his cowardice, treachery, and falsehood on a most critical occasion is presented in detail in the evangelical narrative. It is impossible to doubt that it formed a part of the story of the crucifixion which the apostles, each and all of them, told to their converts. Could a more striking proof of simple candor be afforded? Is it not obvious that the narrators sank their own personality—merged it, as it were—in the absorbing interest with which they looked back on the scenes which they had beheld, and in which they had taken part? And then they relate that at the crucifixion they all forsook Jesus and fled (Matt. xxvi. 56; Mark xiv. 50). They make no attempt to conceal the fact that they left his burial to be performed by one who was comparatively a stranger, and by the women whose devotion overcame their terror, or who considered that their sex would be their safeguard. Beyond the conscientious spirit which this portrayal of their own infirmities and misconduct compels us to attribute to the apostles, these features of the Gospel narrative show that they forgot themselves, so intent were they on depicting things just as they had occurred. In other words, they impress on us the *objective* character of the Gospel history as it is given on the pages of the evangelists.

5. It is an impressive indication of the *objective* character of the apostolic narrative, that the manifestations of human infirmity in Jesus—infirmity which does not involve sin—are referred to in the plainest manner, and without the least apology or concealment. These passages occur side by side with the accounts of miracles. Had there been a conscious or latent disposition to glorify their Master at the expense of truth, it is scarcely possible that they would have spread out these illustrations of human weakness. It is only necessary to remind the reader of the record of the agony of Jesus in the garden. We are informed that he was overwhelmed with mental distress. He sought the close companionship of the three disciples who were most intimate with him. He prostrated himself on the earth in supplication to God. As he lay on the ground one of the evangelists tells us that the sweat fell from his body, either actually mingled with blood, or in drops like drops of blood issuing from the wounds of a fallen soldier. "My soul"—thus he had spoken to the three disciples—"is exceeding sorrowful unto death." In the presence of passages like these, how can it be thought that the apostles were enthusiasts, oblivious or careless of facts, and bent on presenting an ideal of their own devising, rather than the life of Jesus just as they had seen it?¹

6. The truthfulness of the apostles is proved by their submission to extreme suffering and to death for the testimony which they gave.

They had nothing to gain, from an earthly point of view, by relating the history which is recorded in the Gospels. On the contrary, they had everything to lose. It had been distinctly foretold to them that they would be "delivered up to be afflicted," delivered up to pain and distress, be objects of universal hatred, and be killed (Matt. xxiv. 9). They were forewarned that they would be seized, imprisoned, brought before rulers as criminals, betrayed by friends and nearest relatives (Luke xxi. 12-16; cf. xi. 49). "The time cometh," it was said, "that he that killeth you will think that he doeth God service" (John

¹ It does not fall within the plan of John to repeat this narrative of the synop-
tists. But John reports an instance of the deep distress of Jesus: "Now is my
soul troubled," etc. (xii. 27). John alone relates that He "wept" (xi. 35).

xvi. 4; cf. xv. 20, xvi. 33). These predictions were verified in their experience. Whatever view is taken of the authorship of the Gospels, none can doubt that these passages are a picture of what the apostles really endured. The persecution of the apostles was the natural result of the spirit which had prompted the crucifixion of Jesus. It began as soon as they began publicly to preach "Jesus and the resurrection." There were men, like Saul of Tarsus, eager to hunt down the heretics. The murder of Stephen occurred in the year 33 or 34, about two years after the death of Christ. The apostles were objects of mingled scorn and wrath. Their situation is described by St. Paul as follows: "For I think that God hath set forth us the apostles last, as it were appointed to death"—or, doomed to death—"for we are made a spectacle unto the world, and to angels, and to men." "Even unto the present hour we both hunger, and thirst, and are naked, and are buffeted, and have no certain dwelling-place." "Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we suffer it; being defamed, we entreat; we are made as the filth of the world, and are the offscouring of all things unto this day" (I. Cor. iv. 11-14). There were certain peculiar exposures to suffering in the case of Paul; yet he describes here the common lot of the apostles. Defamation, public scorn, physical hardship, assaults by mobs and punishments by the civil authority, imprisonment, death—this was what they saw before them and what they actually suffered. Ostracism, with all the indignities and pains that bitter fanaticism can inflict along with it, was the reward which they had to expect for their testimony to the teaching, the miracles, the resurrection, following the death, of Jesus. To suspect them of dishonesty is to imagine that men will fling away property, friends, home, country, and life itself, for the sake of telling a falsehood that is to bring them no sort of advantage.

Hardly less irrational is it to charge them with self-delusion. It has been shown in a preceding article,¹ by internal evidence derived from the Gospels, and by other proofs, that miracles were wrought by Christ. It has been shown that the theory of hallucination will not avail to explain the unanimous, immovable belief of the apostles in his resurrection. The

¹ PRINCETON REVIEW, Jan. 1881.

twelve attended Jesus through his public ministry from the baptism in Jordan to the close. The occurrences which necessarily presuppose the exertion of miraculous power took place in their presence. They were events in which they had a deep concern. The apostles were not wanting in common sense. And they were conscientious men. They were the men whom Jesus Christ selected to be his companions. Unless, as the enemies of Jesus charged, he was "a deceiver," and most accomplished in the art, how could they mistake the character of these works which, as they alleged, he performed before their eyes?

But as the miracles are the part of the Gospel history which, in these days, chiefly provokes incredulity, it is well to consider this topic further. No time need be spent on Hume's argument to show that a miracle is, under no circumstances, capable of being proved. As Mill observes, all that Hume has made out is that no evidence can prove a miracle to an atheist, or to a deist who supposes himself able to prove that God would not interfere to produce the miraculous event in question.¹ We assume the being and moral attributes of God, and we have no call to discuss the character, in other respects, of Hume's reasoning.

We are not called upon to confute the opinion that the first three Gospels—the historical character of the fourth has already been vindicated—were moulded by a doctrinal purpose or bias, since that opinion finds no countenance now from judicious critics of whatever theological creed. The First Gospel contains numerous passages in which the catholic character of Christianity is emphatically set forth.² "Our Matthew," says Mangold, an unprejudiced critic, not at all wedded to traditional views, "is, to be sure, written by a Jewish Christian for Jewish Christians," "but he has given us no writing with a Jewish Christian doctrinal bias." "The words of Jesus, quoted in Matthew," says Reuss, "which form the doctrinal kernel of the book, are not selected in the slightest degree from that point of view,"—that of the Palestinian Jewish Christianity,—"but go beyond it in a hundred places, and bespeak so much the more the faithfulness

¹ J. S. Mill, "System of Logic," vol. ii. p. 110.

² Matt. xxiv. 14, xxviii. 19, viii. 12, xx. 1 *seq.*, xxi. 28, 33, xxii. 40, xxiii. 33, ix. 16, *seq.*, xii. 8, xiii. 31. Cf. "Essays on the Supernat. Origin of Christianity," pp. 213-215; Reuss, "Gesch. d. heilig. Schrift.," p. 195.

of the tradition."¹ Mark has decidedly outgrown Judaism, "but no dogmatic tendency can on this account be saddled on his presentation of the Gospel history, as long as it is not shown that Christ himself did not rise above Judaism, and that the Jewish Christian Matthew looks on Christianity as a development within the limits of Judaism."² In Luke, "not only does the history of Jesus acquire in general no other significance than in Matthew; nowhere is there disclosed a design to set aside or to overcome an imperfect understanding of it. On the contrary, there occur numerous words and acts, drawn from the general tradition, which, when literally taken, rather wear a Jewish Christian coloring. But here it will be nearest to the truth to affirm that not a party feeling, but the most independent historical research—or, if we prefer so to call it, a thirst for the fullest possible information—has governed in the collection of the matter."³ The whole charge of being *Tendenz-Schriften*, which Baur and his school brought against the Gospels, is founded on untenable theories respecting their authorship and order of composition.

If the "tendency-theory" no longer calls for detailed refutation, the same thing is true of the attack of Strauss on the credibility of the Gospels, which is founded on their alleged inconsistencies. This attack is acknowledged by judicious scholars to be merely the work of an expert advocate, bent on finding contradictions in testimony which he is anxious to break down.⁴ The Gospel narratives are wholly inartificial. No compositions could be more open to assault from critics who ignore this character that belongs to them, and labor to magnify the importance of variations which only serve to prove that there was no collusion among the several writers, and no attempt on the part of anybody to frame a story that should be proof against hostile comment.

As the miracles rest on the same grounds of evidence as the other matters of fact to which the apostles testify, special rea-

¹ Reuss, p. 194.

² Mangold, p. 342; cf. Holtzmann, "Die Synopt. Evangg.," p. 384, *seq.*

³ Reuss, p. 212.

⁴ For a full reply to Strauss on this topic, see "The Supernatural Origin of Christianity."

sons are required for discrediting their testimony as regards this one class of events. Is it said that miracles are incredible? The answer is that, being a necessary element and the natural adjuncts of Revelation, they are not incredible unless the fact of Revelation, and of the Christian Revelation in particular, is incredible. Their improbability is just as great, and no greater, than the improbability that God would reveal himself to men, and send his Son to save them. Is it objected that there have been a vast number of pretended miracles? The answer of Bishop Butler appears sufficient, that mankind have not been oftener deluded by these pretences than by others. "Prejudices almost without number and without name, romance, affectation, humor, a desire to engage attention or to surprise, the party-spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable likings and dislikings—these influence men strongly in common matters." As they are not reflected on by those in whom they operate, their effect is like that of enthusiasm. And yet, as Butler adds, human testimony in common matters is not, on this account, discredited. Because *some* narratives of miracles spring out of mere enthusiasm, it is an unwarrantable inference that *all* are to be accounted for in this way.

But it is frequently alleged that the evidence in favor of pagan and ecclesiastical miracles, which fill so large a space in chronicles of a former day, but which are generally allowed to be fictitious, is as strong as that for the miracles recorded in the Gospels. What is to be said of the ecclesiastical miracles is in the main applicable to the miraculous tales found in ancient heathen writers from Herodotus to Livy, and from Livy to the fall of the old paganism. To the stream of church miracles, then, which flows down from the early centuries through the middle ages almost or quite to our own time, we may confine our attention. Is the evidence for these alleged miracles equal in force to that of the miracles recorded by the evangelists? So far from this being true, there are broad marks of distinction by which these last are separated from the general current of miraculous narrative.

1. The Gospel miracles are for the express purpose of attesting Revelation. They are the proper counterpart and proof of Revelation. They occur, with few exceptions, only at the marked

epochs of Revelation, the Mosaic era, the reform and advance of the Old Testament religion under the great prophets, and in connection with the ministry of Christ and the founding of the Church. "We know," it was said, "that thou art a teacher come from God, for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him."

On the contrary, ecclesiastical miracles profess to be for a lower, and, in general, for a signally lower end. At the best, they are to give efficacy to the preaching of a missionary. Miracles were requisite to attest Revelation. When they have once taken place, testimony is all that can reasonably be demanded as a ground of faith. There need not be a perpetual interruption of the course of nature. Even the Roman Catholic Church holds that the whole deposit of Revelation was with Christ and the apostles.

But, in a vast majority of instances, the ecclesiastical miracles are for some end below that of serving as the credentials of a missionary. At the best, they are to relieve the distress of an individual, with no ulterior and more comprehensive end such as is inherent in the miracles wrought by Jesus and the apostles. In a multitude of instances they simply minister to an appetite for marvels. Witness the wonders that crowd the pages of the apocryphal Gospels. Many are for objects extremely trivial. Tertullian gives an account of a vision in which an angel prescribed to a female the size and length of her veil. Some, like the Jansenist miracles at the tomb of Abbé Paris, to which Hume appeals, are in the cause of a political or religious party and against an antagonistic faction. Very frequently, miracles are valued, and said to be wrought, merely as verifications of the sanctity of a person of high repute for piety.

The distinction which we are here considering is one of great importance. No doubt there is a presumption against the probable occurrence of miracles, which grows out of our instinctive belief in the uniformity of nature, and the conviction we have that an established order is beneficent. This presumption Christians believe to be neutralized by the need of Revelation, and by the perceived character of the Christian system and of its author. But in proportion as the end assigned to miracles is lower, that adverse presumption remains in full force.

2. The Gospel miracles were not wrought in coincidence with a prevailing system, and for the furtherance of it, but in opposition to prevalent beliefs.

This is another striking difference. Jesus won all of his disciples to faith in him. They did not inherit this faith, they did not grow up in it. He and they had to confront opposition at every step. "The world," he said, "hateth me." His doctrines and his idea of the kingdom of God were in collision with Judaic opinion and feeling. Christianity had to push forward in the face of the hostility of all the existing forms of religion. But how is it with the ecclesiastical miracles of later ages? They occurred, if wrought at all, in the midst of circles and communities which were already in fervent sympathy with the cause in behalf of which they were supposed to be performed. The narrations of them sprang up among those who were, beforehand, full of confidence in the Church as the possessor of miraculous power, and in the individuals to whose agency such miracles were ascribed. Recollecting what occurred at the origin of the Church, full of faith in the supernatural powers which were thought still to reside in it, men were on the look-out for startling manifestations of them. There was a previous habit of credulity in this particular direction. The same scepticism which is deemed reasonable in respect to stories of miracles performed by Dominicans or Franciscans, where the rival interests of the two orders are involved, is natural in regard to wonders said to have been wrought in behalf of a creed assumed to be true and enthusiastically cherished. In Galilee, Judea, and in the various provinces of the Roman Empire, Christianity was a new religion. It was at the start an unpopular religion, in a struggle against wide-spread, bitter prejudice. The whole atmosphere was thus totally different from that which prevailed in the middle ages, or even in the Roman Empire after the Gospel had succeeded in gaining hundreds of thousands of converts.

3. The motives to fraud, which justly excite suspicion in the case of many of the ecclesiastical miracles, were absent in the case of the miracles of the Gospel.

It cannot be denied that pious fraud played a prominent part in producing the tales of the supernatural which are interspersed in the biographies of the saints. Ecclesiastical superiors

have often given a free rein to popular credulity, on the maxim that the end sanctifies the means. Where positive trickery has not been practised, circumstances have been concealed which, if known, would have stripped many a transaction of the miraculous aspect which it wore in the eyes of the ignorant. The same spirit that gave rise to the mediæval forgeries, of which the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals are a conspicuous example, was capable of conniving at numberless deceits which served to bolster up sacerdotal pretensions. In order that an individual may be enrolled as a saint, and invoked in this character, it has been held to be indispensable that he should have wrought miracles. Miracles are held to be a badge of sainthood. It is easy to conceive not only what a stimulus this theory must have afforded to the devout imagination, but, also, what conscious exaggeration and wilful invention must have sprung out of such a creed.

When we enter the company of Christ and the apostles we find that this incentive to the invention of miracles is utterly absent. We find, rather, the deepest antipathy to every species of deceit and fraud.

4. A great number of the Roman Catholic miracles can be explained by natural causes, without any impeachment of the honesty of the narrators. Frequently, natural events, of no uncommon occurrence, are viewed as supernatural. The physical effect of vigils, and fastings, and pilgrimages, on the maladies of those who resorted to these practices, was, no doubt, in many cases salutary. As the body acts on the mind, so the mind powerfully affects the body. Heated imagination, ardent faith, the confident hope of relief, may produce physical effects of an extraordinary character. There is a variety of nervous disorders which are cured by a sudden shock which turns feeling into a new channel. Mohammed was a victim of hysteria, attended by catalepsy. Especially when medical knowledge was scanty, exceptional conditions of mind and body were easily mistaken for supernatural phenomena.

If the miracles of the Gospels consisted only of visions, or of the cure of less aggravated cases of demoniacal possession, or of the healing of certain diseases which spring mainly from nervous derangement, there might be no occasion for referring them to supernatural agency. But such miracles as the cure of the

lunatic at Gadara, the multiplication of the loaves, the conversion of water into wine, the raising of the son of the widow of Nain, and of Lazarus, the resurrection of Jesus himself, baffle every attempt at naturalistic solution. If miracles such as these are admitted on the ground of the testimony to them, taken in connection with the exalted character of Christ and with the doctrine of Christianity, it is alike unreasonable and profitless to resort to any naturalistic explanation of visions and cures, which, considered by themselves, might perhaps be accounted for by that method. The whole set of Gospel miracles belong together. If certain of them do not of necessity carry us beyond the limit of physiological and psychological causes, and if this boundary is not strictly definable, there are others, equally well attested, which do undeniably lie beyond this limit, and must, if the phenomena are admitted, be referred to the interposition of God.

5. The incompetence of the witnesses to ecclesiastical miracles, as a rule, is a decisive reason for discrediting their accounts.

We do not include under this head an intention to deceive. Reports of pagan and ecclesiastical miracles frequently rest on no contemporary evidence. It was more than a century after the death of Apollonius of Tyana when Philostratus wrote his life. Sixteen years after the death of Ignatius Loyola, Ribadeneira wrote his biography. At that time he knew of no miracles performed by his hero. St. Francis Xavier himself makes but one or two references to wonders wrought by him; and these occurrences do not necessarily imply anything miraculous. In the case of an ancient saint, Gregory Thaumaturgus, the life that we possess was written long after his time by Gregory Nyssa. Boniface, the apostle to the Germans, and Ansgar, the apostle to the Scandinavians, do not themselves claim to be miracle-workers. It is others who make the claim for them. Of the string of miracles which Bede furnishes, there are few, if any, which he affirms to have occurred within his personal knowledge.

Where there are contemporary narratives, it is evident, generally, that the chroniclers are too deficient in the habit of accurate observation to be trusted. This want of carefulness is manifest in what they have to say of ordinary matters. Dr.

Arnold gives an example of the inaccuracy of Bede.¹ The Saxon chronicler describes a striking phenomenon on the southern coast of England, in such a way that one who is familiar with it would be quite unable to recognize it from this author's description. Where the observation of natural objects is so careless, how can we expect a correct account of phenomena which are taken for miraculous? Excited feeling, on the watch for marvels, in minds not in the least trained to strict observation, renders testimony to a great extent worthless.

Now who were the original witnesses of the miracles of Jesus? As Cardinal Newman has said, "they were very far from a dull or ignorant race. The inhabitants of a maritime and border country (as Galilee was); engaged, moreover, in commerce; composed of natives of various countries, and, therefore, from the nature of the case, acquainted with more than one language, have necessarily their intellects sharpened and their minds considerably enlarged, and are of all men least disposed to acquiesce in marvellous tales. Such a people must have examined before they suffered themselves to be excited in the degree which the evangelists describe." Their conviction, be it observed, was no "bare and indolent assent to facts which they might have thought antecedently probable, or not improbable," but a great change in principle and mode of life, and such a change as involved the sacrifice of every earthly good. There is a vast difference between the dull assent of superstitious minds, the impressions of unreflecting devotees, and that positive faith which transformed the character of the first disciples, and moved them to forsake their kindred and to lay down their lives in attestation of the truth of their testimony. A conviction on the part of such persons, and attended by consequences like these, must have had its origin in an observation of facts about which there could be no mistake.

6. The Gospel miracles, unlike the ecclesiastical, were none of them merely tentative, unsuccessful, or of doubtful reality.

In ancient times, the temple of Æsculapius was thronged by persons in quest of healing at the hands of the god. No one could pretend that more than a fraction of these votaries were

¹ "Lectures on Modern History" (Am. ed.), p. 128.

actually healed. Of the multitude who failed of the benefit there was no mention or memory.

To come down to a later day, many thousands were annually touched for the scrofula by the English kings. Some recovered, and their recovery, no doubt, was blazoned abroad. But of the generality of those who thus received the royal touch, there is not the slightest proof that it was followed by a recovery. So, elsewhere, among those to whom miraculous power has been attributed, the instances of apparent success were connected with uncounted failures of which no record is preserved. Even in the cases where it is loudly claimed that there was every appearance of miracle—as in certain of the wonders at the tomb of the Abbé Paris—it is found that some have been only partially relieved of their maladies, or have experienced soon a recurrence of them.

Mark the contrast presented by the miracles of the Gospel. They were performed by a definite class of persons. They were “the signs of an apostle.” The main point, however, is that there were no exceptions, none on whom the wonder-working power failed of its effect. There were no abortive experiments. *All* whom Jesus attempted to heal were healed. *None* went away as they came. None went away with painful symptoms alleviated, while the disorders were not removed. Had such instances of failure occurred, they would not have escaped the attention of the apostles and their enemies. Confidence in Christ would have been weakened, if not subverted. In accounting for the Gospel miracles, the supposition of accident is thus precluded. We do not reason from occasional coincidences.

7. The grotesque character of many of the ecclesiastical miracles awakens a just presumption against them as a class.

A miracle emanates from the power of God. But it will not be, for that reason, at variance with his other attributes. As far as an alleged miracle appears to be unworthy of God in any particular, it loses its title to be credited.

The miracles in the Apocryphal Gospels (such as that of the throne of Herod, drawn out to its right length by the child Jesus, to remedy a blunder of Joseph in making it) give no unfair idea of the style of many narratives in the legends of the Church. Among the miracles attributed to Thomas à Becket is

the story that the eyes of a priest of Nantes who doubted them fell from their sockets. "In remembrance," says Mr. Froude, "of his old sporting days, the archbishop would mend the broken wings and legs of hawks which had suffered from herons." "Dead lambs, pigs, and geese were restored to life, to silence Sadducees who doubted the resurrection." The biographers of Xavier relate that, having washed the sores of a poor invalid, *he drank the water*, and the sores were forthwith healed. Even St. Bernard, preaching on a summer day in a church where the people were annoyed by flies, excommunicates these winged insects, and in the morning they are found to be all dead, and are swept out in heaps. It would be unjust to say that trivial, ludicrous, or disgusting circumstances belong to all ecclesiastical miracles. But such features are so common that they affix a corresponding character to the set of wonders, taken as a whole, to which they pertain.

That the miracles of the Bible have a dignity and beauty peculiar to themselves is acknowledged by disbelievers; for instance, by the author of "Supernatural Religion." If any of them are thought to bear a different look, they are exceptions. "Hence," observes Cardinal Newman, "the Scripture accounts of Eve's temptation by the serpent, of the speaking of Balaam's ass, of Jonah and the whale, and of the devils sent into the herd of swine, are by themselves more or less improbable, being unequal in dignity to the rest." "They are then supported," adds the same author, "by the system in which they are found, as being a few out of a multitude, and, therefore, but exceptions (and, as we suppose, but apparent exceptions) to the general rule." When the miracles of Scripture are looked at as a body, they are seen to be of an elevated character. They are at a wide remove in this respect from the common run of pagan and ecclesiastical miracles. The contrast is like that of a genuine coin with a clumsy counterfeit.

8. The evidential value of the miracles of the Gospel is not weakened, even if it be admitted that miraculous events may have occasionally occurred in later ages.

The restoration of the sick is commonly through no visible or demonstrable interference with natural law. Yet no one should be charged with credulity for holding that in certain

exceptional instances the supernatural agency discovers itself by evidence palpable to the senses. So discreet an historical critic as Neander will not deny that St. Bernard may have been the instrument of effecting cures properly miraculous. It is true, as was suggested above, that missionary work is something to which human powers are adequate, and which requires no other aid from above than the silent, invisible operation of the Spirit of God. Yet, Edmund Burke, speaking of the introduction of Christianity into Britain by Augustine and his associates, remarks: "It is by no means impossible that, for an end so worthy, Providence on some occasions might directly have interfered." "I should think it very presumptuous to say," writes F. D. Maurice, "that it has never been needful, in the modern history of the world, to break the idols of sense and experience by the same method which was sanctioned in the days of old." Those who, like the writers just quoted, hold that miraculous events have not wholly been wanting in later ages, cannot maintain that they have occurred under such conditions of uniformity and the like, as distinguish the miracles of Christ and the apostles. The most that can be claimed is that *sometimes* they have occurred in answer to prayer—a form of answer on which the petitioner has never been able to count. The judicious student who surveys the entire history of miraculous pretension will be slow to admit the miraculous in particular instances of the kind described, without the application of strict tests of evidence. He will bear in mind that the great, the principal design of the miracle is to stand as the sign and proof of Revelation.

A particular examination of the alleged miracles of the early age of the Church is precluded by the limits of the present article. The following points are specially worthy of attention :

1. The miracles said to have been performed in the second and third centuries are far less marked and less numerous than those referred to in the two centuries that followed—a fact the reverse of that which we should expect if these narrations were founded in truth.

2. The same writers—as Origen, Tertullian, Eusebius, Augustine—who record contemporary miracles, imply, in other

passages, that the age of miracles had gone by and that their own times were in marked contrast, in this respect, with the era of the apostles.

3. The miracles related by the Fathers are mostly exorcisms, the healing of the sick, and visions—that is, occurrences where natural agencies are most easily mistaken for supernatural. Miracles, in which this error is impossible, lack sufficient attestation.

The true view on this subject appears to be that miraculous manifestations in the Church ceased gradually. No sharp line of demarcation can be drawn marking off the age of miracles from the subsequent period when the operation of the divine Providence and Spirit was no longer palpably distinguished from the movements of natural law.

As we advance into the fourth century, called the Nicene age, we meet with a notable increase in the number of alleged miracles. Yet Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine, speak of the apostolic age as distinguished from their own as having been a period marked by miracles. Notwithstanding the high merits of the authors of the Nicene era, they discover more and more the artificial rhetorical tone which had now come to infest literature. There was a habit of thought and style which tends to breed exaggeration. It was a period of decadence. Relic-worship, the invocation of martyrs and saints, and like superstitions, established themselves in the Church, and the alleged miracles were frequently associated with these customs. A spirit of credulity gained ground. Moreover, an examination of the miracles described by Augustine shows how little reason there was to assume a supernatural agency in these cases. For example, instances of healing are given which are now known to result not unfrequently from natural causes. Other supposed miracles of a more portentous character rest upon no testimony which is of any value. The evidence for most of the post-apostolic miracles which the Fathers advert to melts away on examination.

The standing argument at the present day against the credibility of the evangelists is the precedent afforded by the biographers of "the saints," and of the incredible marvels which they mingle with authentic history. To some it is no matter of

surprise that the apostles should be utterly deceived in this branch of their testimony. Thus, Matthew Arnold boldly admits that if we had the original reports of eye-witnesses, we should not have a miracle less than we have now.¹ Very different is the judgment of a great historical scholar, Niebuhr. He refers to the critical spirit in which he had come to the study of the New Testament histories, and to the imperfections which he supposed himself to find in them. He adds: "Here, as in every historical subject, when I contemplated the immeasurable gulf between the narrative and the facts narrated, this disturbed me no further. He whose earthly life and sorrows were depicted had for me a perfectly real existence, and his whole history had the same reality, even if it were not related with literal exactness in any single point. Hence, also, the fundamental fact of miracles, which according to my conviction must be conceded, unless we adopt the not merely incomprehensible, but absurd, hypothesis, that the Holiest was a deceiver, and his disciples either dupes or liars; and that deceivers had preached a holy religion, in which self-renunciation is everything, and in which there is nothing tending toward the erection of a priestly rule—nothing that can be acceptable to vicious inclinations. As regards a miracle in the strictest sense, it really only requires an unprejudiced and penetrating study of nature, to see that those related are as far as possible from absurdity, and a comparison with legends, or the pretended miracles of other religions, to perceive by what a different spirit they are animated."²

"To see by what a different spirit they are animated"—it is just this which Renan fails to see in the legends of the saints. It is found impossible to dispute the fact that testimony substantially equivalent to the contents of the Gospels was given by the apostles. The old fortification of unbelief, held 'up to a recent day, is abandoned. That the apostles were wilful deceivers, if it be sometimes insinuated, is felt to be a weak position. What, then, shall be said? Why, answers Renan, they were like the followers of St. Francis of Assisi—credulous, romantic enthusiasts. The frequency with which he reverts to the lives of

¹ *Contemporary Review*, vol. xxvi. p. 697.

² "Memoir of Niebuhr" (Am. ed.), p. 236.

St. Francis, indicates what is the real source and prop of his theory in his own mind. It is well to look at this parallel more narrowly.

We have two lives of St. Francis by personal followers—one by Thomas de Celano, and another by the “three companions.” Another life is from the pen of Bonaventura, who was five years old when the saint died.¹ The moment one takes up these biographies he finds himself in an atmosphere different from that of nature and real life. Feeling dominates perception. Everything is suffused with emotion. We are in an atmosphere where neither discriminating judgment nor cool observation is to be looked for. Here is an example of the strain of eulogy in which these disciples, rapt in admiration, indulge: “Oh, how beautiful, how splendid, how glorious he appeared, in innocence of life and in simplicity of language, in purity of heart, in delight in God, in fraternal love, in odorous obedience, in complaisant devotedness, in angelic aspect! Sweet in manners, placid in nature, affable in speech, most apt in exhortation, most faithful in trusts, prudent in counsel, efficient in action; gracious in all things, serene in mind, sweet in spirit, sober in temper, steadfast in contemplation, persevering in esteem, and in all things the same; swift to show favor, slow to anger,” etc., etc.² This is only one of the outbursts of ecstatic admiration for “the morning star,” the luminary “more radiant than the sun,” in which these chroniclers break out. When we turn to the Saint who is the object of all this fervor, we find in his character, to be sure, much to respect. There is “sweetness and light,” but the light is by far the minor factor. The practice of asceticism rendered his bodily state at all times abnormal and unhealthy. To sleep on the ground with a log for a pillow, to deny himself the refreshment of sleep when it was most needed, to choose on principle the coarsest food, and to insist on its being cooked, if cooked at all, in a way that made it as unpalatable and indigestible as possible, to weep every day so copiously that his eyesight was nearly destroyed, and then, as always when he was ill, to take remedies with great reluctance, if he took them

¹ These lives are in the “*Acta Sanctorum*” (ed. nov.), vol. 90, pp. 693-798.

² “*Acta Sanctorum*,” ut sup., p. 716.

at all—these customs were not favorable to sanity of mental action any more than to soundness of body. They coexisted with attractive virtues. They sprang from pure motives. But they were none the less excesses of superstition. Persuaded on one occasion, when he was enfeebled by illness, to eat of a fowl, he demonstrated his penitence by causing himself to be led with a rope round his neck like a criminal, through the streets of Assisi, by one of his followers, who shouted all the time, “Behold the glutton !”

The sort of miracles ascribed to St. Francis, and the measure of credence which the stories of them deserve, may be understood from what is said of his miraculous dealing with the lower animals. On a journey, leaving his companions in the road, he stepped aside into the midst of a concourse of doves, crows, and other birds. They were not frightened at his approach. Whereupon he delivered to them a sermon, in which he addressed them as “my brother birds,” and gave them wholesome counsel—supposing them able to comprehend it—respecting their duties to God. But we are assured they did comprehend it, and signified their approbation by stretching their necks, opening their mouths, and flapping their wings. Having received from the Saint the benediction and permission to go, this winged congregation flew away. This is only one in a catalogue of wonders of the same kind. Fishes, as well as birds, listened to preaching, and waited for the discourse to conclude. We can readily believe Celano when he says that St. Francis was a man of “the utmost fervor” and had a feeling “of piety and gentleness towards irrational creatures.” He was probably one of those who have a remarkable power of dispelling the fear and winning the confidence of animals. Incidents where this natural power was exercised were magnified by the fancy of devotees into the tales a sample of which has been given. A like discount from other miraculous narratives resting on the same testimony would reduce the events which they relate to the dimensions of natural, tho it may be remarkable occurrences. It is needless to recount these alleged miracles. Travelling together, St. Francis and his followers see in the road a purse apparently stuffed with coins. There was a temptation to pick it up. The rule of poverty was in peril. The saint

warns his curious disciple that the devil is in the purse. Finally, the disciple, after prayer, is permitted to touch it, when out, leaps a serpent, and instantly serpent and purse vanish! When the saint comes to die, one of his followers saw his soul, as it parted from the body, in appearance like an immense, luminous star, shedding its radiance over many waters, borne upon a white cloud, and ascending straight to heaven.

The great miracle in connection with St. Francis is that of the "stigmata," or the marks of the wounds of Christ, which the Saviour was thought in a vision to have imprinted upon his body. From the hour when a vision of the crucified Christ was vouchsafed him, as he thought, while he was in prayer before his image, "his heart," say the "tres socii," was wounded and melted at the recollection of the Lord's passion, so that he carried while he lived the wounds—stigmata—of the Lord Jesus in his heart. He sought in all ways to be literally conformed to the Lord as a sufferer. For example, remembering that the Virgin had no place where her son could lay his head, he would take his food from the table where he was dining, carry it out, and eat it on the ground. It was his constant effort to bring upon himself the experiences of pain and sorrow which befell Christ. Especially did he concentrate his thoughts in intense and long-continued meditation on the crucifixion. There is a considerable number of other instances of *stigmata* found upon the body besides that of St. Francis. The scientific solution, which has high authority in its favor, is that the phenomenon in question is the result of the mental state acting by a physiological law upon the body. It is considered to be one effect of the mysterious interaction of mind and body, the products of which, when body and mind are in an abnormal condition, are exceptionally remarkable.

Before leaving our subject, let the reader reflect on that one trait of the apostles by which they are distinguished from other witnesses to alleged miracles. It is their *truthfulness*. Men may be devout, they may be capable of exalted emotions, they may undertake works of self-sacrifice, and be revered for their saintly tempers, and yet they may lack this one sterling quality on which the worth of testimony depends. This defect may not

be conscious. It may grow out of a habit of seeing things in a hazy atmosphere of feeling in which all things are refracted from the right line. But the apostles, unlike many devotees of even Christian ages, were *truthful*. Without this habit of seeing and relating things as they actually occurred, their writings would never have exerted that pure influence which has flowed from them. Because they uttered "words of truth and soberness," they make those who sympathize with the spirit of their writings value truth above all things.

And there is one proof of the truth of the apostles' testimony which can be appreciated by the unlearned. The character of Jesus as he is depicted in the Gospels is too unique to be the result of invention. It is the image of a perfection too transcendent to be devised by the wit of man. Yet it is perfectly self-consistent and obviously real in all its traits. In Him the natural and the supernatural, divine authority, and human feeling, the power which gives life to the dead, and the sympathy which expresses itself in tears, blend in complete accord. This portrait of Christ in the Gospels is evidently drawn from the life. It demonstrates the truth of the Gospel history.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

ON CERTAIN ABUSES IN LANGUAGE.

"LANGUAGE," according to one of those well-known sayings about which it matters little whether they were ever really said or not, "was given us to conceal our thoughts." In this there no doubt is literal truth: a skilful use of language may often conceal our thoughts far more thoroughly than they can ever be concealed by mere silence. Silence in many cases is practically the same thing as speech. Silence often at once lets out the truth which a skilful use of speech will keep hidden. But when language is used to conceal thought, two things are implied: first, there must be some thought to conceal; secondly, there must be a conscious purpose of concealing it. Some malicious people have been known to whisper that a good deal of the diplomacy of the most civilized nations is done on this principle. The ambassador need not be, in the full force of an older saying than that with which I started, an "honest man sent abroad to *lie* for the good of his country." There may be no lying, strictly so called, in the matter; there need be no direct misstatement of fact. When language is used to conceal thought, the great achievement is to make no statements of fact at all. Something should be said which sounds like a statement of fact—or the statement of an intention, which is, in truth, a statement of fact—but which, when it comes to be weighed, is found to contain no really distinct statement of fact or intention. The man who speaks or writes has a very distinct meaning which he himself perfectly understands. He wishes others to believe that he has some meaning; but he has no wish that they should know what his meaning is. Mere silence would not serve his purpose; it might very likely let his real meaning be known. But a skilful use of language, a clever handling of those vague

ways of speaking which are equally true and equally untrue under all circumstances, a clever use of phrases which sound as if they had a very deep meaning while in truth they have no meaning at all, serves his purpose far better. He has thoughts; he wishes to conceal his thoughts; and he uses language as the best means for concealing them.

But the conscious use of language to conceal thought is not the subject to which I wish specially to call attention. I do however wish to speak of something which is in some measure akin to that use—of something which in a great degree adopts its formulæ and reproduces its general outward likeness. The state of mind which has a meaning, and which uses language as a means to conceal that meaning, is, as a state of mind, as widely removed as may be from the state of mind which has no meaning at all. But these two opposite states of mind do to a great extent make use of exactly the same kind of outward utterance. When the man who has no meaning is trying to conceal the fact that he has no meaning and to make people believe that he has a meaning, his case is really a good deal the same as that of the man who wishes his meaning to be thought other than it really is. And this, I suspect, must often be the case with those who have to write or speak something or other every day. It must constantly happen that a man is forced to say something when he really has nothing to say. He knows perfectly well that he has no meaning; but necessity is laid upon him; he must say something which shall sound as if it had a meaning. It is almost in the nature of the case that the man who wishes to conceal his meaning, and the man who wishes to conceal his lack of meaning, should fall very largely into the same style of speaking and writing. Sounding phrases, grand abstractions, any form of speech which has an air of meaning without much substance, are of equal service to both classes.

But there is a third class, humbler than either of these, with whom there is no conscious concealment of anything, but where the outward effect is much the same as in the two classes where there is a conscious concealment. These are those who certainly have no meaning, but who are quite unaware that they have none. Or perhaps they may in some sort have a meaning; but their meaning is not distinct: it is not clear-cut; it is

confused and hazy; it is incapable either of being put into the shape of a scientific statement or of being put into words of one syllable. I am tempted to think that any thought, any meaning, which has any real claim to the name of thought or meaning, ought to be capable of both those processes. It is not a bad test of clearness of thought; Can you, on the one hand, put what is said into logical order? Can you, on the other hand, make a child understand it? The first kind of man above referred to could do both perfectly well; only it does not suit his purpose to do either. The second cannot do either with the matter in hand, because in truth he has no matter in hand. But he could most likely do both perfectly well with some other matter. It is our third man, he who either thinks that he has a meaning when he has not or who does not stop to think whether he has a meaning or not, who can in no case reach that clearness of expression which is needed either for the child or for the logician. The sounding and empty phrases which the others use consciously for their own purposes, to conceal either a meaning or a conscious lack of meaning, he uses because he cannot help using them. If he has to arrange his thoughts in syllogisms, if he has to put them into words of one syllable, he must first have thoughts to arrange. But he has no thoughts; he has only big words. He cannot be clear in speech, because he has no clear ideas. The vague and grand way of talking helps him just as much as it helps the other two, tho for quite an opposite reason.

The subject which I wish here to discuss is that kind of style in speaking and writing which has become common among us, specially on some special classes of subjects, through the great number of speakers and writers who belong to one or other of these three classes. And I do not wish to discuss mere literary style, but also certain practical evils which, as it seems to me, have arisen, partly from the use of certain words out of their right places, partly from the use of certain words which had better not be used at all. I say practical evils, because I mean something more than mere questions of good or bad style. I mean cases where the misuse of a word has led to confusions of thought and misconceptions of fact. Such confusions and misconceptions are surely themselves

practical evils in a sense in which no mere fault of style is. And they often, moreover, lead to practical evils in a yet more distinct sense, if, as is very likely to happen, confusions in speech and misconceptions in thought lead directly to practical errors of conduct. I will begin with some cases which are mere questions of taste, where the error, if any, is a mere error of style; from thence I will go up to the cases where I believe that real practical errors have come of the misuse, the vague and inaccurate use, of language.

I am not now directly pleading the cause of the native English tongue against foreign intrusion. I believe I am doing so indirectly; but it is only indirectly. I am not pleading for Teutonic words as such against Romance words as such. I am pleading for whatever words give the clearest and most accurate idea. I believe that, where you have the choice between the two, the Teutonic word will commonly be found to give the clearest and most accurate idea. But, in any case where it is not so, I say for my present purpose—indeed I should say at all times—use the Romance word without doubting. In speaking of these matters, I have always pleaded for the Teutonic word against the Romance, whenever there is a real choice between them. But I have always admitted that there are many cases where there is no real choice in the matter. I have always been for getting rid of Romance words wherever they can be got rid of; but I have always kept the fact in sight that there are many cases in which they cannot be got rid of. First of all, there are those words, some of which come directly from Latin, some from Old-French, which came in so early as to be thoroughly naturalized, and which have altogether put on the outward shape of English words. Secondly, there is the great fact that we have so largely lost the power of coining words in our own tongue that we are constantly driven to use Romance words for any purposes which are at all technical or abstract. My own rule is, as far as may be, to look at Romance words of the second class—words whose shape and endings show them at first sight to be Romance—strictly as technical terms. I hold that they should be used freely wherever they are really needed in their strict and accurate sense,

but that they should be avoided wherever they are not really needed, and should not be used in any but their strict and accurate sense. A good many, both of the faults in style and of the graver practical faults of which I have to speak freely, have come of using what I must call technical terms, words freely to be used as technical terms, in a lax and inaccurate way. A common process is, first to use a word in some way which is a mere abuse of language, and then to found a practical argument on the abuse.

Let me, by way of distinction, begin by speaking of a few words where the question is one of mere style, in many cases a mere matter of taste and feeling between Teutonic and Romance words. In my first sentence I quoted the saying about language being given us to conceal our thoughts. I might, instead of the Romance word *conccal*, have used the Teutonic word *hide*. Perhaps if I had myself been throwing the thought into words for the first time, I might have used the word *hide*. But in quoting a well-known saying, I quoted it in the shape in which it is commonly known. Besides, I am not quite sure that *hide* and *conccal* can always be used for one another. Sometimes, I should say, they can; in other cases there would seem to be a slight shade of difference in their meaning. We *conceal* a thing of which we wish the very being not to be known; we *hide* a thing the being of which is known, but of which we wish the whereabouts not to be known. The man who wished to conceal his thoughts wished nobody to know that he had such thoughts. According to my rule, I should say, Use *hide* rather than *conccal* whenever the meaning of the two is quite the same. But in the case of my quotation I am not quite sure that the meaning is quite the same; so in this particular phrase *conccal* may really be the better word. But in the first words of this article I certainly said that I should *begin*; I did not say that I should *commence*. Here is a clear case where the choice lies between a Teutonic and a Romance word of exactly the same meaning. No shadow of difference of meaning can be discerned between *begin* and *commence*. The question between the two words is purely a question of style. Each might, as far as its meaning goes, be put instead of the other in any sentence where either of them is used. I therefore am, accord-

ing to my rule, for Teutonic *beginning* against Romance *commencement*; tho I must do penance for my past sins by saying openly that I found the word *commence* in a writing of my own six-and-twenty years old. But at the same time I must again insist that this difference is a mere difference of taste and style. He who says *commence* instead of *begin* in no way sins against the law of clearness; his meaning may be just as plain, his line of thought may be just as accurate, as if he used the Teutonic word. But it is, I think, another thing when, instead of either *beginning* or *commencing*, we get to *initiating* and *inaugurating*. Then we are fairly landed in the grand style, the high-polite style, the diplomatic style—the style of those who have no meaning while they think they have one—the style of those who have no meaning, but who wish other people to think that they have one—the style of those who have a very distinct meaning, but who wish other people not to know what it is. When one tremendous personage “initiates a policy,” when another tremendous personage “inaugurates an epoch,” what is it that their excellencies, highnesses, or majesties really do? They begin or commence something; but what is it that they begin or commence? I should like to believe with the song that “there’s a good time coming.” When the good time comes it will, I should guess, be in the high-polite style, an “epoch;” being an “epoch,” it will doubtless have to be “inaugurated.” Only what is the exact ritual for the inauguration of an epoch? How ought the tremendous personage who will have to do the work of inauguration to set about it? Can any one tell us in plain English, in words which at least go away no further from plain English than *commence* and *conceal*?

I think then that my readers will be pleased to learn what I may report upon the personal authority of one of the revisers of the translation of the Bible, that two familiar passages of the Old and New Testament are not to be touched. The first words of the book of Genesis and the first words of Saint John’s Gospel are to stay as they are. The *beginning* is still to be the *beginning*; it is not to be turned into a *commencement*, still less into an *inauguration*. This last word *inauguration*, and its verb to *inaugurate*, supply me with a good example of the kind of abuse

of language of which I wish specially to speak. The process is this: Some strictly technical word is taken, some word which, in some other language, most likely in some distant age and country, had a very distinct and technical meaning. It is used perhaps, first of all, consciously as a figure, with a direct allusion to its original meaning. It is applied to something which has some kind of relation to its original meaning, to something which the reference to its original meaning really illustrates. As a figure, used once for all, it is very likely really in place; its application is very likely both apposite and ingenious. Only it is safer not to make such applications, unless we are quite sure that they will never be made again. For the chances are that the word will be caught up by some one who does not understand the force of the original allusion. It is to him simply a new word, a foreign word, perhaps a long and grand-sounding word, which he thinks it fine to drag into his talk, without any thought whatever of its real meaning. Step by step others receive the new word as a fine word; it passes into the received dialect of those who love to use fine words. It is no longer used as a figure or an allusion; all thought of its origin and history has passed away. The word is used simply as being finer, and withal vaguer, than the common word to whose meaning it comes nearest. The common word has a sharp, definite meaning which everybody understands. There is no metaphor, no vagueness, no haziness, about it; it is simply the name for the thing, and that is all. The common word is therefore used by those who know what they mean and who mean what they say, and who wish every one to know what they do mean. But the word which once was a metaphor, but which has ceased to be one, does not in the same way ever become the simple name of the thing in the same way as the common English word. The point of the metaphor has wholly passed away, but the once metaphorical expression still keeps about it a good deal of the vagueness and haziness of its metaphorical days. It is therefore used by all those classes of speakers for whose ends fine words, hazy words, pay. It is used by those who wish to conceal their meaning, by those who know that they have no meaning to conceal, and those who are fumbling about for a meaning

and who sometimes think that they have found one, when they have lighted upon anything which sounds a little grand and not a little hazy.

Now as to these particular words "inaugurate" and "inauguration." They are technical words of the religious ritual of pagan Rome. They cannot be applied to anything else without a certain degree of metaphor. To inaugurate a person or thing was to admit the man to his office, to dedicate the thing to its use, by the religious ceremony of *augury*—that is, by marking the flight of birds and thereby learning the will of the gods. A king or magistrate was *inaugurated*, because the *augurs* took the *auspices* at his solemn admission. A temple, a public building, a place of meeting, was *inaugurated*, because it was set apart for its use in the same way. Now it was not a very violent metaphor to transfer the word from the rites of one religion to the rites of another. By this kind of figure one might speak of the inauguration of a Christian king by the sacred unction, or of the inauguration of a Turkish sultan by girding him with the sacred sword. The particular Roman rite of augury is perhaps by this time forgotten; but the general idea of admitting by religious rites is in full force. The word was in this stage in the days of Samuel Johnson, who explains "inaugurate" to mean "to consecrate; to invest with a new office by solemn rites." If things could have stopped here, there might have been no great harm. If by chance I wanted, for the nonce, a general word which should take in the coronation of a king, the consecration of a bishop, the benediction of an abbot, the ordination of a priest, the installation of a canon, the admission of a fellow or scholar, the dedication of a church, I might be tempted to use, for the nonce, the word "inauguration" as by an easy figure applicable to all of them. But when a word has once got the reputation of being fine, it does not stick at any such point as this. The next step will perhaps be to apply the word to a formal admission, to a formal opening of a building, tho it is not accompanied by any religious ceremony. In the next stage the word altogether loses the notion of admission or dedication. It ceases for the most part to be applied to persons or to material things. We seldom hear of a king, a magistrate, a minister, being *inaugurated*. The American President is an exception.

In his case the word still keeps some shadow of its old meaning. The chief of the American Union is "inaugurated," not indeed in the old Roman sense by any taking of auspices, but in a sense which still keeps the notion of solemn admission to an office. In other cases it is commonly not the man himself who is said to be inaugurated, but his schemes, his policy, above all his epoch. Here the word does not exactly mean to *begin*. It means to begin with a certain cloud of haziness thrown over the process of beginning. I fancy that "inaugurating an epoch" means something like "turning over a new leaf." That too is a metaphor; but it is a metaphor much easier to understand than the other. But there are cases in which to *inaugurate* seems simply to mean to *begin*. I think I have heard of inaugurating a ball or a dinner. If so, one can only say, with Count Shucksen in "Peter Simple," "Spin your yarn in plain English." The chief case where to "inaugurate" is applied to a material object is in the case of a statue. In that case some slight memory of the original notion cleaves to the word; there is something of a formal dedication. But in such cases the actual physical act meant by the word "inauguration" seems to mean the act of uncovering. It is odd that a word which strictly means to find out the will of Jupiter by the flight of birds should have come to mean, sometimes to begin, sometimes to uncover. It is as odd as the usage by which, when a tradesman sends in his bill, he is said to "render" it, while, when a choir sing a psalm, they are said to "render" it also. Surely in all four cases we may say, "Spin your yarn in plain English."

There are a crowd of other technical words of Roman or Greek religious, political, or civil life which have fared in much the same way as this one of inauguration. Many of them in truth have fared much worse. After all, to talk of inaugurating an epoch, a statue, or a dinner is a harmless piece of folly. I do not think that any one who has clear thoughts and who wishes to set forth his thoughts in clear words would talk in that way; but I do not know that any practical mischief is done by such a way of talking. I do not know that any one is likely to be led astray by it as to any matter of fact. The fact that the abusive meaning has so utterly parted company from

the original meaning, the fact that the thought of augury has utterly passed away from "inaugurate" and "inauguration," is in some sort a gain. The new use of the words is not likely to lead any one to false notions about the Roman augury, nor is it likely to lead to any more practical evil consequences as to affairs of our own day. It is a silly and affected way of talking; but it is nothing worse. In some of the other cases there is something worse. Many of them are likely to lead to misconceptions as to things past; some of them are likely to lead to practical mistakes as to things present.

Let us begin with a phrase which is sure to be used whenever there is a Congress or a Conference—I am not sure that I know the difference between the two—of the great powers of Europe. Such an assembly is sure to be spoken of somewhere or other as "the European Areiopagos." I do not know that any direct practical evil comes of this; I do not suppose that the resolutions of such a Congress or Conference are likely to be less wise or just because it is called an Areiopagos. But those who so speak of it must have very false ideas of the ancient Areiopagos, and those who form their notions of the ancient Areiopagos from the "European Areiopagos" now will certainly go very far wrong in their ideas of old Athenian polity. The Areiopagos was simply the highest criminal court, the highest religious court, at Athens. It was not an international body at all; it was a court of justice in a single commonwealth. But I suspect that this phrase of the "European Areiopagos" arises from a twofold error. The court of Areiopagos is confounded with the Amphiktyonic Council, and the functions of the Amphiktyonic Council are altogether misconceived. The Amphiktyonic Council was not an international Congress; as its functions were primarily religious, it had really more likeness to a General Council of the Church, and, in that character, it sometimes preached a crusade. But it had likeness enough to an international Congress to be mistaken for one, and it often has been mistaken for one. To call a diplomatic Congress "the Amphiktyons of Europe" would imply a very false notion of the Greek Amphiktyons; still there would be likeness enough between the two things to account for the mistake. But when the diplomatic Congress is called an Areiopagos, there is

such an utter lack of likeness between the two things that I cannot account for the use of the name in any way but by supposing the twofold confusion of which I have just spoken.

In this case of Areiopagos the word has not passed into common use. It is still used consciously as a figure, with a direct, tho misleading, reference to the Areiopagos at Athens. There are other technical words of Greek polity which have passed into common use, and from which the remembrance of their original meaning has largely passed away, tho not quite so harmlessly as in the case of the Latin inauguration. I might indeed ask, by the way, why the followers of Achilleus, the *Myrmidons*, have undergone a fate which is shared by no other division of the Achaian host before Ilios. I do not remember that any other people in the Homeric catalogue have come to be written with a small letter, or that it is thought smart to call policemen or sheriffs' officers by their national name. I might also ask, by the way, why the *sphinx* and the *sirens* so commonly take possession of a longer letter than they have any claim to, and constantly appear as *sphynx* and *syrens*. I might ask too why the latter name gets so often applied to various persons who are not at all like the sweet singers of the Odyssey. I might ask again why the crane's enemy, the *pygmy*, who has the best of rights to that specially Greek letter to which the sphinx and the sirens have no claim, is so commonly deprived of his rightful spelling, and is, perhaps on account of his small size, put off, under the form of *pigmy*, with the smallest letter either in the Greek or the Latin alphabet. But I pass to words where the misuse is of greater importance. Let us take the word *tyrant*. In old Greece that word had a very distinct meaning. It meant a man who had taken to himself kingly power in a state where there was no king by law. It referred to the way in which power was gained, not to the way in which it was used. Most of the Greek tyrants were oppressive rulers, but all were not so. To speak of a just and merciful tyrant was not a contradiction in terms; the class was certainly rare, but it was not unknown. Under the Roman Empire the word was used in a sense exactly analogous, a sense just so far modified as it could not fail to be modified in passing from a commonwealth to a monarchy. The *tyrant* was now the usurper, the

man who set himself up in opposition to a lawful emperor. Many of the so-called tyrants of this time were among the best rulers in the imperial series, and the question which was tyrant and which was lawful emperor was commonly a question of final success or failure. The word bore the same meaning in early mediæval times; it expressed a power the origin of which was deemed to be unlawful, whether its actual use was good or bad. Whenever it was applied to a prince whose title was not disputed, it was used as a kind of figure. The revolutions of the Italian commonwealth brought again to life a class of rulers to whom the name might be applied with the strictest truth in the old Greek sense. But in later times the historical meaning of the word has been quite forgotten. It is remembered that the name of "tyrant" was always a name of reproach; for, let the tyrant use his power never so well when he had got it, the unlawful way of getting it was always remembered against him as a crime. But it is forgotten that the reproach of the name applied in strictness to the way of getting the power, and not to the way of using it. The word "tyrant" has now become simply a name of reproach for any oppressive ruler, whatever may have been the way in which he came by his power. And it would not in common use be applied to the case of a ruler who came by his power unlawfully, but who, when he had got it, used it well. Now here comes the practical evil. When a word comes to be misused, when a word which started with a strict and definite meaning has come to be used in a vague and careless way, it becomes very difficult to use it in its strict and definite sense, even when no other word can be put in its place. It is hard now to use the word "tyrant" in its strict sense, even when speaking historically of the Greek tyrants. No other word expresses the idea, and yet we cannot use the right word without feeling the need of some explanation, and without some risk of being misunderstood. Mr. Grote felt this difficulty, and instead of "tyrant," he used "despot." But he had to define the word *despot*, and to use that word too in a technical sense, different alike from its original meaning and from the meaning which it commonly bears. But take another side of the matter. Let us suppose the case of a modern ruler to whom the name should strictly apply in the Greek sense. It would, in

such a case, be very convenient to apply the name to him, but it would be very difficult. The dominion of such a ruler might be tyrannical in the vulgar sense, or it might not. In the latter case the name would be so certain to be misunderstood that there would be some injustice in using it. Even in the former case, where the name would be deserved in both senses, its force would be lost. When it was meant in the strict sense, it would be taken in the vulgar sense. It would be understood as a vague term of reproach, true or false, while what was really meant by it would be a distinct and undoubted matter of fact. In short, a word which it would be very useful to have the power of using in its strict sense has come to be practically lost, because it has got to be vulgarly used in a vague way without any thought of its proper meaning.

Still I do not think that the practical evil of the vague use of the word *tyrant* is at all so great as the evil is in some other like cases of abuse. And perhaps the vague use has become so familiar that there is no hope of recalling the word to its strict sense. But there is another word which I think we might save, another Greek name, the bearers of which were in their own nature the exact opposite to the tyrants, tho some members of the class are said to have sometimes grown into tyrants. Not long ago I saw, in a very polite paper, the writers in which might be expected to understand the Greek tongue, something about "demagogues declaiming in pot-houses." I believe that this way of speaking was meant to be smart. Perhaps it was not specially meant to be learned, because the word *demagogue* has so utterly passed away from its original Greek meaning, it has so utterly ceased to suggest any thought of its Greek meaning, that it no longer has a learned sound. When people talk about demagogues declaiming in pot-houses, it is clear that they have not the least thought of a real Athenian or Syracusan demagogue before their eyes. Now the real meaning of the word *demagogue* makes it the noblest name that a political community can bestow on its noblest members; it is the leader of the people. It is the right name for the first man in any free state, whomever you may deem that man to be. It never was an official title, because the kind of power which it expresses is a purely personal

power. But it is a name which was applied to the greatest men in Greece, to Periklês himself. And yet the name came very early to carry with it a tinge of reproach. But this is simply because the class to which the name was commonly applied was looked on with a measure of dislike by most of the writers from whom we get our knowledge of Greek political life. The demagogue was necessarily a politician on the popular side, and the greater part of the ancient Greek literature which has come down to us comes from writers who were not on the popular side. Mr. Grote defines the demagogues to be "opposition-speakers," and this is perhaps as near an analogy to modern political life as we can get. But it is very far from being an exact analogy, because at Athens there was nothing really answering to office and opposition. For it is the essence of an opposition that the measures which it proposes or which it would like to propose, are not carried, while the measures which an Athenian demagogue proposed commonly were carried. The demagogue was a popular speaker, whose strength lay in popular support, and who was therefore disliked by those whose politics were not popular. But his position was a strictly parliamentary position. The audience which he harangued was the sovereign political assembly of his city. In the vulgar modern use of the word it commonly marks a position which is not parliamentary—the position, for instance, of those who declaim in pot-houses. It would not be applied, unless by a kind of disparaging figure, to any member of parliament—certainly not to any past, present, or probable minister—acting strictly in his parliamentary character. If it is said of a minister, or even of an ordinary member of parliament, that he acts as a demagogue, that he makes a demagogic speech or brings in a demagogic measure, what is meant is that his speech or his measure is unworthy of his parliamentary position, and that he is acting like the true demagogues outside who declaim in the pot-houses. Now what harm, it may be asked, comes of so using the word? The harm, I should say, which comes of using any word vaguely and carelessly, without any very distinct meaning. According to my notions of language, *demagogue* is strictly a technical term, and should never be used except either directly of a Greek demagogue or else, by a figure, of some one

whom it is meant purposely to liken to a Greek demagogue. If anything else is meant, do not call the man of whom you speak by the Greek name *demagogue*. Call him in plain English whatever you wish to imply by calling him a demagogue. In this, as in other cases, the vague way of using a word makes it hard to use it in the strict way. It is hard, even in speaking historically of Greek demagogues, wholly to get rid of associations which in no way belong to the Greek use of the word. The declaimer in the pot-house will thrust himself in. And he is altogether out of place. For, if such a being existed at Athens, no Athenian, of whatever politics, would have thought of calling him a demagogue. The name would have been too big for him. The demagogue had, for good or for evil, another and a wider field.

There are a number of other words of the same kind, words which it is thought fine to use in some vague and meaningless way, while their real meaning is wholly forgotten. It is forgotten to that degree that it is hard to use the words in their true meaning, even when speaking historically of the times and places to which they really belong. Of one of these misused words one is almost ashamed to speak. One would have thought that the silly talk about *ovations* had been by this time laughed to scorn. But it is not so. We still read, even in very decent newspapers, that, when a man is loudly cheered, he "receives an ovation," or, to reach the lowest point of nonsense and bad English, that he "receives *quite* an ovation." At the time of the Tichborne trial, a witness in a police-court said that the Claimant "received the usual ovation." Being asked by the magistrate what an "ovation" was, he answered that the word meant "shouting and cheering." How then is it left to us to speak of the ovation of Marcellus, conqueror of Syracuse? By what words are we to set forth that, great as was his conquest, yet, as it was only winning back what Rome had lost, he might not triumph—he might not be drawn in the kingly chariot to sacrifice the bull to Jupiter of the Capitol—but that he had to put up with the lesser honor of the ovation—to walk at the head of his legions, and to sacrifice a sheep only—*ovum*—to the patron god? I confess that, when I hear of an ovation, I am tempted to forget Marcellus and his sheep, I am tempted to forget the Claimant with his shouting and cheering, I am tempt-

ed to lengthen the first syllable of the word, to derive it from *ovum* rather than from *ovis*, and to picture to myself the receiver of the ovation, receiving it in the shape, not of shouting and cheering, but of rotten eggs. Yet in some cases we cannot seriously think of that explanation. I read not long ago that the common sovereign of Hungary and Austria, in going about through his kingdoms, received ovation after ovation. Yet I cannot believe that his Majesty was pelted with eggs; I cannot believe that he sacrificed a sheep to any pagan god. Only when tremendous personages like the Claimant and the Apostolic King go about receiving tributes of respect, why do their admirers stop at anything so lowly as an ovation? Why are not those whom the world delights to honor promoted to the full glories of a triumph?

Let us take quite another word. When an army or a district suffers from the sword or hunger or pestilence, it is always said to be *decimated*. I remember when this folly began. It was in the time of the Crimean war. Somebody said, I suppose by way of a figure, that the army before Sebastopol was *decimated*. I suppose it was in a figure that the word was used. I never heard that any part of any army engaged there, English or Russian, French or Piedmontese, behaved so badly as to deserve to be decimated in the literal sense. To *decimate*—literally to *tithe*, to take the tenth—is a technical word with a technical meaning. It means when all the men of a regiment or other large body of men have equally offended, but when their number makes it impossible to punish all, and when justice is therefore thought to be satisfied by taking every tenth man for punishment. Some one, as I said, applied the word in a figure to the sufferings of the army before Sebastopol. So many perished that the army might be said to be *tithed* or decimated. As a figure, used once and never again, the saying might perhaps just pass. But the word sounded fine, and seemed to have no particular meaning; everybody therefore took it up. Every army, every set of men, which has since that time suffered any considerable loss, has always been said to be “decimated.” The word is dragged in without any thought of its real meaning, without so much as any thought of the number ten. No one would say in plain English that the army was *tithed*, because then the non-

sense would stand out in all its nakedness. But the Latin word *decimated* is fine and vague, and so it goes down. Only there comes my question, the same question which affects me as to the tyrant, the demagogue, and the ovation. If I have to speak historically of the real decimation of a regiment or other body of men, what am I now to call it?

Again, we have all been reading the papers lately, and we have all read a good deal about "agrarian outrages," "agrarian disturbances," "agrarian questions," and the like. This is nothing new; I remember the word cropping up ever and anon ever since I can remember anything. The word sounds as if it had something to do with a field; but I never quite understood whether an agrarian outrage meant an outrage done in a field or only an outrage done about a field. The word doubtless comes from some confused remembrance of the agrarian laws of Rome. But the agrarian laws of Rome had nothing to do with agrarian outrages. They had nothing to do with outrages of any kind, except so far as the proposers of the agrarian laws became victims to the outrages of the oligarchs. An agrarian law was simply a law for granting out portions of the public land of the state, a thing constantly done in many British colonies and in many American States. Opinions might differ as to the wisdom of an agrarian law; but it was as legal and regular a proceeding as any other law. But as the agrarian laws touched the interests of powerful classes, and as Roman history was largely written in the interests of those classes, the agrarian laws got a bad name, and for a long time their nature was thoroughly misunderstood. It was long believed that the agrarian laws forbade any man to hold above a certain number of acres in freehold. In truth the agrarian laws did not meddle with freehold estates at all; they were laws by which the state, in its character of landlord of the public land, declared that none of its tenants should hold above a certain quantity. But the object of the laws was misrepresented; their name got a bad sound; it came to be applied as a name of reproach to things which had nothing to do with the old agrarian laws. The word seems always to be used in a bad sense; it is never used approvingly or even in a purely colorless way. It is not everything that concerns land which is called "agrarian," but only

those things that concern land which are not thought well of. The thing that is called "agrarian" is always an outrage or a disturbance, or at best that ticklish thing a "question." But if a man tills his land better than it was ever tilled before, I do not think he is ever said to make "agrarian improvements." Next, as in the other cases, the misuse of the word acts back again. It is hard to think and write of the agrarian laws of Rome without the foolish application of the word sounding in one's ears. In short, simply because people in our own time have thought that the word "agrarian" sounded fine, Licinius and Sextius, Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, have to bear, not only the blame which was naturally thrown on their acts by their own political adversaries, but also the blame which has been earned by people ages after, whose doings have nothing whatever in common with theirs.

I might go on with many other instances. There is the vulgar use of *aristocracy* very constantly, of *democracy* not uncommonly, to mean, not a form of government, but a social class. There is the chatter about a *proletariat*, which I believe simply means poor men, with or without large families. There is the foolish name *plebiscite*, which is always applied to certain irregular doings in France which have nothing in common with the Roman *plebiscitum*, while it is never applied to certain regular and lawful proceedings in Switzerland, which have very much in common with it. Then there is the race of *clients*, whose name keeps some analogy to its original meaning as long as they have to do with lawyers only, but who sound strange indeed now that their patrons have, through surveyors and house-agents, dwindled down to barbers. Then when a man undergoes the penalty which, by a figure nearer home, is called being sent to Coventry, he is said to be *ostracized*, even tho he be of the class for whom the oyster-shell of Athens was not designed.¹ There is the whole jargon of diplomacy, especially of telegraphic diplomacy. It is indeed a strange tongue which is chosen for those utterances of mysterious wisdom which the electric wire daily flashes to us from continental capitals. There is the good *impression* which is made by such and such a piece of news, the good impression which is made *here*, the impression made in well-

¹ οὐ γὰρ τοιοῦτων οὐνεκ' ὄστρακ' ἠυρέθη.

informed circles, perhaps even in diplomatic circles. Somehow it is always in *circles* that these impressions seem to be made ; and this may perhaps be one reason why the impressions so commonly begin and end in themselves, and have no effect whatever on the fate of the world in general. Then there is the *tension* between this power and that, and the *strained* relations, as if the makers of jargon had for once, by some odd chance, stumbled on a plain English word. Then there are sure to be the expected *difficulties*, and, above all, the *complications*, of which last the diplomatic mind seems so terribly afraid that the fear of them sometimes passes as an excuse for doing nothing at all. Yet one would have thought that human life was largely made up of difficulties and complications, and that, if there were no difficulties, no complications, in the world, as there would be little need for lawyers at home, so there would be little need for diplomatists abroad. Sometimes indeed the stock even of nominal English is used up, and we are told how some power, anxious to preserve its *prestige*, takes to *pourparlers*, and how the *pourparlers* sometimes lead to a *rapprochement*. I might go on with a crowd of other examples of the kind, examples of words used in vague and inaccurate senses, to the great promotion of haziness of the thought, and to the great damage of those who wish to use the words in their strict technical meaning. But there are words the abuse of which has even a more practical effect than any of the others. There are cases where a word is first utterly misused, and then an argument is founded upon its misuse.

We have often heard, for instance, in the political disputes of the last dozen years, a bill before Parliament attacked on the ground that it was a "measure of *confiscation*." Now when a measure is said to be a "measure of confiscation," it seems to be understood that, if it is admitted to be a measure of confiscation, there is an end of all argument. Those who approve of the measure will try to show that it is not a "measure of confiscation;" but they commonly seem to allow that, if it can be proved to be a "measure of confiscation," there is no more to be said for it. I saw a very little time ago an elaborate argument about a certain measure in which the word "confiscation" played the chief part. One side vehemently asserted that the measure was full of con-

fiscation. The other side as vehemently asserted that there was no confiscation in it. But the arguments on both sides took for granted that, if there was confiscation in the measure, the measure was condemned without going a step further. Now I venture to go a step further. What if the defender of the measure had answered: "Yes, it is a measure of confiscation; but what then?" What if he had gone on to say: "Confiscation may be just or unjust, according to circumstances. In this case you think it unjust; I think it just. Instead of using vague names, let us argue the question of its justice or injustice." I believe that, if any one took up this line of argument, a good many, both of the friends and the enemies of the measure, would be a little amazed. Yet the line of argument is perfectly sound. To say that a certain bill is a "measure of confiscation" really proves nothing for or against it. Of course it may happen that the statement is false, that there is no confiscation in the measure. Then, doubtless, the right argument is to show that the measure is not a measure of confiscation. But, on the other hand, it may be that the measure is undoubtedly one of confiscation, but of perfectly righteous confiscation. And then the right argument is to show, not that there is no confiscation, but that the confiscation is righteous.

Let us look at the history of the word. It is a word of Latin origin, but it cannot be called a technical term of the Roman polity or of any other. It describes a process which must take place pretty often in every civilized community, whatever be its form of government. To *confiscate* is to take something from this or that man, and to put it into the *fiscus*, the treasury of the sovereign. This is constantly done by the state and its officers, whenever any fine or forfeiture of any kind takes place. As far as the origin of the word goes, it might be applied to every case of taxation; in every such case the state takes the property of A or B and puts it into the *fiscus*. But in all free countries the taxpayer is held to be paying something which he has, through his representatives, agreed to pay. The tax therefore is not a penalty; it is each man's contribution, as a member of the nation, towards a payment to which the nation has consented. But it seems to be implied in the idea of *confiscation* that it should be the infliction of a penalty, or at least the

enforcement of a payment to which the payer has not consented. Confiscation therefore is always an unpleasant process, a process to which a man submits unwillingly. It is a process which he who submits to it is apt to think unjust, even when its justice is clear to everybody else. And there is no doubt that in many times and places governments have resorted to measures of confiscation which everybody would allow to have been unjust. To take away the property of the subject, like taking away his life or his liberty, is a serious business, and, as a rule, it should not be done, except according to the provisions of a general law. That is to say, confiscation, as a rule, should be the act of the judicial power. There is therefore a strong presumption against bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties. That is to say, if we had seats in a parliament in which such a bill was introduced, we should be *prima facie* inclined to vote against it. But it would be too much to say that no case could possibly arise in which we might be convinced that it was right to vote for it. A bill of confiscation in the strict sense, a bill to confiscate the property of a particular man, a bill like that against Duncombe which is discussed by Lord Macaulay, has a strong presumption against it. But such a measure is clearly within the competency of a legislature whose power knows no bounds but those of physical possibility; and it would be too much to say that it could in no case be just or expedient. Still, in the case of a measure of confiscation in the strict sense, a bill to take away the property of a particular man, there would certainly be a very strong presumption against it; a very heavy *onus probandi* would be laid upon its supporters. But this would simply be because it is commonly better the power of confiscation, like other kindred powers, should not be exercised by the legislature itself, but by judges and magistrates acting according to such rules as the legislature may lay down.

Here then is the true meaning of the word *confiscation*; it is the taking of private property by the state. It is a colorless word, expressing a process which may be just or unjust as may happen. But it is a process which is always unpleasant, and which has often been unjust. As such, it has got an ill name. And, having got an ill name, it has come to be vulgarly applied to all kinds of acts which have nothing to do with confiscation.

Confiscation, the name of an act which can in its very nature be done only by the state or by some officer authorized by the state, has come to be vulgarly used as an equivalent to robbery done by a private person. I am not sure that the name is applied to all kinds of robbery. I am not sure that a burglar would be said to confiscate one's plate. If anybody did say so, it would be with the notion of saying something smart. The word commonly implies some form of robbery which, if it does not put on some shadow of legal form, is at least not done by open violence. I did once hear of a case in which A was said to *confiscate* B's hat; but then A did not take the hat from B's head by main force; he had got hold of it in some other way, and then, on some pretext or other, refused to restore it to its owner. I believe something like this would be generally found to be the way in which the word *confiscation* is commonly used. It is used to mean something nearer akin to swindling than to highway robbery, and specially to such kinds of swindling as are done under some kind of pretext of right. That is to say, some trace of the real meaning of the word still clings to it, even in its vulgar misapplication. But it is misapplied in two ways. First, whereas *confiscation* is necessarily an act of some public authority, it is applied to the acts done by private persons. Secondly, whereas the word is really colorless, implying an act which may be either just or unjust, it is not only always used in a bad sense, but is used as if the bad sense were inherent in the word itself. To apply the word *confiscation* to any act implies condemnation of that act. The word has come to carry a taint with it. That acts of *confiscation*, which, it is to be hoped, are not unjust, are done almost every time that a magistrate sits is not remembered. The word *confiscation* has come, in its vulgar use, to mean something which is much less likely to be the act of the magistrate than the act of the culprit who is brought before him.

Here then comes the unfairness of the way in which the word is used in political discussion. It is brought forward as a decisive argument against a measure that it is a "measure of *confiscation*." Perhaps the name is rightly given; perhaps it is not. In either case the argument is unfair, because it is grounded, not on the real meaning of the word, but on its vulgar abuse.

Those who speak in this way would hardly, if pressed, maintain the abstract proposition that no act of confiscation can ever be justified. Such an argument would simply upset all civil government. But they do not scruple to drag in the word "confiscation" in order to raise an irrelevant prejudice against a certain measure. They first take a colorless word; they misapply it so as to give it a bad sound, so as to make the word carry a taint with it. They then take the word which they have misapplied, and use it in its misapplied sense as an argument against a measure to which it may or may not be applicable in its true sense. When anything is meant by the word "confiscation" beyond the mere love of using a fine word, what is meant is to imply that the measure is a measure of robbery, without directly saying so. *Robbery* is the uglier word; but *confiscation* is the more effectual word; just because *robbery* is a plain word about whose meaning there is no doubt, while *confiscation* is one of the words which are used to conceal thought or lack of thought. Again, no act of the state can in strictness be an act of robbery, while confiscation cannot in strictness be the act of any power except the state. Hence to call a measure a measure of robbery is at once open to the answer that no act of the state can be an act of robbery. But an act of the state may be an act of confiscation; indeed nothing but an act of the state or its officers can be an act of confiscation. And the word, in common use, has come to have so bad a meaning that to apply it to any act is at once to condemn that act. When such a confusion of meanings is afloat, to call a measure a measure of confiscation is far more telling than to call it a measure of robbery. "Confiscation" is a fine word; as used, it is a vague word; it sounds less hard than robbery, while, as used, it is meant to imply almost more. It is a word which in its true sense may be perfectly applicable to the measure in question; but it is used in a false sense, in order to create an unfavorable impression before the real arguments for and against the measure have been heard. The lawyers tell us that no man can take advantage of his own wrong. But those who argue in this way do take advantage of their own wrong. They first abuse a word in a vulgar and misleading way, and then they found an argument on their own abuse of the word.

For a new thing let us by all means have a new name ; do not take and misuse an old name to describe it. If a special name is needed for declaimers in pot-houses, make a name for them ; do not misuse the name *demagogue*, which means quite another kind of people who want their own name for themselves. If a special name is needed for receptions given to illustrious personages, unfortunate noblemen or kings of many kingdoms, make a name for them ; do not misuse the name *ovation*, which means quite another kind of business, and one which needs its own name. Make new words, by all means ; make them, if possible, out of the rich stores of our own tongue ; but make them anyhow, out of any stores, rather than create confusion and misconception by using words which have one distinct meaning in some quite other meaning. Of two unpleasant alternatives, I had rather talk about "sociology" than talk about demagogues declaiming in pot-houses, or say that the Claimant received an ovation. As to most of the words of which I have spoken, I believe that the rule with which I set out is a sound one. Use them as technical terms when you have occasion to use them in their strict original sense. Do not use them simply to sound fine, when the original sense is put quite out of sight. I do not think that so to do needs any great self-denial ; at least I cannot see the temptation to the abuse of words ; I do not see what part of man's mixed nature receives any pleasure by talking about an ovation or an ostracism, when something quite different from an ovation or an ostracism is meant. I do not find the English tongue so poor as to make it needful to talk in any such way. I do not want to hide my thoughts, but to set them forth ; and I find that, for that end, the plain English tongue does thoroughly well. Perhaps my thoughts may not be so deep as those of some of my neighbors ; I certainly do not know about the "unconditioned," nor yet about "metapolitics"—the last new and strange word that I have come across. But such as my thoughts are, I find that, except when I need a strictly technical term, the plain English tongue does for me. I talk of an ovation at Rome and an ostracism at Athens ; I do not talk of them here, because we have no such things. I feel no temptation to call sheriffs' officers Myrmidons any more than to call them Dolopes. And if I ever write a discourse on the Homeric Achilleus, and

have therefore to talk about the Myrmidons, I shall feel a little hampered by the misuse of their name. I believe that nothing is just now doing more mischief to clearness of speech, and thereby to clearness of thought, than the jargon of diplomacy.

Setting aside abstract or technical subjects, where technical terms cannot be got rid of, the one rule, the one test, is, "Spin your yarn in plain English." If a man cannot spin his yarn in plain English, it is for the most part because he has in truth no yarn to spin.

EDWARD A. FREEMAN.

